Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely, and not subject to statutory tolling. Petitioner's petition challenged his jury conviction in California state court for murder and attempted murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court found petitioner's 2005 habeas petition timely. Since petitioner then filed in federal district court on July 3, 2007, less than a month after the California Supreme Court denied his petition on June 13, 2007, his federal petition was timely filed. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner timely petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's holding that defendant was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his domestic violence conviction constituted an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Defendant argued that because an aggravated felony was defined as a crime of violence for which a term of imprisonment was at least one year, and because his 365-day sentence was completed during a leap year, which was 366 days long, his California conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that, for purposes of section 1101(a)(43)(F), a sentence of 365 days qualified as a term of imprisonment of at least one year," even when the sentence was served in whole or in part during a leap year. The court concluded that all of petitioner's arguments for cancellation of removal have been addressed by the court's precedents and none have been resolved in his favor. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Defendant appealed his 70-month below-Guidelines sentence of incarceration for illegal reentry after a prior deportation. The court held that, because a conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, under California Penal Code 273.5, was a categorical crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, defendant's conviction under this section warranted a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in imposing a 70-month sentence of incarceration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed his 52-month sentence imposed following his open plea of guilty to a single-count indictment charging him with illegal re-entry after deportation. The court held that, after considering the state court records, defendant's conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in applying a 16-level enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed the 46-month sentence of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to one count of illegal reentry. The court held that because it agreed with the district court that a conviction for forcible rape under California Penal Code 261(a)(2) was categorically a "crime of violence" as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, the court held that the district court correctly imposed a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and that the sentence of 46 months was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, a high school math teacher, filed suit in federal court alleging that the school district violated his constitutional rights by making him remove banners he displayed in his classroom which referenced "God" and the "Creator." At issue was whether a public school district infringed the First Amendment liberties of plaintiff when it ordered him not to use his public position as a pulpit from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation's history to the captive students in his mathematics classroom. The court agreed with the district court that no genuine issue of material fact remained in the present case. The court held, however, that the district court made a critical error when it determined that the school district had created a limited public forum for teacher speech and evaluated the school district's actions under a traditional forum-based analysis rather than the controlling Pickering-based inquiry. Applying the correct legal principles to the undisputed facts, the court held that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the claims raised by plaintiff. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 1155 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court held that because its decision in Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law, it applied retroactively. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense. All but two of the documents tendered for the courts consideration in the modified categorical approach did not qualify as judicially noticeable documents under Shepard v. United States. The two remaining documents required re-examination through the lens of Grisel and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff, a frequent filer of lawsuits and indigent, sought money damages and other relief against defendant resulting from an alleged mistreatment of plaintiff when he was a prisoner. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. As a preliminary matter, the court held that because the underlying substantive claims were not moot and because a ruling in favor of plaintiff would permit those claims to proceed, the court could provide effective relief and the appeal was not moot now that plaintiff was released from jail and was on parole. The court held that because only two of the four dismissals identified by the district court qualified as "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Protrero Hills Landfill, a privately owned solid waste and recycling business in Solano County, and twenty-two related businesses appealed the dismissal on Younger v. Harris abstention grounds of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of a voter-enacted county ordinance restricting the import of out-of-county solid waste into Solano County. The court held that Younger abstention did not apply here because a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over Protrero Hill's claim would not interfere with the state's exercise of basic state function and would not offend the principles of comity and federalism that Younger abstention was designed to uphold. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded, asking the district to consider whether R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman rather than Younger abstention might be appropriate.