Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from defendant's convictions for making two statements regarding Barack Obama on an online message board two weeks before the presidential election. At issue was whether the district court properly convicted defendant under 18 U.S.C. 879(a)(3), which made it a felony to threaten to kill or do bodily harm to a major presidential candidate. The court held that, taking the two statements at issue in the context of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the court held that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the subjective intent to threaten a presidential candidate. For the same reasons, given any reasonable construction of the words in defendant's postings, these statements did not constitute a "true threat," and were therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were reversed.

Petitioner applied for authorization to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree burglary, and theft in March 1988. At issue was whether a "claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application" was "presented in a prior application." Also at issue was whether petitioner's application to file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted. The court held that because petitioner's claim regarding ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel was raised in a prior habeas petition, it must be dismissed. The court also held that petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence he now proffered, regarding the ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel and petitioner's recent diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), was newly-discovered or that no reasonable factfinder would have found him eligible for the death penalty had he been aware of the evidence. Accordingly, petitioner's application was denied.

Defendant appealed his conviction for importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, claiming that the district court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding the structure and operations of drug-trafficking organizations and unknowing drug courier modus operandi, including testimony that drugs were rarely smuggled by unknowing courtiers. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony because it was relevant, probative, and not unduly prejudicial in light of defendant's defense theory that he did not know that he was transporting drugs and because he opened the door to the testimony by providing notice that he intended to call an expert witness to testify that drug trafficking organizations sometimes utilize unknowing couriers to smuggle drugs across the border. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. At issue was whether a state court conviction for a simple-possession drug crime, later expunged by the state court, nevertheless constituted a "conviction" for federal immigration purposes. The court held that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection did not require treating, for immigration purposes, an expunged state conviction of a drug crime the same as a federal drug conviction that had been expunged under the Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C. 3607(b). Therefore, the court overruled its holding to the contrary in Lujan-Armendariz v. INS. The court also held that, in light of the equities and other considerations, the court would apply this new rule only prospectively. Accordingly, the court held that the BIA did not err and affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA dismissing an appeal from an order of removal to Mexico. Despite petitioner's testimony to the contrary, an IJ found that petitioner was inadmissible because the inspectors at the border inspection station had reason to believe that petitioner was knowingly involved in drug trafficking. The BIA dismissed the appeal because substantial evidence supported the finding that an immigration officer had the necessary "reason to believe." The court granted the petition for a new hearing because the IJ misunderstood the relevant legal standard and in the circumstances, the court held that it was appropriate to remand for further proceedings to evaluate the credibility of petitioner's testimony that he did not know he was transporting marijuana, and the effect of the determination on the question of whether the IJ or BIA had "reason to believe" in light of all the evidence placed before the IJ during the course of the proceedings.

The parents of E.M., a bilingual student, brought an action to challenge the Pajaro Valley Unified School District's (District) determination that E.M. did not qualify for special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The Special Education Division of the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the District's assessment and the district court affirmed the OAH's decision. The court disagreed with the district court's assessment only to the extent that it found one claim not addressed and one report not measured for its relevance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in part and reversed in part. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether the report was relevant to the determination of whether the district met its obligations to E.M. under the IDEA and whether an auditory processing disorder could qualify as an other health impairment, and if so, whether the district met its obligations to assess E.M. and identify him as a child with an other health impairment.

Plaintiff, a Christian congregation church, sued the City of Yuma when the city prevented the church from conducting church services in a building it had bought for that purpose. At issue was the "equal terms" provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The court held that the church's claims for declaratory judgment and injunction were moot where the church no longer owned the building, so the city could not be required to issue a conditional use permit for the building to the church. Nor could the church be entitled to a declaration that a code provision and statute violated federal law because they no longer affected the church. The court also held that, because the city required religious assemblies to obtain a conditional use permit, and did not require similarly situated secular membership assemblies to do the same, it violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Therefore, the court did not reach the church's argument that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to adjudicate the church's claims as to damages.

Appellant, a state prisoner, sought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 where appellant was convicted in 2005 for first degree murder, attempted murder, and attempted robbery with enhancements for firearm use and prior convictions. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus where his admissions were improperly admitted into evidence at trial and where the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding the interrogation methods used by law enforcement at his interviews prevented him from presenting a complete defense. The court held that, under the "highly deferential standard" that the court must apply the state appellate court's determinations under AEDPA, appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was correctly denied where neither the state court's rulings on the constitutionality of the admission of appellant's confession nor the constitutionality of the exclusion of the expert's testimony were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of one count of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and six counts of attempted premeditated murder, all arising from shootings during two gang-related car chases on the same night. At issue was whether defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and whether the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike African American jurors violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that a rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt, including intent to kill the three backseat passengers, especially considering the double deference owed under Jackson v. Virginia and AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254, to state court findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's petition as to the attempted murder convictions. The court also held that the state trial court's determination at Batson v. Kentucky step three was not unreasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's petition as to the peremptory challenges.

Plaintiff, the mother of a developmentally disabled high school student, alleged that the several sexual encounters her daughter had with another developmentally disabled student in a school bathroom were the result of the school's failure to properly supervise her daughter. At issue was whether plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her daughter, had a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the daughter's special education teacher. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claim at summary judgment where the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception did not apply in this case. The court held that whatever liability the special education teacher faced, that liability must come from state tort law, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.