Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA ordering him removed to his native country. The BIA affirmed the IJ's ruling that petitioner was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because he had been "convicted of a particularly serious crime," driving under the influence (DUI). The BIA also ruled that petitioner was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT because he failed to prove a likelihood of future torture. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that an alien had been convicted of a "particularly serious crime." The court also held that driving under the influence was not statutorily defined as an aggravated felony did not preclude the BIA from determining that it could be a particularly serious crime. The court further held that the BIA, as the Attorney General's delegate, was permitted in this case to determine whether petitioner's DUI offenses were particularly serious for purposes of asylum eligibility. The court held, however, that the BIA's explanation for its decision was so ambiguous that the court could not conduct meaningful judicial review and therefore, remanded to the BIA for a clear explanation.

Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against the county, alleging violation of her constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection. Plaintiff alleged that the county harassed her in retaliation of her complaints about the county's failure to enforce building and safety codes against her Malibu neighbors. At issue was whether the district court properly denied plaintiff an award of attorney's fees for her spouse's legal services. The court held that plaintiff, who was represented by her attorney-spouse in a successful civil rights action, could be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" under 42 U.S.C. 1988. Accordingly, the court vacated the portion of the district court's fee order denying plaintiff an award of attorney's fees for her spouse's services and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to have his sentence reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court held that, when determining a sentencing range under U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b), a district court could apply the offense level dictated by the career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, offense level at the defendant's original sentencing, so long as the court determined at the original sentencing that defendant was a career offender. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence.

This case arose when the Washington State Department of Health (Department) would not license Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital (Memorial) to perform certain procedures known as elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) where, according to the Department, the community Memorial served did not need another PCI provider. The district court held that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption, holding that the PCI regulations were a unilateral restraint on trade not barred by the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. With regard to Memorial's claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the district court found Memorial had standing because it alleged it would participate in an interstate market for PCI patients, doctors, and supplies. Nevertheless, the district court found that any burden on Memorial's interstate commercial activity was expressly authorized by Congress' approval of certificate of need regimes, making a dormant Commerce Clause violation impossible. The court agreed that Memorial failed to state a claim of antitrust preemption because the PCI regulations were a unilateral licensing requirement rather than an agreement in restraint of trade. The court also agreed that Memorial had standing under the dormant Commerce Clause, but reversed the district court's judgment on that claim because the Department failed to prove congressional authorization for the PCI regulations.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Veterans Health Administration, submitted eight requests under the Freedom of Information Act, (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, primarily asking for emails to and from specified individuals. At issue was whether an agency fulfilled its disclosure obligation by offering to supply the documents to the requester, but only in his capacity as an employee of that agency. Also at issue was the application to internal emails of FOIA Exemption 6, which provided that an agency could withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The court held that plaintiff's claim as to the 157 emails was not mooted by the VA's offer to provide him the records in his capacity as its employee. The court remanded for the district court to consider the VA's claimed exceptions as to those emails in the first instance. The court also held that, as to the VA's application of Exemption 6 to the nine in camera emails, the district court's decision was vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff, a disabled individual who required the use of a motorized wheelchair to get around, filed a lawsuit against defendants, alleging that a Food 4 Less grocery store in Chula Vista, California did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, 12213, and certain state laws. At issue was whether the district court erred in refusing to consider the allegations in plaintiff's expert report; in granting summary judgment to defendants as to the barriers he claimed violated California's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), which was based on the district court's conclusion that violations of the MUTCD were not per se violations of the ADA; and in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to consider the barriers that plaintiff identified only in his expert report; the district court properly granted partial summary judgment to defendants regarding those of plaintiff's allegations premised on noncompliance with the MUTCD rather than the ADA Accessibility Guidelines; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's state law claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appealed the district court's order granting petitioner's, an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1302(7), prohibited the tribal court from imposing consecutive sentences cumulatively exceeding one year for multiple criminal violations arising from a single criminal transaction. The court held that section 1302(7) unambiguously permitted tribal courts to impose up to a one-year term of imprisonment for each discrete criminal violation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Appellee sued Mary Lafond, DSHS's Child Study and Treatment Center's (CSTC) CEO, and Norman Webster, the Director of Nursing Services, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe conditions while in the custody of a state-run mental institution. LaFond and Webster, relying on qualified immunity, appealed the district court's order denying their motion for summary judgment. The court held that the allegations and evidence against LaFond sufficiently supported a constitutional violation that defeated qualified immunity, while those against Webster did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to LaFond and reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to Webster. The court remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when a student told a police officer that her teacher, plaintiff, inappropriately touched her and police subsequently searched plaintiff's home for child pornography. Plaintiff and his son sued the police officer, the City of Covina, and the Chief of Police for violating his constitutional rights, claiming that the city and the officers violated his and his son's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; the city inadequately trained and inadequately investigated complaints about its officers (Monell claim); and all defendants inadequately supervised and trained their subordinates with respect to the incidents alleged. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a search warrant issued to search a suspect's home computer and electronic equipment lacked probable cause when no evidence of possession or attempt to posses child pornography was submitted to the issuing magistrate; no evidence was submitted to the magistrate regarding computer or electronics used by the suspect; and the only evidence linking the suspect's attempted child molestation to possession of child pornography was the experience of the requesting police officer, with no further explanation. The court held, however, that it had not previously addressed such issues and therefore, the officers involved in the search were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's Monell and supervisory liability claims where amending the complaint would be futile.

This consolidated appeal asked the court to consider the constitutionality of the Nevada Department of Corrections' (NDOC) policy prohibiting inmates' personal possession of typewriters. NDOC inmates appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NDOC. The court held that the NDOC's prohibition on inmate possession of typewriters did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the rights of the inmates. The ban was enacted to reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety. As applied to these inmates, it did not result in an unconstitutional denial of access to courts because they have failed to demonstrate actual injury. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in either admitting the NDOC's affidavits or ruling on summary judgment when it did. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.