Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the district court’s sentencing order, which imposed a heightened base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing on an open record. The court explained Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) applies if the offense involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” Application Note 2 to Section 2K2.1 defines such a firearm as one: that has the ability to fire many rounds without reloading because, at the time of the offense (A), the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. Because the parties assumed that Application Note 2 applies, the panel deemed waived any arguments concerning whether Application Note 2 is inconsistent with the Guideline or whether Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) is ambiguous so as to defeat resort to Application Note 2. Because these issues were waived, the panel applied Application Note 2 for the purposes of this appeal.   The panel held that the district court clearly erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant’s magazine could accept more than 15 rounds, where the government did not physically produce or inspect the firearm or the magazine, and, without physical evidence, the government largely relied on its expert agent, who was, at most, equivocal. View "USA V. FRANCISCO LUCAS, JR." on Justia Law

After a grand jury indicted Defendant, he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to three counts of cocaine distribution and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At sentencing, the district court concluded that the two-level Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applied but found—albeit deeming it a “close call”—that Defendant was entitled to safety valve relief under Section 2D1.1(b)(18). It also found that Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was well-supported by a historical tradition of Second Amendment regulation and rejected Defendant’s constitutional objection. Calculating a total offense level of 15, the court sentenced Defendant to a below-Guidelines term of 15 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) under Bruen.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Applying the two-part test adopted by Bruen, the panel assumed, without deciding, that step one is met—when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. At step two, however, the panel found Section 2D1.1(b)(1) constitutional because it clearly comports with a history and tradition of regulating the possession of firearms during the commission of felonies involving a risk of violence. View "USA V. MIGUEL ALANIZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that when he was a first-year student-athlete at the University of Arizona, his teammates subjected him to frequent “sexual and homophobic bullying” because they perceived him to be gay. He claims that the Arizona Board of Regents and the University of Arizona (“University Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to his claims of sexual harassment and that they retaliated against him in violation of Title IX. He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two of his coaches (collectively, “Defendant Coaches”). Finally, he sought punitive damages against the Defendant Coaches. The district court dismissed the action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. The panel held that Title IX bars sexual harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. The panel held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex-based discrimination under Title IX. The panel held that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the first, third, and fourth elements of his Title IX harassment claim, but the operative complaint failed to allege a deprivation of educational opportunity. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the harassment claim, vacated the portion of the district court’s order denying leave to amend, and remanded for the district court to consider Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint again, should he renew that request before the district court. The panel held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged that Plaintiff suffered harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and that Defendants retaliated against him when they failed to investigate his accusations adequately. View "MICHAEL GRABOWSKI V. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The State of Nevada sentenced Petitioner to die for brutally raping and murdering a 16-year-old in 1979. Petitioner pled not guilty by reason of insanity but was convicted by the jury after a trial in the District Court for White Pine County in Ely, Nevada. Petitioner argued that he is intellectually disabled and, therefore cannot constitutionally be executed under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Nevada trial court found he was not intellectually disabled, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which is subject to the restrictions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that he is not intellectually disabled is unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably found that a 1981 IQ test was of “little value”. The panel wrote that first, the Nevada Supreme Court explicitly rejected Petitioner’s argument that the trial court had erred in crediting the 1981 IQ test over another expert’s testing. The second reason was that the record as a whole portrays Petitioner as a person who does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court said that it “need not decide the relevance, if any, of” the Flynn Effect, which causes average IQ test scores to inflate over time, “and the necessity of adjusting the 1981 IQ score” because that test occurred well after Petitioner turned 18. View "ROBERT YBARRA, JR. V. WILLIAM GITTERE" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, federal prisoners (collectively “Petitioners”) challenged the dismissals of their habeas corpus petitions in which they asserted that their incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Eighth Amendment and sought release from custody. The district court dismissed the petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Petitioners were challenging conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of confinement, and thus their claims did not properly sound in habeas.