Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought to expunge records that were created by several federal agencies as part of a surveillance program in 2018–2019, arguing that the collection and retention of these records violated their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek expungement.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the government. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ central argument that the government’s retention of illegally obtained information about them was per se an injury-in-fact. Under Supreme Court precedent, the retention of records alone does not constitute a concrete injury, and Plaintiffs must assert that such retention gives rise to a tangible harm or material risk of future tangible harm or bears a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the government’s retention of records allegedly obtained in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights constituted a concrete and ongoing injury under that framework.   The evidence did not show that the government was using or will use the records to investigate plaintiffs or prevent them from crossing the border or that a third party will obtain the records and use them to Plaintiffs’ detriment. Plaintiffs had not shown that retention of the type of information contained in the records could give rise to a common law tort claim. Finally, plaintiffs failed to explain (or identify supporting authority) why retention of the records was an ongoing violation of their constitutional rights. View "NORA PHILLIPS, ET AL V. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant Living Essentials, LLC, sold its 5-hour Energy drink to the Costco Wholesale Corporation and also to the plaintiff wholesalers, who alleged that Living Essentials offered them less favorable pricing, discounts, and reimbursements in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. On summary judgment, the district court found that the wholesalers had proved the first three elements of their section 2(a) claim for secondary-line price discrimination. At a jury trial on the fourth element of section 2(a), whether there was a competitive injury, the jury found in favor of Defendants. At a bench trial on the wholesalers’ section 2(d) claim for injunctive relief, the court ruled in favor of Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and reversed in part the district court’s judgment after a jury trial and a bench trial in favor of Defendants. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was some factual foundation for instructing the jury that section 2(a) required the wholesalers to show, as part of their prima facie case, that Living Essentials made “reasonably contemporaneous” sales to them and to Costco at different prices. The panel further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the wholesalers had to prove that any difference in prices could not be justified as “functional discounts” to compensate Costco for marketing or promotional functions. The panel concluded that the functional discount doctrine was legally available to Defendants. View "U.S. WHOLESALE OUTLET & DISTR., ET AL V. INNOVATION VENTURES, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California in an action alleging that California Government Code Section 3205 violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting local government employees from soliciting political contributions from their coworkers while state employees are not similarly barred. Plaintiffs Progressive Democrats for Social Justice, a political organization, and Krista Henneman and Carlie Ware, two officers of that organization (collectively “PDSJ”), sued to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3205. Henneman and Ware were deputy public defenders for Santa Clara County who supported Sajid Khan, a fellow county deputy public defender, in his campaign to become district attorney. Henneman and Ware determined that individually soliciting donations from their coworkers would violate Section 3205. They, therefore, did not engage in the solicitations and instead filed this lawsuit challenging Section 3205 as unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that California’s law violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by banning political solicitations among local employees but not among state employees. After filing suit, PDSJ moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of Section 3205, which the district court denied.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California. The panel held that the speculative benefits that Section 3205 may provide the Government were not sufficient to justify the burden on Plaintiffs’ expression. None of the materials before the State at the time of Section 3205’s enactment supported the statute’s distinction between local and state workers. Further, the court explained that Section 3205 did not account for agency size, which undercut the State’s argument that the statute was properly tailored to address the government’s interest, and Section 3205 was underinclusive as a means of limiting the actuality and appearance of partisan behavior by public employees. View "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

After Defendant was indicted for various offenses arising out of the export of semiconductors to the People’s Republic of China, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The district court subsequently entered a judgment of acquittal on one count. The government appealed that acquittal, and Defendant appealed his convictions on the other counts.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal, affirmed Defendant’s other convictions, and remanded. The court explained that The Export Administration Regulations (EARs), administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, impose controls on certain exports to “serve the national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other interests of the United States.” After the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the EARs were continued pursuant to Executive Order 13,222, which declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The panel rejected Shih’s argument that Executive Order 13,222 was an improper invocation of presidential authority. The panel also rejected Defendant’s argument and argued that IEEPA violates the nondelegation doctrine. The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that this term requires post-manufacture, pre-export testing. The panel therefore ordered the reinstatement of the jury verdict on that count. Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to give his proposed jury instruction on the fundamental research exemption. The panel rejected this argument because other instructions given in their entirety cover the defense theory. The panel found no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings because they were well within the district court’s discretion. View "USA V. YI-CHI SHIH" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend, both dressed in “sexy cop” costumes, posed with pedestrians on the Strip and accepted tips in exchange for photos. Defendant police officers, working a plain-clothes Strip enforcement assignment, arrested Plaintiff and her friend for doing business without a license after the officers were asked to pay a tip or delete a photo. The charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dropped. Plaintiff sued various people involved in her arrest, asserting eleven federal and state causes of action. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for injuries suffered during detention and attorney’s fees. The district court granted the Officers’ summary judgment motion and denied Plaintiff’s.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on May 24, 2017; and (2) an amended opinion reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel concluded that the First Amendment protections accorded to Plaintiff’s own activities did not lapse because of what her friend said or did without Plaintiff’s direct participation. There was no evidence at all, for example, of a prior agreement between the women to require a quid-pro-quo payment for posing in photos, nor of a demonstrated pattern of demanding quid-pro-quo payments during performances together. The panel held that the district court erred by deciding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff despite the First Amendment protections afforded to her expressive association. View "MICHELE SANTOPIETRO V. CLAYBORN HOWELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the “City”) brought an action against Plaintiffs for abatement, unfair competition, and public nuisance regarding their ownership of a motel. Plaintiffs appealed from the district court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) seized $98,000 from Plaintiffs pursuant to a state court judgment, Plaintiffs brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging that the failure to provide pre-seizure notice violated their constitutional rights.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing. The panel concluded that the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of procedural due process. The panel considered the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), factors. First, the competing interests strongly weighed against a conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights were violated. The City as creditor had a clear interest in collecting the money judgment because it prevailed before the California trial court and on appeal, and Plaintiffs did not allege that the funds were exempt or were needed for subsistence. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation under California’s procedures was small because the procedures required the clerk of the court only to transcribe the amount of the money judgment and take account of statutory defenses like the exemptions asserted by a judgment debtor. Finally, given the small risk of erroneous deprivation, the value of the substitute procedure proposed by Plaintiffs did not outweigh the strong interests of the City. View "NANUBHAI PATEL, ET AL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2018, Plaintiff filed a federal Terry action against the City of Pasadena and several of its police officers seeking to recover for the death of Reginald Thomas, a father figure to Plaintiff. The Terry action, which included a section 1983 claim, was dismissed with prejudice for lack of Article III standing in 2019. Plaintiff then filed a nearly identical lawsuit in California state court, which the Defendants removed to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss based on issue preclusion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 action brought against Defendants. The panel held that a plain reading of the first district court’s judgment established that Article III standing was actually litigated and decided, although erroneously. However, erroneous, unappealed judgments are still owed preclusive effect. The panel concluded that issue preclusion was available, and Plaintiff was bound by the prior standing determination. While issue preclusion was available, the panel held that the Defendants waived issue preclusion by removing the refiled case to federal court because a removing defendant voluntarily invokes and acquiesces to the federal courts and bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and Article III standing. Accordingly, the panel vacated and remanded to the second and current district court to determine, in the first instance, whether jurisdiction lies in the federal courts and whether Plaintiff adequately stated a claim if the Defendants pursue such an argument on remand. View "SHANE LOVE V. AARON VILLACANA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) at their home during the Deputies’ investigation into allegations that Plaintiffs’ son planned a shooting at his school that day. During the interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twistlock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in handcuffs. The district court held that the Deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining Plaintiffs even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during Plaintiffs’ detention and, even if they had, qualified immunity applied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Deputies in Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 action. The panel first considered whether the initial seizure of Plaintiffs was reasonable. Because Plaintiffs were detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. The panel held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and question Plaintiffs about Ryan’s location due primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school shooting. Further, on balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’ use of force against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances. The panel concluded that the district court erred in finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too great in the context of detaining a non-suspect witness. View "WILLIAM BERNAL, ET AL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The district court applied a “career-offender enhancement” to the sentence on the drug offense, which the Sentencing Guidelines recommend if, among other things, “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Over the next decade, intervening case law disqualified three of Defendant’s prior convictions as predicates for the career-offender enhancement. Defendant moved for sentence reduction in 2021. Although the district court concluded that Defendant’s Guideline range would be reduced to 140 to 175 months if he were sentenced at the time of his motion, it denied relief.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial and remanded for the district court to consider the motion anew. The panel held that district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in post-sentencing decisional law affecting the applicable Sentencing Guidelines when assessing whether a defendant has established the requisite “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The panel wrote that the logic of United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022), which rested on Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) applies with full force when the relevant change in sentencing law is decisional. The panel wrote that considering decisional law in the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons inquiry does not circumvent habeas, as Defendant does not claim that his original sentence violated the Constitution or federal law and does not seek to correct sentencing errors. View "USA V. JERRAMEY ROPER" on Justia Law