Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. At issue was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of "brandish." The court affirmed the conviction and held that the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in instructing the jury with the statutory definition of "brandish" and declining appellant's proffer of a dictionary definition where, in light of the well-settled principle that, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the language of the statute was the first and, if the language was clear, the only relevant inquiry.

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief after she was found guilty of murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At issue was whether the trial court violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by dismissing a juror who was known to be the lone holdout for acquittal. The court held that the removal of Juror No. 6 deprived petitioner of her right to a fair trial by jury where there was at least a reasonable possibility that Juror No. 6's discharged stemmed from his disagreement with his peers over their views of the merits of the case and where there was no good cause to justify the juror's discharge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

Defendants, both Mexican citizens, were arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325. Defendants appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's Operation Streamline. At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated the Fifth Amendment right to due process where defendants contend that the record did not disclose that they voluntarily and understandably pleaded guilty. The court concluded that, because they were not faced with a silent record, defendants must demonstrate that any error in the proceeding or in the transcript was plain and affected their substantial rights. Namely, they must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, they would not have entered their pleas. The court also held that, because defendants did not even suggest, much less show, that they would not have pleaded guilty if the plea hearing had been more individualized, it could not conclude that there was any plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against the City and County of San Francisco and its election officials (collectively, "city") alleging that when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the restricted instant runoff voting ("IRV") system precluded some groups of voters from participating to the same extent as others. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city where plaintiffs alleged that the restricted IRV system was unconstitutional by violating the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court held that, if the aspects of the city's restricted IRV system scheme imposed any burdens on voters' constitutional rights to vote, they were minimal at best. The court also held that the city had advanced valid, sufficiently-important interests to justify using its system. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs had not established that the city's chosen IRV system was unconstitutional and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city.

A.S., a California minor, filed a request for a special education due process hearing where he was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., as an emotionally disturbed child. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding a special education student's placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court requested the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion and decide the following certified question, "Whether under California law the school district responsible for the costs of a special education student's education while the student is placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility is the district in which the student's de facto parent, who is authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the student, resides."

The state appealed the district court's grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus where defendant was charged with murder. At issue was whether petitioner's lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel while trying to have him acquitted of the death penalty. The court reversed and held that petitioner had not made out his claim that his counsel's assistance was constitutionally deficient and even if he had, the gruesome nature of the crime, coupled with the relatively weak additional evidence that might have been revealed, led the court to conclude that any ineffectiveness was not prejudicial.

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court alleging that his prolonged detention was unlawful. At issue was whether petitioner's bond hearing, provided under Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, violated due process. The court clarified that once an alien received a Casas bond hearing before an immigration judge ("IJ"), he could appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). If the alien was dissatisfied with the BIA's decision, he could then file a habeas petition in the district court challenging his continued detention. The district court's decision on the habeas petition could then be appealed to this court. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss petitioner's petition without prejudice where he did not exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing habeas relief.

Plaintiffs, two non-profit organizations, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to remedy the delays in the provision of mental health care and adjudication of service-connected death and disability compensation claims by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). At issue was whether these delays violated veterans' due process rights to receive the care and benefits they were guaranteed by statute for harms and injuries sustained while serving our country. While the court affirmed the district court's ruling, with respect to various claims for specific forms of relief under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 500 et. seq., that the APA prevented the court from granting veterans the statutory relief they sought, the court reversed the district court's ruling on plaintiffs' constitutional claims and held that the VA's failure to provide adequate procedures for veterans facing prejudicial delays in the delivery of mental health care violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court further held that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' due process challenge to delays and procedural deficiencies in the compensation claims adjudication system and that it erroneously denied plaintiffs' the relief to which they were entitled under the Due Process Clause.

Defendant appealed a restitution order directing him to pay the victim's mother to cover costs that she incurred in making a series of trips between her home and the victim's boarding school 150 miles away after defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual contact and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. At issue was whether the mother's travel expenses were "incurred by the victim" and subject to restitution under the applicable statute. Also at issue was whether the restitution award was issued in violation of the procedural and evidentiary requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3664. The court initially held that defendant's waiver of appeal was ineffective as to the restitution order and so would consider his challenges to that order on the merits. The court then held that the mother's travel expenses could have been "incurred by the victim" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2248(b)(3) where the mother could have made trips in her capacity as a loved family member but she incurred the costs of the trips in her capacity as legal guardian, on behalf of her daughter. The court also held that the district court's restitution order violated the requirements of section 3664 where the district court set forth no explanation of its reasoning and where a spreadsheet was an inadequate evidentiary basis to support the restitution award.

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California more than three years after his conviction for first-degree murder became final and five days after the California Supreme Court denied his final state habeas petition. At issue was whether the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), was tolled during petitioner's delays between his state-court petitions for collateral review. The court held that petitioner's state petitions were untimely and that he was not entitled to statutory tolling under AEDPA where he showed no adequate justification for the eighty- and ninety-one day filing delays and there was no indication from the California courts to the contrary. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's request for equitable tolling where he failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances that warranted tolling of AEDPA's one year deadline.