Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography and appealed a judgment that included, as a condition of supervised release, a requirement that monitoring technology be installed on his computer-related devices. The court rejected defendant's argument that his conditions of supervised release should be vacated because he was not afforded adequate notice that the district court was considering imposing them where his procedural rights were not violated. The court also rejected defendant's claims that the computer monitoring condition imposed on him occasioned a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary because the term "monitoring" was imprecise and encompassed a broad swath of surveillance methods, some of which would be unnecessary or intrusive. The court noted, however, that in situations like this one, where technological considerations prevent specifying in detail years in advance how a condition was to be effectuated, district courts should be flexible in revisiting conditions imposed to ensure they remain tailored and effective. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possessing and transporting child pornography and appealed his conviction, sentence, and the district court's order directing him to pay $65,000 in restitution to two victims. The court affirmed his conviction and sentence where the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of five law enforcement officers; in vacating defendant's possession conviction; and in imposing conditions for the full term of supervised release rather than for just the duration of defendant's sexual deviancy treatment. The court held, however, that because the government failed to carry its burden of proving that defendant's offense conduct proximately caused the losses incurred by the victims, the court vacated the restitution order.

In a previous en banc opinion, the court held that defendant's trial counsel provided him constitutionally ineffective assistance because he failed to consult or call forensic experts to explain a pool of blood found at the crime scene. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state court reasonably denied the claim in a decision entitled to AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), deference. The court addressed defendant's remaining claims related to the ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims of error, which were not addressed by the Supreme Court, and subsequently affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three capital charges and seven other charges in connection with the kidnapping, sexual abuse, and murder of a 9 year-old boy and the kidnapping and sexual abuse of an 8 year-old girl. Defendant exercised his right to represent himself during his penalty phase hearing and his lawyer challenged his competency to do so. After the district court rejected the challenge, defendant received a death sentence, and standby counsel filed a timely notice of appeal. At issue was whether the court lacked jurisdiction because standby counsel had no standing to appeal and if the court did have jurisdiction, whether the district court erred in its determination that defendant competently could represent himself and waived his right to appeal. The court held that standby counsel's standing was established under Mason ex rel. Marson v. Vasquez. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, the court agreed with standby counsel that a competency hearing was required where the evidence created a reasonable doubt about defendant's competence. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a retrospective competency hearing.

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was convicted twice for second-degree commercial burglary when he was arrested for walking out of a supermarket with unpaid items on two separate occasions. As a result, the BIA found him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and also as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). Petitioner petitioned for review, challenging the determinations that the prior convictions were grounds for removal. The court held that the BIA erred in holding that petitioner's convictions were generic attempted theft offenses where simply entering a commercial building was not in itself "a substantial step" supporting attempted theft liability. The court also held that the BIA erred in concluding that the convictions qualified as CIMTs, either because it misapprehended the elements of the crime of conviction or because it misread caselaw. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal.

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for reentry after deportation. Defendant contended that his deportation was invalid because the IJ failed to advise him of his eligibility for voluntary departure. The government claimed that the court need not reach that question because defendant waived his right to appeal. The court held that appellate waiver, negotiated by the district court at sentencing in exchange for a reduced sentence, was invalid and unenforceable. In a memorandum disposition filed contemporaneously with the opinion, the court held that the IJ failed to adequately advise defendant of his ability to apply for voluntary departure, and the court remanded for the district court to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.

Petitioner Richard Hurles appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his murder conviction and death sentence. He argued that the district court erred on four issues: judicial bias, ineffective assistance of his sentencing, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and procedure. The unusual circumstances of this case revealed that the trial judge became involved as a party to this case as part of an interlocutory appeal. He was then denied standing to appear as an adversary, proceeded to preside over the murder trial and single-handedly determined Petitioner's death sentence. "These exceptional facts raise the probability of actual bias to an unconstitutional level." Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Petitioner's judicial bias claim, and did not address the rest of Petitioner's other issues in light of the need for reversal on judicial bias. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated identity theft and to committing fraudulent transactions with access devices. In a written plea agreement, defendant waived "his right to appeal any aspect of his convictions." At issue was whether defendant's waiver of his right to appeal his conviction extended to the denial of his subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that defendant's appellate waiver extended to this appeal. The court held, however, that it could not conclude that defendant's waiver was made involuntarily. The court further held that it would "not remand a case from direct appeal for fact-finding related to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but allow[ed] a defendant to pursue the issue in district court collateral proceedings." Therefore, the court left open the possibility that defendant might raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a subsequent collateral attack. Accordingly, the court dismissed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was charged with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, occurring within the Colorado River Indian Tribes reservation in western Arizona. At issue was whether a district court could, over defense objection and after the administration of an unsuccessful Allen charge, inquire into the reasons for a trial jury's deadlock and then permit supplemental argument focused on those issues, where the issues in dispute were factual rather than legal. The court held that allowing such a procedure in a criminal trial was an abuse of the discretion accorded to the district courts in the management of jury deliberations. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.