Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

Jill Esche, who was seven months pregnant, was admitted to Renown Regional Medical Center in Nevada with severe hypertension and erratic behavior. Hospital staff, believing she was mentally ill and a danger to herself and her fetus, petitioned for her involuntary commitment under Nevada law. While the petition was pending, Esche was kept in the hospital, given psychiatric and medical treatment against her will, restricted from visitors and phone use, and not informed that a public defender had been appointed for her. After giving birth by C-section, the hospital decided to withdraw the commitment petition but allowed Esche to leave while she was still in fragile condition. She died outside near the hospital that night. Her estate and survivors sued the hospital and several staff members, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Nevada law.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment to the defendants on some claims, including unreasonable seizure and procedural due process claims, but denied summary judgment on others, such as substantive due process, conspiracy, and failure-to-train-or-supervise claims. The court also denied the defendants’ assertion of a good-faith defense to § 1983 liability, finding that the defense did not apply because the hospital was not required by law or directed by a public official to hold Esche involuntarily. Both sides appealed: the defendants challenged the denial of the good-faith defense, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismissal of other constitutional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court’s denial of the good-faith defense was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, as the defense is a defense to liability, not an immunity from suit. The court dismissed both the defendants’ appeals and the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Estate of Esche v. Bunuel-Jordana" on Justia Law

A resident of Billings, Montana, who lived across the street from a public elementary school, began carrying a shotgun outside his home, including on the sidewalk, during the summer of 2023. He did so to protect himself and his mother from a former neighbor who had repeatedly violated a protection order. Local police received several complaints about his conduct but did not charge him with any crime and told him he was complying with state law. After the resident contacted the FBI to complain about police harassment, federal authorities indicted him for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that he was exempt from the federal prohibition because, under Montana law, he was considered licensed to possess a firearm in a school zone. The district court found that Montana’s licensing scheme did not meet the federal requirements for the statutory exception, and also rejected the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. The defendant then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s order, directing that the indictment be dismissed. The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory exception for state-licensed individuals in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was ambiguous as applied to Montana’s licensing scheme. Given this ambiguity, and considering the rule of lenity, constitutional avoidance, and the presumption in favor of scienter as articulated in Rehaif v. United States, the court concluded that the defendant lacked fair notice that his conduct was criminal. The court did not address the Second Amendment argument. View "USA V. METCALF" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

Parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools requested that the schools purchase and allow the use of sectarian curricular materials for instruction. The schools denied these requests, citing California laws that prohibit the teaching of sectarian or denominational doctrine in public schools, including charter schools. The plaintiffs argued that the independent study programs were essentially homeschooling and that the denial of their requests violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that charter schools are part of California’s public school system and are permitted to provide strictly secular education. It concluded that the plaintiffs were not being excluded from a generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise, as the case involved state-funded public schools rather than private schools. The court also held that a public school’s curriculum constitutes government speech, which is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the funding and materials provided in independent study programs are a generally available public benefit, the programs are sufficiently public to allow California to require the use of secular curricula. The court further held that the curriculum decisions of public schools are government speech and thus not subject to the Free Speech Clause. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WOOLARD V. THURMOND" on Justia Law

California enacted a law aimed at addressing concerns about minors’ addiction to social media by regulating how internet platforms provide personalized content to users under 18. The law restricts minors’ access to algorithmic feeds without parental consent, imposes default settings such as hiding like counts and requiring private accounts, and mandates future age-verification procedures. NetChoice, a trade association representing major internet companies, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it unconstitutionally restricts both platforms’ and users’ speech, and that some provisions are unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against two provisions not at issue in this appeal, but otherwise denied NetChoice’s request for broader injunctive relief. The district court found that NetChoice lacked associational standing to challenge the personalized-feed restrictions as applied to its members, that the age-verification requirements were not ripe for review, and that the default settings provisions (including the like-count and private-mode requirements) were constitutional. The court also rejected NetChoice’s vagueness arguments and found that any unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit agreed that NetChoice lacked associational standing for as-applied challenges to the personalized-feed provisions and that the age-verification requirements were unripe. The court held that the private-mode default setting survived intermediate scrutiny, but found that the like-count default setting was a content-based restriction on speech and failed strict scrutiny. The court determined that the like-count provision was severable and ordered the district court to enjoin its enforcement, while affirming the denial of injunctive relief as to the other challenged provisions. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested in Montana in 2019 in connection with a burglary, during which officers found methamphetamine and syringes in his possession. He admitted to being addicted to methamphetamine. He was charged in state court with felony drug possession, and his pretrial release conditions prohibited firearm possession. In 2022, while those charges were still pending, he was found in possession of a stolen firearm and again admitted to daily methamphetamine use. He was subsequently indicted in federal court for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and for illegally receiving a firearm while under felony indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that both statutes were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district court relied on prior Ninth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court language in District of Columbia v. Heller, concluding that the statutes were consistent with longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by certain groups, such as felons and the mentally ill, and that the defendant had sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit held that both § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n) are facially constitutional under the Second Amendment, as there are circumstances in which their application is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court also held that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. STENNERSON" on Justia Law

Two police officers responded to a domestic battery call at a residential home. While one officer spoke with a woman at the door, the other saw a person flee over a backyard wall into a neighboring yard. Instead of immediately pursuing, the officer returned to his car, called for backup, and drove to establish a perimeter. Eighteen minutes later, a K-9 unit arrived and began searching within the perimeter. The K-9 alerted toward the plaintiffs’ backyard, which was locked and posted with a “Beware of Dog” sign. Without a warrant or consent, officers entered the backyard. The plaintiffs’ three dogs were roused, and two of them attacked the police K-9. One officer shot and killed the two dogs. The suspect was never found.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment to the officers and the City of North Las Vegas, finding the officers’ entry justified under the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement and the use of force against the dogs reasonable. The court also granted summary judgment to the City on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the “hot pursuit” exception did not apply because the officers lost track of the suspect for eighteen minutes, breaking the continuity required for exigent circumstances. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the warrantless search. However, the court affirmed qualified immunity for the officer’s use of force against the dogs, finding no clearly established law prohibiting his actions in the spontaneous circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the City on the Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence of a policy or deliberate indifference. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

A reporter who regularly covered sideshows—events involving drivers performing stunts in public intersections—sought to continue his on-site reporting, which included observing and recording these events within 200 feet of their occurrence. After the County of Alameda enacted an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to knowingly spectate a sideshow from within 200 feet, the reporter canceled his plans out of fear of prosecution, alleging that the ordinance impeded his ability to gather news and inform the public.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the reporter’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that, while the reporter had standing, the First Amendment did not protect his newsgathering and reporting activities in this context. The court reasoned that the ordinance did not specifically prohibit recording and that being present to observe a sideshow was not inherently expressive conduct. Alternatively, the district court concluded that the ordinance was content neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporter’s newsgathering and reporting activities, including observation and recording, are protected by the First Amendment. The court determined that the ordinance is content based because it targets only spectating sideshows and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny. The court found that the ordinance fails strict scrutiny, as less restrictive alternatives exist to address public safety concerns, and the ordinance is underinclusive. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the reporter demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. The court remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of the reporter. View "GARCIA V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA" on Justia Law