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. Given Petitioner’s transfer from USP Victorville prior to the court’s review of her habeas petition, the panel addressed its jurisdiction. The petition sought relief in the form of release from USP Victorville and an injunction requiring that facility to protect USP Victorville inmates from COVID-19. Because the panel could no longer provide Petitioner’s requested relief, the panel held that she fails to present a live case or controversy, and Article III, therefore, prohibits jurisdiction over her petition.   The panel explained that Hernandez did not instruct federal prisoners to bring claims related to the conditions of their confinement under Section 2241; rather, Hernandez states that challenges to “conditions of a sentence’s execution” may properly be brought under Section 2241. The panel concluded the district court was not required to convert Petitioners’ habeas petitions into civil rights actions and declined the invitation to remand to the district court to perform this conversion in the first instance. View "JEREMY PINSON V. MICHAEL CARVAJAL" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after two officers discovered a handgun concealed in his vehicle. At the time of this encounter, Defendant was a registered gang member on California state parole and was subject to a suspicionless search condition that has been upheld by the Supreme Court. After entering a plea of guilty and preserving his right to appeal, Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers did not have advance knowledge that he was on parole at the time of this encounter.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Consistent with case law and with general Fourth Amendment principles, the officer must possess advance knowledge of an applicable parole condition before they may detain or search a parolee. The officer need not be absolutely certain, with ongoing day-by-day or minute-by-minute awareness of the subject’s parole status. Instead, it is sufficient for the officer to find that the individual to be searched is on active parole and an applicable parole condition authorizes the search or seizure at issue. Applying this standard, the panel concluded that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Defendant remained on active parole when he was detained and searched. The panel further held that this encounter did not violate California’s independent prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches. View "USA V. CHRISTIAN ESTRELLA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition in district court. In the amended petition, Petitioner challenges, among other things, the United States Parole Commission’s 2019 decision to issue a three-year “set-off,” the time he must wait until his next parole hearing. The district court for the District of Columbia transferred the case to the District of Arizona, where Petitioner was incarcerated. That court dismissed Petitioner’s petition as an impermissible second or successive petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and denied Petitioner’s motion to reconsider.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The panel held that Petitioner need not obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of the instant petition because Congress did not define or include the District of Columbia Superior Court as a “State court” in 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c), where it had expressly done so in that and other statutes. The panel held that Section 2253(c)(1)(A)’s language, “in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court,” does not include the District of Columbia Superior Court. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as an abuse of the writ when Petitioner could not have possibly raised the same claims in prior petitions. Thus, because no court has addressed Petitioner’s three-year set-off claims regarding his 2016 parole denial, he did not abuse the writ by raising the 2019 denial issue in his instant habeas petition. View "CLINTON ELDRIDGE V. CATRICIA HOWARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. View "STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant on four counts, including one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841. Defendant pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count. At sentencing, the district court found the Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the Probation Officer accurate and correct and so adopted it. For the offense of conviction, the PSR calculated the base offense level at 32 based on the Drug Quantity Table set forth in U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(c). The PSR then found that Defendant had two prior convictions under Cal. Health & Safety Code Section 11378 that qualified as controlled substances offenses under U.S.S.G. Sections 4B1.1; 4B1.2(b).   The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that Kisor is an intervening decision and is clearly irreconcilable with the holdings in Vea-Gonzales and Crum. Applying the traditional tools of statutory construction to the text of the guideline, as Kisor instructs, the panel concluded that Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously identifies a list of crimes that do not include inchoate offenses. Because Section 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” is unambiguous, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor now makes it impermissible to defer to Application Note 1 to determine whether conspiracy fits into this definition. Because the text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously does not include inchoate offenses, and because the court is no longer permitted to rely on the commentary of an unambiguous guideline after Kisor, the panel held that Defendant’s conspiracy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” under Section 4B1.1. View "USA V. ROBERTO CASTILLO" on Justia Law