Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are Guam-licensed OBGYN physicians in Hawaii who wish to provide abortion services to Guam patients through telemedicine. They point out that women in Guam seeking abortions must obtain chemical abortifacients via telemedicine, given the current lack of doctors who perform abortions in Guam. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Guam’s in-person informed-consent law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying rational basis review, the panel concluded that the in-person informed consent requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause because it furthers Guam’s legitimate governmental interests in preservation of potential life, protection of maternal health, and promotion of the integrity of the medical profession. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge under the Due Process Clause, in which plaintiffs argued that the in-person consultation requirement undermines informed consent because of the possibility that non-medical personnel may provide the required medical disclosures. The panel held that the requirement does not undermine informed consent because it does not mandate that a non-medical professional provide the in-person medical disclosures, nor does it prevent the treating telemedicine doctor from providing medical information to the patient; it merely requires that patients receive certain information in person before receiving an abortion. Finally, the panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Guam’s in-person informed-consent law violates their equal protection rights because it irrationally treats physicians who provide abortions differently than similarly situated telemedicine providers. The panel held that Guam can require an in-person consultation for abortions because the in-person requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of safeguarding fetal life. View "SHANDHINI RAIDOO, ET AL V. DOUGLAS B. MOYLAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of attempting to commit racially motivated violence. On appeal, Defendant argued that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court held his trial in violation of the public trial right under United States v. Allen, 34 F.4th 789 (9th Cir. 2022). Defendant also contended that his prosecution was unconstitutional because 18 U.S.C. Section 249(a)(1) exceeds Congress’ authority under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Defendant forfeited his claim, that plain error review applies, and that the balance of costs in this case counsels against reversal. Applying the deferential test set forth in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the panel wrote that the rationality of concluding that violence (or attempted violence) perpetrated against victims on account of the victims’ race is a badge or incident of slavery is well established. The panel rejected Defendant’s contention that Section 249(a)(1) is subject to heightened scrutiny apart from the Jones test. View "USA V. OLE HOUGEN" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the BIA, the panel held that the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the BIA comports with Article II of the Constitution. The panel rejected Petitioner’s suggestion that Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their appointment in the Attorney General. The panel next held that the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II, which requires that officers remain accountable to the President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates. The panel explained that the Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration Judges and BIA members and that nothing restricts the Attorney General’s ability to remove them at will. Thus, these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for their positions—and by extension, on the President. View "FORTUNATO AMADOR DUENAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants L.A. Central Plaza LLC and Central Liquor & Market, Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the merits, the district court instead sua sponte dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff’s amended complaint had failed adequately to plead the elements of Article III standing. Plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal.   The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. The panel held that because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to prove his case as to standing, the district court had discretion in resolving Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, to also consider sua sponte whether to grant summary judgment against Jones on the issue of standing. The panel held, however, that when presented with the issue of standing in the context of Plaintiff’s fully briefed summary judgment motion, the district court could not ignore the factual evidence of standing presented at summary judgment and instead sua sponte examine the adequacy of the complaint’s allegations of standing. View "GEORGE JONES V. L.A. CENTRAL PLAZA, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was dismissed for lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court considered and granted Malibu Road and Bungalow Lighting’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision. Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of his ADA claim for lack of standing, but he appeals the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that his lawsuit was not frivolous. However, the issue before the court was not whether Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and therefore justified an award of fees, but rather whether there is a basis to award attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision after the underlying claim has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated. The panel held that because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, it lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 View "ANTONIO FERNANDEZ V. 23676-23726 MALIBU ROAD, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2006, a Nevada jury convicted Leeds of first-degree murder. Although Petitioner resided at the house where the murder occurred, the prosecution presented a felony-murder theory at trial, alleging that Petitioner committed the murder during the course of a burglary because he entered the home’s garage as he struggled with the victim. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to argue that a person cannot burglarize his own home. The jury’s general verdict form did not specify whether the jury relied on the felony-murder theory or the State’s alternative theory of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder to convict Petitioner of first-degree murder. Petitioner later sought state habeas relief, but his postconviction counsel failed to allege in the petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner could not burglarize his own home. The claim was, therefore, procedurally defaulted under Nevada law. