Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A juvenile male appealed the district court's determination that he was an "Indian" under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided federal criminal jurisdiction for certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The juvenile claimed that he did not identify as an Indian, and was not socially recognized as Indian by other tribal members. Nonetheless, he was an enrolled tribal member, had received tribal assistance, and had used his membership to obtain tribal benefits. Therefore, because the juvenile was Indian by blood and easily met three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, the court held that he was an "Indian" under section 1153 and upheld his conviction.

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California.

Plaintiff, a former inmate in the ODOC, sued several ODOC officials in their official capacity, alleging, among other things, that they were substantially burdening plaintiff's practice of his Native American religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc to 2000cc-5. At issue was what relief was available to plaintiff. The court concluded that money damages were not available under RLUIPA against state officials sued in their official capacity. Because the ODOC had released plaintiff from its custody, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from enforcing its limitation on contributions to political committees supporting the recall of a state or county official. The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to demonstrate that the contribution limit was likely an unconstitutional and harmful burden on plaintiffs' rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the injunction and the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was arrested during a DEA "buy bust" operation and subsequently convicted of possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that even if the trial court's failure to administer oaths to a government informant's interpreters was plain error, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err in admitting the nontestifying agents' statements and there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Because defendant had not identified any other error, there was no cumulative error wanting reversal.

This case concerned the Washington State Grange's proposed People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872. I-872 created a "top two" primary in which the primary served as a means of winnowing the candidates to two rather than selecting party nominees. At issue was whether the State of Washington had designed its election ballots in a manner that eliminated the risk of widespread voter confusion, a question left unresolved in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. The court held that the state had done so. The ballots, and related informational material, informed voters that, although each candidate for partisan office could specify a political party that he or she preferred, a candidate's preference did not imply that the candidate was nominated or endorsed by the party, or that the party approved of or associated with that candidate. Given the design of the ballot, and in the absence of evidence of actual voter confusion, the court held that Washington's top primary system, as implemented by the state, did not violate the First Amendment associational rights of the state's political parties. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ballot access and trademark claims. The court reversed the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees paid in accordance with a 2006 stipulation.

Defendant, a citizen of Macau, engaged in efforts to import protected defense articles from the United States into China, without the licenses required by law. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial on four counts of conspiracy and attempt to export defense articles without a license, money laundering, and conspiracy and attempt to smuggle goods from the United States. Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that venue was proper in the Southern District of California; disagreed with defendant that the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, violated the nondelegation principle; concluded that defendant's conviction on count three must be vacated as a matter of law because attempting to cause an export of a defense article was not a federal crime; defendant's conviction on count four must also be vacated for lack of jurisdiction; and because the district court should have allowed defendant to present evidence of duress to the jury, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on counts one and two. The court did not reach defendant's arguments regarding his sentence.

After her first termination from the City of Pasadena Police Department and subsequent reinstatement, plaintiff brought a lawsuit in state court claiming that she had been discriminated against and harassed by the City due to its perception that she had a disability. After her second termination, she reinstated her discrimination and harassment claims in an administrative proceeding, where she also argued that the termination was retaliatory. Both of plaintiff's actions resulted in a decision in favor of the City. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims in federal court based on the same theories in state proceedings. The court held that California principles of issue preclusion prevented the court from reaching these issues.

Plaintiff sued the Corps for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., by failing to interview him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. The court found that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' failure to interview and promote him. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps was reversed.

This case concerned a class action by civilly committed persons confined at Atascadero State Hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order denying defendants qualified immunity. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari, vacated the court's judgment, and remanded for reconsideration. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims for money damages. The conclusory allegations in plaintiffs' second amended complaint were insufficient to establish defendants' individual liability for money damages. On remand, plaintiffs could proceed with their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.