Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against an airline alleging a common law breach of contract under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At issue was whether plaintiff's claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). The court reversed and held that the purpose, history, and language of the ADA, along with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, lead the court to conclude that the ADA did not preempt a contract claim based on the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendants, John Stinson and Robert Griffin, appealed their convictions for crimes related to their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison gang. This appeal centered on numerous procedural decisions by the district court before and during trial. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss for improper venue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffin's motion to sever; the district court did not err in proceeding with a death qualified jury; the district court did not clearly err in rejecting the two Batson challenges; the district court did not err in supervising discovery because the government did not redact Brady material and the district court was not required to review unredacted documents in camera; the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the order granting Griffin's habeas petition; even if the government elicited vouching testimony, it was harmless in light of the strength of its case; the prosecutorial misconduct in posing hypotheticals concerning debriefs not in evidence was harmless in light of jury instructions and an otherwise strong government case; the district court did not err in its jury instructions; the district court did not err in declining to instruct the jurors that Ricky Rose had been a potential government witness; the partial read backs of testimony without precautions, such as an admonition, did not affect defendants' substantial rights in light of other evidence presented and therefore did not warrant reversal; and the district court operated well within its discretion when it chose the wording of the special verdict form on withdrawal. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions.

This case arose when plaintiff sued Lucent Technologies for disability benefits based on grounds of mental disability. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 1981 retaliation claims were governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to claims "arising under an Act of Congress enacted" after December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. 1658, or by the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state. The court held that the district court erred in applying to plaintiff's section 1981 retaliation claim the two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims under California law and not the four-year statute of limitations under section 1658. Consequently, under the proper statute of limitations, the claim was timely. The court also held that the district court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was time-barred. The court held, however, that the district court correctly dismissed Title VII, abuse of process, and fraudulent concealment claims. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants were convicted for several crimes related to their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison gang and were both sentenced to life in prison. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support both defendants' convictions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962; for violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR); 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1), and for murder pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1111. The court rejected defendants' remaining claims of error. Accordingly, the court affirmed both defendants' convictions.

Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibited a deported alien from reentering the United States without the consent of the U.S. Attorney General. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from his subsequent sentence of 96 months imprisonment. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion when it excluded defendant's minimally relevant evidence at issue, which presented the potential for jury confusion and which could have resulted in a verdict premised on mere speculation. The court also held that because the trial record contained nothing more than a mere scintilla of evidence of derivative citizenship, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the requisite evidentiary foundation lacking and refused to instruct the jury pursuant to that theory. The court further held that the district court did not err by upwardly adjusting defendant's sentence pursuant to a multiple count enhancement and that defendant's sentence was both substantively and procedurally reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants were jointly tried and convicted of a substantive RICO violation, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c); RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); and two counts of violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. 1959, arising out of their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB). Defendants appealed, raising Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois issues and claiming instructional error. The court held that, under the circumstances, it saw no plain Brady Error. The court also held that defendants failed to show that a jail house informant's testimony was "actually false" or that the government knowingly presented false testimony in light of Napue. The court further held that, assuming a duress defense was available, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a duress instruction under California, Pennsylvania, or federal law because the evidence did not support such an instruction. The court also rejected defendants' remaining claims of instructional errors. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner, and nine other similarly situated prisoners, appealed the district court's judgment denying their 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas corpus petitions. At issue was whether these consolidated habeas corpus petitions required the court to consider the manner in which the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prioritized a prisoner's eligibility for entering into a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). The court found no error in the BOP's interpretation of the governing statute, 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(1), and therefore, affirmed the district court's judgment. The court noted, however, that the BOP's administration of RDAP, combined with the program's insufficient capacity, had created a troubling situation that called for a legislative or regulatory remedy.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff was a former bus driver for defendant and was terminated, subsequently reinstated pursuant to an agreement executed over the course of a grievance process, and then again terminated for an unexcused absence that violated the attendance requirements of the agreement. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's claims that the second termination violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612, and plaintiff's due process right to a pretermination hearing under the United States and California Constitutions. The court held that because plaintiff was not an employee of defendant when he made his request for leave, the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment for defendant on plaintiff's FMLA claim. The court held, however, that because plaintiff received no pretermination hearing, he was denied due process under the United States and California Constitutions. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's due process claims and remanded with instructions to grant judgment for plaintiff on these claims.

This is an interlocutory government appeal from the district court's suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an airport search of defendant's checked luggage at Hilo International Airport. The government argued that the evidence from defendant's bag, which included, among other things, almost five dozen photographs of nude and partially nude minors. Defendant contended, and the district court agreed, that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents turned a routine administrative search for explosives into an unauthorized investigatory search for contraband. The court, however, vacated the order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the airport screening and the follow-on consent- and warrant-based searches of defendant's computer and other materials where the viewing of the photographs from the envelope at issue was justified by and part of the lawful administrative search and where the development of a secondary desire to confirm that the photographs evidenced contraband did not invalidate that search. The court also held that the district court's probable cause approach was erroneous and remanded with instructions for the district court to decide what materials could be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest defendant and to determine whether that evidence was "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."

Plaintiffs, a Christian sorority and fraternity, as well as several of their officers at San Diego State University, brought suit in federal district court challenging the university's nondiscrimination policy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all counts in favor of defendants. At issue was whether the Supreme Court's holdings in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez extended to a narrow nondiscrimination policy that, instead of prohibiting all membership restrictions, prohibited membership restrictions only on certain specified bases. The court held that the narrower policy was constitutional. The court held, however, that plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the narrower policy was selectively enforced in this particular case, thereby violating plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.