Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine. On appeal, defendant asserted that the last statement made by the prosecution in its closing rebuttal argument rendered the trial unfair and that the district court erred in denying his request for closing surrebuttal on his duress defense. The court held that the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks were improper and prejudicial where the prosecutor suggested that defendant's acquittal would encourage future lawbreaking. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial.

Defendant, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, arguing that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of attempted aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that its review of the evidence convinced the court that the prosecution presented evidence of specific intent to kill, as that element had been defined by Oregon state law and interpreted by the state appellate court. Accordingly, the state court's determination that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to support his conviction was an objectively reasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia.

Defendants, David Ray Newman and Jon Tedesco, committed crimes that subject them to criminal forfeiture: Newman robbed two banks, and Tedesco conspired to defraud banks. Defendants each pleaded guilty and agreed to forfeit a specific amount of money. The district court nevertheless eliminated criminal forfeiture or reduced it to a trivial amount. The government timely appealed. Because the district court's reasoning in the two cases was substantially similar, the court issued a joint opinion. The court vacated and remanded with instructions. In Newman's case, the district court should enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $5,102. In Tedesco's case, the district court should either enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $1 million or, if there was a reason to doubt the accuracy of that agreed amount, follow the procedure described and enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment in the amount of the "proceeds" of Tedesco's crime, not to exceed $1 million.

Defendant plead guilty to possession of child pornography. At issue on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A) required an individual to personally produce the sexually explicit visual depictions of minors that he advertised for distribution. The court held that the plain language of the statute did not contain a personal production requirement, and nothing in the tense of the wording evidenced a congressional intent to insert such an element. Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

This case arose from a deadly use of force lawsuit filed by decedent's family against defendants. The district court issued an in limine order precluding defendants from arguing that decedent was armed when he was shot. In his summation, defense counsel argued that the police sergeant who shot decedent thought decedent failed to surrender because he had shot a man just moments earlier. Plaintiffs' counsel objected, apparently based on the in limine order and the court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore defense counsel's statement. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for sanctions against defense counsel for his statements. The district court granted the motion and sanctioned defendants. Defendants appealed. The court reversed the district court's order imposing sanctions. On remand, the district court could, if it chose, hold further proceedings, consistent with the court's opinion, to determine whether any sanction was warranted for defense counsel's conceded violation.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. At issue was whether the California trial court's use of California Jury Instruction, Criminal (CALJIC) No. 2.50.01 violated petitioner's constitutional right to due process by allowing the jury to find him guilty of charged offenses based only on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that because the decision of the California Court of Appeals to reject petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was not contrary to clearly established federal law, the court affirmed.

Over the course of more than 30 years, petitioner was convicted of crimes involving deviant sexual acts with children. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and postconviction procedures, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition on February 7, 2008. The district court denied his habeas petition and petitioner appealed. During the course of the proceedings, California adopted Proposition 83, which changed the commitment term for sexually violent predators from renewable two-year periods to an indeterminate period. On appeal, petitioner contended that his federal due process rights were violated because he was held under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Cal. Welf. & Ins. Code 6600-6609.3. The court held that because the only relief petitioner sought was release from custody, and because petitioner was not in civil commitment for an indeterminate term based on a proceeding that was legitimately commenced and the result of which was not challenged in this appeal, the appeal was moot.

Respondent appealed the district court's order granting petitioner a conditional writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the petition was timely; even assuming the petition was deemed timely, whether there was error in the state court's jury instructions; and whether the district court erred by not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground that retroactive application of California Evidence Code 1109 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court agreed with the district court that petitioner did not relent in his efforts and that he was entitled to equitable tolling for his diligence in the face of his counsel's deceit and therefore addressed the merits of the petition. The court held that the instructions directed the jury to consider evidence of petitioner's prior unadjudicated acts of domestic violence, most of which were wholly unrelated to the crimes with which he was charged, to convict him, among other things, of first-degree murder. This was error under Sullivan v. Louisiana and Gibson v. Ortiz and the court affirmed the district court's issuance of a conditional writ. The court also held that the use of certain evidence of domestic violence at Doe's trial did not contravene the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

This case arose when defendant was accused of drunk driving on the Kitsap Naval Base in Bremerton, Washington. At issue was whether the Government violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prosecuting and convicting defendant for a crime after the Navy punished him for the same offense. The Government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated because the non-judicial punishment administered by the Navy under 10 U.S.C. 815 was not criminal in nature. The court agreed and held that the Government's prosecution of defendant was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was affirmed.

This case centered around the political corruption of former California Congressman Randall "Duke" Cunningham, who provided lucrative government defense contracts to defendant and others in exchange for expensive meals, lavish trips, a houseboat in Washington D.C., and mortgage payments for his multi-million dollar home. Defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of conspiracy, honest services wire fraud, bribery, and money laundering. The court held that, under its holding in United States v. Straub, the district court's determination that it was not authorized to compel use immunity for a defense witness absent a finding of prosecutorial misconduct was erroneous. Because the district court concluded that the proffered testimony would "counter" the testimony presented by the prosecution through immunized government witnesses, and the government did not challenge that finding as clearly erroneous, the court remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether compelled use immunity regarding the proposed testimony was constitutionally required. The court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction in all other respects.