Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from an indictment charging defendant with two counts of transporting an illegal alien for profit. At issue was whether a district court could, in the absence of a motion for a new trial by the defendant, order a new trial for a defendant who was tried before the judge but never properly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that, insofar as the district court's order for a new trial was premised on the post-verdict declaration of a mistrial, it was error. The court also held that the district court erred in converting defendant's motion, over his objection, into a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's December 11, 2009 order that set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial under Rule 33, as well as its January 26, 2010 order that also justified the new trial by declaring the first proceeding a mistrial under Rule 26.3. The court remanded with instructions to deny defendant's "Motion to Set Aside Verdict by Trial Court," which cited no rule or authority and was procedurally improper.

This case arose when federal law enforcement officers seized funds from passengers who were temporarily in the Atlanta airport changing planes. The travelers truthfully explained that the funds were legal gambling proceeds, not evidence of drug transactions. The travelers subsequently claimed that the seizure and later efforts to institute forfeiture proceedings were unconstitutional and sued in Las Vegas, where they were heading, lived at least part time, and suffered the inconvenience of arriving with absolutely no money, as well as other financial injuries. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Bivens action against the federal officers for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that an officer's intentional acts with regard to the false probable cause affidavit and the consequent delay in returning the travelers' money were expressly aimed at Nevada and so satisfied the requirement for personal jurisdiction. As to the search and seizure claim, the court remanded to the district court for the exercise of discretion with regard to pendant personal jurisdiction. The court also held that venue was proper in the District of Nevada.

Plaintiff, a minor with dyslexia, by and through her mother and Guardian Ad Litem, appealed from the district court's order affirming the Administrative Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) properly found plaintiff ineligible for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court held that the DOE procedurally violated the IDEA by applying regulations that required exclusive reliance on the "severe discrepancy model" at plaintiff's final eligibility meeting. This violation deprived plaintiff of a significant educational opportunity because it resulted in an erroneous eligibility determination. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order affirming the Hearing Officer's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of importation of marijuana and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the government to introduce evidence of defendant's prior "law enforcement contacts." Therefore, the court held that because this error was not harmless, defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The court declined to address defendant's remaining arguments.

A jury convicted defendant of felony murder and/or aiding and abetting felony murder, but acquitted him of premeditated murder. The trial judge then imposed the death penalty. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that, although it rejected defendant's contentions on appeal, absent the State's knowing presentation of perjured inmate testimony, the result of defendant's penalty-phase hearing could have been different. Accordingly, the court held that the State violated defendant's due process rights under Napue v. Illinois and reversed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to defendant's death sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and oxycodone with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal, and with possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the initial stop, the extended duration of the seizure, and the search of his vehicle all violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that all the physical evidence seized and defendant's subsequent statements to police must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule because there was no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime where there was no specific particularized fact indicating that the passenger of the vehicle had identification and that such identification was located in defendant's car.

The Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute (SPOSFI) and Mary Figone appealed the district court's judgment rejecting their facial First Amendment and vagueness challenges to portions of "Proposition M," a popularly enacted amendment to the rent-stabilization ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco. The court held that, because both SPOSFI and Figone lacked standing, the court could not reach the merits of their challenges. Instead, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The State of Arizona appealed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent a state law from taking effect that would have terminated eligibility for healthcare benefits of state employees' same-sex partners. The district court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because they showed that the law adversely affected a classification of employees on the basis of sexual orientation and did not further any of the state's claimed justifiable interests. The district court also found that plaintiffs had established a likelihood of irreparable harm in the event coverage for partners ceased. The court held that the district court's findings and conclusions were supported by the record and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged his conviction for illegal reentry after removal on the ground that the removal order on which the conviction was based was invalid. The court held that in light of the "unique circumstances" of defendant's case, it was not plausible that the IJ would have granted him permission to withdraw his application for admission. Therefore, defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the IJ's alleged error and could not show that the entry of the February 27, 2006 removal order was "fundamentally unfair" as required by 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3). Accordingly, defendant's collateral attack on the removal order failed and the court upheld the district court's ruling.

Over thirty years ago, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1979 kidnapping, rape, and murder of a sixteen-year-old female. Petitioner subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the district court erred by dismissing as unexhausted petitioner's claim for denial of an impartial jury, but after receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, the court denied the claim on the merits. The court affirmed the district court on the other three claims. As to the uncertified claims, the court granted a COA on the prosecutorial misconduct claim because the district court erred by finding this claim unexhausted, but also denied that claim on the merits. The court denied a COA on the remaining uncertified claims. Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.