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which the court ultimately granted. The State of Nevada appealed the grant of Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Petitioner established a basis to excuse the procedural default of his claim because (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel IAC claim is substantial and therefore satisfies Martinez’s prejudice requirement; and (2) Petitioner’s postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland, meeting the Martinez cause requirement. The panel held that Petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits because (1) the trial counsel’s failure to raise the objectively important burglary argument constituted deficient performance, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "ROBERT LEEDS V. PERRY RUSSELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action in May 2018, alleging federal claims under Section 1981 and Section 1983 and state law claims against a building inspector Troy Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, and other defendants. Only Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Seguirant is at issue in this appeal; the district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Seguirant with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity on a claim under Section 1981, and remanding, the en banc court held that Section 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action against state actors. Joining other circuits and overruling Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), the en banc court held that Section 1981, as amended in 1991, establishes substantive rights that a state actor may violate but does not itself contain a remedy against a state actor for such violations. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by Section 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The en banc court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead his Section 1981 claim as a Section 1983 claim. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to expunge records that were created by several federal agencies as part of a surveillance program in 2018–2019, arguing that the collection and retention of these records violated their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek expungement.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the government. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ central argument that the government’s retention of illegally obtained information about them was per se an injury-in-fact. Under Supreme Court precedent, the retention of records alone does not constitute a concrete injury, and Plaintiffs must assert that such retention gives rise to a tangible harm or material risk of future tangible harm or bears a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the government’s retention of records allegedly obtained in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights constituted a concrete and ongoing injury under that framework.   The evidence did not show that the government was using or will use the records to investigate plaintiffs or prevent them from crossing the border or that a third party will obtain the records and use them to Plaintiffs’ detriment. Plaintiffs had not shown that retention of the type of information contained in the records could give rise to a common law tort claim. Finally, plaintiffs failed to explain (or identify supporting authority) why retention of the records was an ongoing violation of their constitutional rights. View "NORA PHILLIPS, ET AL V. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant Living Essentials, LLC, sold its 5-hour Energy drink to the Costco Wholesale Corporation and also to the plaintiff wholesalers, who alleged that Living Essentials offered them less favorable pricing, discounts, and reimbursements in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. On summary judgment, the district court found that the wholesalers had proved the first three elements of their section 2(a) claim for secondary-line price discrimination. At a jury trial on the fourth element of section 2(a), whether there was a competitive injury, the jury found in favor of Defendants. At a bench trial on the wholesalers’ section 2(d) claim for injunctive relief, the court ruled in favor of Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and reversed in part the district court’s judgment after a jury trial and a bench trial in favor of Defendants. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was some factual foundation for instructing the jury that section 2(a) required the wholesalers to show, as part of their prima facie case, that Living Essentials made “reasonably contemporaneous” sales to them and to Costco at different prices. The panel further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the wholesalers had to prove that any difference in prices could not be justified as “functional discounts” to compensate Costco for marketing or promotional functions. The panel concluded that the functional discount doctrine was legally available to Defendants. View "U.S. WHOLESALE OUTLET & DISTR., ET AL V. INNOVATION VENTURES, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California in an action alleging that California Government Code Section 3205 violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting local government employees from soliciting political contributions from their coworkers while state employees are not similarly barred. Plaintiffs Progressive Democrats for Social Justice, a political organization, and Krista Henneman and Carlie Ware, two officers of that organization (collectively “PDSJ”), sued to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3205. Henneman and Ware were deputy public defenders for Santa Clara County who supported Sajid Khan, a fellow county deputy public defender, in his campaign to become district attorney. Henneman and Ware determined that individually soliciting donations from their coworkers would violate Section 3205. They, therefore, did not engage in the solicitations and instead filed this lawsuit challenging Section 3205 as unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that California’s law violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by banning political solicitations among local employees but not among state employees. After filing suit, PDSJ moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of Section 3205, which the district court denied.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California. The panel held that the speculative benefits that Section 3205 may provide the Government were not sufficient to justify the burden on Plaintiffs’ expression. None of the materials before the State at the time of Section 3205’s enactment supported the statute’s distinction between local and state workers. Further, the court explained that Section 3205 did not account for agency size, which undercut the State’s argument that the statute was properly tailored to address the government’s interest, and Section 3205 was underinclusive as a means of limiting the actuality and appearance of partisan behavior by public employees. View "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law