Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that he faced harassment, retaliation, and physical harm. Relevant here, he alleged that prison officer Lieutenant Carmen Herrera repeatedly threatened him, denied him law library access, and assaulted him several times, causing a broken arm and wrist. Plaintiff also alleged that physician’s assistant Jose Esquetini refused to treat his broken bones or take x-rays for six weeks to cover up Herrera’s assaults. Chambers asserts that he was then assaulted by Officer Enrique Velez, who allegedly sprayed him in the mouth and face with mace.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. Affirming the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim, the panel agreed with Plaintiff that the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule explicitly disavowed any Bivens claims based on First Amendment retaliation. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim failed to state a claim under Egbert. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim similarly failed under Bivens, but dismissal of that claim should be with prejudice because even plausible allegations could not constitute a Bivens claim for excessive force under Egbert, and amendment would be futile. The panel determined that it was unclear whether the Bivens claim was viable because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts about his injuries, examination, or treatment. View "ROSCOE CHAMBERS V. C. HERRERA, ET AL" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to a single count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), Defendant argued at his sentencing that the district court should not consider certain prior convictions in determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. According to Defendant, subsequent case authority made clear that the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions constitutionally invalid. Defendant argued that the district court should not consider his prior 2004 federal convictions in determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because the subsequent authority in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), made clear that the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions constitutionally invalid.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, under Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), neither the Constitution nor any federal statute granted Sadler a right to collaterally challenge the validity of his 2004 convictions in connection with their use in enhancing his sentence in this Section 922(g) prosecution. The panel also held that the Guidelines’ provisions and commentary did not create any such right. Defendant argued that the commentary accompanying Guidelines Section 2K2.1 requires that any conviction that is disregarded for criminal history purposes must also be disregarded in applying Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhanced base offense level for a felon-in-possession offense that follows a conviction for a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime. View "USA V. JASON SADLER" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the robbery of two jewelry stores in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(a). For his crimes, he was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment, including a mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a “crime of violence.” On appeal, Defendant argued that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and, therefore, cannot serve as a predicate for his Section 924(c) conviction and mandatory minimum sentence.   The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court explained that under the “elements clause” of Section 924(c), the phrase “crime of violence” is defined as “an offense that is a felony and . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The phrase “physical force” means violent force or force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. The panel applied the “categorical approach,” asking whether the federal felony at issue always requires the government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. The panel held that under United States v. Dominguez, completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c). The panel concluded that, even if it were not bound by Dominguez II, it would still find that Dominguez I’s analysis of the completed Hobbs Act robbery was not clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. View "USA V. LEON ECKFORD" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of leave to amend his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that neither witness tampering by attempting to kill a witness nor witness tampering by use of force is a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the panel held that Section 1512, as a whole, is not categorically a crime of violence because it criminalizes conduct that does not necessarily require physical force. The panel then applied the modified categorical approach because Section 1512 contains several, alternative elements of functionally separate crimes that carry different penalties, and the statute therefore is “divisible.” The panel held that Dorsey was convicted under a divisible part of the witness-tampering statute that qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause: either attempted killing in violation of Section 1512(a)(1) or use of force in violation of 1512(a)(2). The panel also held that the use of physical force in violation of Section 1512(a)(2) is a categorical match with Section 924(c)’s elements clause because it requires proving that the defendant intentionally used physical force against another. View "DEVAUGHN DORSEY V. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Syrian national, appealed his conviction after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted U.S. military personnel and property in Iraq. The jury delivered a mixed verdict on the six-count indictment. It convicted Defendant for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction (Count One), conspiring to damage U.S. government property (Count Two), and conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same (Counts Three and Four). The jury acquitted Defendant of conspiring to murder Americans (Count Five) and providing material support to terrorists (Count Six).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the conviction. Reversing in part, the panel agreed with the parties that Defendant’s convictions on Counts Three and Four, for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same, could not stand after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). On those counts, the panel remanded with direction to the district court to vacate the convictions. The panel affirmed Defendant’s convictions on Counts One and Two for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage U.S. Government property by means of an explosive. As to Count Two, the panel held that 18 U.S.C. Section 844(f) and (n) applied to Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct. The panel held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes as well as to civil statutes. View "USA V. AHMED ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of various offenses stemming from an eight-person conspiracy to fraudulently obtain and launder millions of dollars in federal Covid-relief funds that were intended to assist businesses impacted by the pandemic. On appeal, Defendants challenged their restitution obligations on both legal and factual grounds.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendants’ restitution obligations, except that the court vacated and remanded for one Defendant’s judgment and commitment order to be amended to specify that, as all parties agree, his restitution obligation runs jointly and severally with those of his trial co-defendants. The panel held that, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), the district court properly imposed restitution in the full amount of the loss caused by the conspiracy instead of just the loss caused by the fraudulent loan applications Defendants personally played a role in submitting. In separately filed memorandum dispositions, the panel affirmed Defendants’ jury convictions, affirmed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to one defendant, and vacated and remanded for that defendant’s resentencing. View "USA V. ARTUR AYVAZYAN" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

In Hawaii, it is a misdemeanor knowingly to manufacture, sell, transfer, transport, or possess a butterfly knife—no exceptions. Plaintiffs sued Hawaii’s Attorney General and Sheriff Division Administrator (“Hawaii”). Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief to establish that section 134-53(a) violates the Second Amendment and injunctive relief against its enforcement. Plaintiffs alleged that, “but for Hawaii law,” they would purchase butterfly knives. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that section 134-53(a) does not violate the Second Amendment, granted Hawaii’s motion, and entered judgment in its favor.   The Ninth Circuit reversed district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hawaii officials. The court held that because the possession of butterfly knives is conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment, and because Hawaii has not demonstrated that its ban on butterfly knives is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms, the court concluded that section 134-53(a) violates Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The panel determined that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Section 134-53(a) because they alleged that the Second Amendment provides them with a legally protected interest to purchase butterfly knives, and for section 134-53(a), they would do so within Hawaii. Plaintiffs further articulated a concrete plan to violate the law, and Hawaii’s history of prosecution under its butterfly ban was good evidence of a credible threat of enforcement. The panel held that possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The panel held that Hawaii failed to prove that section 134-53(a) was consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating weapons. View "ANDREW TETER, ET AL V. ANNE E. LOPEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Following a federal trial, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decisions to (1) instruct the jury that a Section 1983 claim could not be grounded in a Miranda violation alone and (2) exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s coerced confessions expert. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the Miranda issue, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. On remand, Plaintiff concedes that his Miranda claim is no longer viable but maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on his Fifth Amendment coercion claim because the district court improperly excluded his expert witness.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants and remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim that his confession was coerced. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness’s testimony on coerced confessions because the testimony was relevant, false confessions are an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s confession went to the heart of his case. View "TERENCE TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law