Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits based on combined impairments including bullous emphysema, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder and alleged that her disability began when her right lung collapsed. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. et seq. The court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred by failing to follow the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a) in determining whether plaintiff's mental impairments were severe and, if severe, whether they met or equaled a listed impairment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to remand to the ALJ to conduct a proper review of plaintiff's mental impairments.

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, filed a petition of review of the Department of Homeland Security's decision to reinstate an immigration judge's 1989 order of deportation pursuant to post-Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), reinstatement provision 241(a)(5). At issue was whether the reinstatement provision, enacted as part of the IIRIRA, applied retroactively to a petitioner who applied for discretionary relief prior to IIRIRA's effective date. The court held that the application of section 241(a)(5) was permissibly retroactive when it applied to such petitioners in light of Landgraf v. USI Films Prod. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review in part and remanded for further proceedings. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to review agency determinations of eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NACARA"), however, the court denied the petition in part.

Petitioner appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") determination that it did not have jurisdiction to accept an appeal filed one day late due to a post office error. At issue was whether the 30 day deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the BIA was jurisdictional. The court held that the 30 day deadline must be read as a claim-processing rule that was not jurisdictional. The court also held that, since the BIA erred as a matter of law in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the court must remand to the BIA to permit it to fully reconsider whether, under the circumstances presented, it would hear the appeal from the immigration judge's decision in this case. The court also concluded that all the BIA needed to do to avoid subjecting aliens to the risk of losing their appeals due to bad weather or delivery service error was to allow people to send notices of appeal over the internet.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of attempted second degree robbery and first degree murder of a Long Beach shop owner with the special circumstance that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang under Cal. Penal Code 190.2(a)(22). The jury also found that a principal discharged a firearm resulting in the shop owner's death under Cal. Penal Code 12022.53(d), (e)(1) and imposed two gang enhancements pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 186.22(b)(1). At issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support the special circumstances finding pursuant to section 190.2(a)(22) and the gang enhancements imposed pursuant to sections 186.22(b)(1) and 12022.53(d) and (e)(1). The court held that petitioner's due process rights were not violated where there was ample evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that petitioner used extreme violence to avenge a minor slight against a casual acquaintance and a rational trier of fact could have found that when he and another gang member acted together to commit the robbery and murder, petitioner specifically intended to assist in criminal conduct. Therefore, the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.

Petitioner, an African-American, was tried and convicted of aggravated mayhem, torture, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon, corporal injury on a cohabitant, and criminal threats. During voir dire examination, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove nine potential jurors. At issue was whether the state court's decision to deny a Batson v. Kentucky claim when petitioner made no contemporaneous objection to the use of peremptory challenges in the trial court was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court held that petitioner could not raise a Batson claim in his habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely object to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges at trial. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner habeas relief.

Pinnacle Armor, Inc. ("Pinnacle") produced armor designed to protect buildings, vehicles, and the human body. Among Pinnacle's primary customers were local law enforcement agencies who depended in large part upon a federal subsidy to purchase the body arbor. The federal subsidy was conditioned on certification that the manufacturer's body armor was compliant with standards set by the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"). Pinnacle alleged that the NIJ's decision to revoke certification of one of its products violated its procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). The court held that the due process claims were properly dismissed because the NIJ afforded Pinnacle adequate process. The court also held that the NIJ's certification decision was not committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore reviewable under the APA where Pinnacle's claims were sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claim.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.

Defendant appealed his sentence for seven counts of bank robbery. Defendant argued that his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the government breached the plea agreement; the district court's decision to make an upward departure from criminal history category II to III, U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, was procedurally erroneous; and the district court's overall sentence was substantially unreasonable. The court held that the government did not breach the plea agreement where it made no argument that the district court should increase the offense level calculation set forth in the presentence report ("PSR") and plea agreement. The court also held that the court reviewed upward departures under section 4A1.3 for substantive reasonableness, not for procedural error, and concluded that the district court's sentence was substantively reasonable and procedural error was harmless where the district court deviated only 30 and 16 months from the high end of the PSR and its own Guidelines ranges and where the district court's characterization of defendant's seven armed robberies as serious offenses reflected a rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

Defendants, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lunde Electric Company ("company"), appealed convictions stemming from the misappropriation of employee 401(k) contributions to pay the company's operating expenses. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. 664, for embezzlement or conversion of elective deferrals, and 18 U.S.C. 1027, for false or misleading statements in a required Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C 1001 et seq., document. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Counts 17 and 18 under section 664 where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 1991 Profit Sharing Plan had been restated before defendants retained their employees' elective deferrals in the company's general account; where defendants commingled their employees' contributions with the company's assets to prop up their failing business and therefore, intentionally used their employees' assets for an unauthorized purpose; where they sent participants account statements showing 401(k) balances which were in fact non-existent; where defendants' decision to deviate was the wilful criminal misappropriation punished by section 664; and where defendants were alerted repeatedly about their obligation to remit the deferrals and defendants hid their actions from employees. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Count 21 under section 1027 where defendants' initial decision to mislead their own employees about the solvency of their retirement plans by filing false account statements and false Form 5500s were the behaviors targeted by section 1027.