Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated based on the admission of his confession. The court held that the district court did not err in upholding the California Court of Appeal's determination that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that petitioner's will was not overcome and that his confessions to one detective and subsequently to two others were voluntary. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner filed a motion for a stay of execution pending the United States Supreme Court decision in Martinez v. Ryan. Petitioner sought a stay of his impending execution, leave to file successive petitions for habeas corpus relief in his capital cases under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), and appointment of new counsel to represent him in pursuing those petitions. The court granted petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court denied petitioner's motion for a stay of execution where he did not meet his burden of establishing that he was likely to succeed on the merits and he offered no legitimate reason for bringing this motion at the 11th hour. The court concluded that petitioner's reliance on what the Supreme Court's holding in Martinez might be was speculative. The court held that, to the extent petitioner's related requests for new counsel to be appointed and for leave to file a successive habeas corpus petition were properly before the court, those requests were denied.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his emergency motion for preliminary injunction or stay of execution. The district court held that the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) had provided appropriate safeguards to ensure that there was not a substantial risk of serious harm to petitioner in the form of severe pain during the administration of the drugs used in Idaho's three-drug lethal injection protocol; that the safeguards were substantially similar to those contained in execution protocols approved by the Supreme Court and by this court; that the IDOC was not required to implement a different, one-drug protocol in this execution; that petitioner would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; that the equities of the case did not require a different result; and that the public interest favored denial of the request for a stay of the execution. The court concluded that petitioner had not shown that he was entitled to injunctive relief on the merits of his claims and, because he had not shown that he was likely to succeed on the merits, the court need not and did not consider the district court's remaining conclusions. Accordingly, the emergency motion was denied.

Plaintiff sued defendants, employees of the State of Washington's State Operated Living Alternative (SOLA) program, on behalf of herself and her daughter's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her daughter of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe physical conditions while in involuntary state custody. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that defendants had no constitutionally required duty of care towards plaintiff's daughter because there was no special relationship between her daughter and the state and there was no state-created danger. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and requested that the district court recommend a southern California housing designation to the Bureau of Prisons. At the sentencing hearing, neither the district court nor counsel addressed this request. Defendant and the government subsequently filed a joint stipulation asking the court to revise the Judgment and Commitment Order to include the designation recommendation. The district court denied the request. Defendant appealed, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and/or 18 U.S.C. 3742. The court held that because it lacked jurisdiction to review a district court's non-binding housing recommendation, the appeal was dismissed.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, county officers and the county, alleging a state law wrongful death claim and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment when her 18-year-old son was shot and killed in his driveway by the officers. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants after concluding there was no constitutional violation. The court held that there were material questions of fact about plaintiff's son's and the officers' actions that precluded a conclusion that the officers' rapid resort to deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. The court concluded that resolution of these issues was critical to a proper determination of the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the use of lethal force. The court also reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether plaintiff's state law wrongful death claim could properly be resolved on summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, four citizens of Iran who came to the United States at various times due to their long-standing opposition to that nation's theocratic regime, sued defendants, raising a number of claims including unlawful detention, inhumane conditions, witness intimidation, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court declined to extend Bivens to allow plaintiffs to sue federal agents for wrongful detention pending deportation given the extensively remedial procedures available to and invoked by them and the unique foreign policy considerations implicated in the immigration context. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument regarding the dismissal of their claim against one agent for witness intimidation and against two agents for conspiracy to intimidate a witness because plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced by any alleged wrongdoing. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, because the decision to detain an alien pending resolution of immigration proceedings was explicitly committed to the discretion of the Attorney General and implicated issues of foreign policy, falling within an exception to the FTCA. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint where plaintiffs' woes were not caused by insufficient allegations of factual content and no potential amendments would change the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from the district court's order finding him in violation of his conditions of supervised release based upon his use of marijuana. Defendant asserted that because he had a recommendation from a physician to use marijuana in California pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, he did not violate the possession prohibition of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and adopted that court's reasoning, with one addition. Whatever else "order" might mean under section 844(a) of the Controlled Substances Act, it did not include a mere recommendation from a physician pursuant to the Compassionate Use Act.

Defendant appealed his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine. On appeal, defendant asserted that the last statement made by the prosecution in its closing rebuttal argument rendered the trial unfair and that the district court erred in denying his request for closing surrebuttal on his duress defense. The court held that the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks were improper and prejudicial where the prosecutor suggested that defendant's acquittal would encourage future lawbreaking. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial.

Defendant, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, arguing that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of attempted aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that its review of the evidence convinced the court that the prosecution presented evidence of specific intent to kill, as that element had been defined by Oregon state law and interpreted by the state appellate court. Accordingly, the state court's determination that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to support his conviction was an objectively reasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia.