Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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A man named Brett Wayne Parkins was convicted of aiming a laser pointer at a police helicopter. Police officers searched Parkins's apartment without a warrant after obtaining consent from his girlfriend. Parkins, who was present but not at the doorway of his apartment, verbally objected to the search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must be physically present and expressly refuse consent to nullify a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search. The court clarified that physical presence does not require the defendant to stand at the doorway — presence on the premises, including its immediate vicinity, is sufficient. The court ruled that Parkins was physically present on the premises and had expressly refused consent, so the search of his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of Parkins's motion to suppress his pre-arrest and post-arrest statements because Parkins was not subject to interrogation for his pre-arrest statements and his post-arrest statements at the police station were not a product of the unlawful search of his apartment. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "USA V. PARKINS" on Justia Law

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In the case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Peace Ranch LLC challenged the constitutionality of California AB 978, a mobilehome-rent-control statute. Peace Ranch alleged that if it increases mobilehome rents more than AB 978 permits, the California Attorney General would enforce AB 978 against it. However, Peace Ranch also alleged that AB 978 does not apply to its mobilehome park. The Court of Appeals concluded that Peace Ranch had adequately established standing based on a pre-enforcement injury. The court reasoned that Peace Ranch was trapped between complying with a law that it believes does not apply to it or risking enforcement proceedings by raising rents. This dilemma, the court ruled, is the precise predicament that supports pre-enforcement standing. As such, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. View "PEACE RANCH, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

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In the case of Donald Sherman, who was convicted of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder in Nevada, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decision to deny Sherman's habeas corpus petition. Sherman had argued that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the trial court excluded certain impeaching evidence about Dr. Bauer’s daughter, whom Sherman had dated.Sherman claimed that this evidence would have countered the prosecution's narrative that Sherman had murdered Dr. Bauer out of spite for his daughter after their breakup. Instead, he argued, the evidence would have shown that he was manipulated into confronting Dr. Bauer.The Ninth Circuit found that Sherman's argument was not presented to the district court and, in any case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) deferential standard of review was applicable because Sherman did not rebut the presumption that the Nevada Supreme Court adjudicated his federal constitutional claim on the merits.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherman did not show that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial of his right-to-present-a-complete-defense claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel found that the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings on the exclusion of the evidence were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The panel also concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court's alternative conclusion that any error was harmless was not unreasonable. View "Sherman v. Gittere" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, DeWitt Lamar Long, a practicing Muslim and inmate at Halawa Correctional Facility in Hawaii, brought a legal action against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that his First Amendment rights to freely exercise his religion were violated and that he was unconstitutionally retaliated against for engaging in protected First Amendment activity. Specifically, Long claimed that he was denied meals consistent with his Islamic faith, that his meal during Ramadan was delivered early and thus was cold and potentially unsafe by the time he could break his fast, and that he was transferred from a medium-security facility to a high-security facility in retaliation for filing grievances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the district court erred in dismissing Long's claims for injunctive relief without allowing him a chance to amend his complaint to demonstrate the need for such relief. The court also vacated the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Lee, holding that the delivery of Long's evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of religion. The court remanded the case to allow the district court to evaluate whether the burden was justified.However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Chief of Security Antonio regarding Long’s claim that he was transferred from a medium-security facility to a high-security facility in retaliation for filing grievances. The court agreed with the district court that the sequence of events leading to the transfer was insufficient to show retaliatory intent. The court also affirmed the district court’s judgment after a bench trial in favor of Sergeant Sugai and Chief of Security Antonio on Long’s free exercise of religion and retaliation claims. View "LONG V. SUGAI" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a group of plaintiffs challenged a Seattle ordinance that criminalizes the intentional writing, painting, or drawing on property without the express permission of the property’s owner or operator. The plaintiffs, who were arrested for writing political messages in charcoal and sidewalk chalk near a Seattle Police Department precinct, argued that the ordinance was substantially overbroad under the First Amendment and facially vague under the Fourteenth Amendment.The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because enjoining enforcement of the ordinance was substantially likely to redress plaintiffs’ injury by allowing them to chalk political messages on City sidewalks and barriers erected on public walkways without fear of arrest. However, the court found that the district court erred when it granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction on their First Amendment facial overbreadth claim and their Fourteenth Amendment facial vagueness claim. The court reasoned that the district court failed to acknowledge the numerous applications of the ordinance that would not implicate any protected speech, and speculated about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the court.Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "TUCSON V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

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In the case involving Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron, and Springville Investors, LLC, versus Multnomah County, the Metro Regional Government, and members of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, the plaintiffs challenged the designation of their land in Multnomah County, Oregon, as "rural reserves" under the Oregon Land Reserves Statute. They claimed that the statute and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and that the defendants’ rural reserve designations violated their federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the designation, concluding that the requirements for Burford abstention (a doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding a case in deference to state courts) were met for each of the as-applied claims. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs had abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. View "BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a judgment from the United States District Court for the Central District of California regarding the FBI's "inventory" of 700 safe deposit boxes at US Private Vaults (USPV). The USPV was under investigation for various criminal activities. The FBI seized the boxes and their contents under a warrant that expressly did not authorize a criminal search or seizure of the box contents. After a trial based on written submissions, the district court ruled in favor of the government, holding that the government's "inventory" of the safe deposit boxes was a constitutionally valid inventory search. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that the inventory search doctrine did not apply because one of the key features of the doctrine is the existence of standardized instructions which limit the discretion of officers and apply consistently across cases. The court found that the FBI had supplemented its standardized instructions with additional instructions specifically designed for the USPV raid, which took the case out of the realm of a standardized "inventory" procedure. The Ninth Circuit also held that the government exceeded the scope of the warrant, which did not authorize a criminal search or seizure of the contents of the safe deposit boxes. The case was remanded for the FBI to sequester or destroy the records of its inventory search pertaining to the class members. View "Snitko v. United States" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. MARIN" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the drug-trafficking and money-laundering convictions of Benjamin Galecki and Charles Burton Ritchie for their distribution of "spice," a synthetic cannabinoid product. The defendants were found guilty of manufacturing and distributing spice through their company, Zencense Incenseworks, LLC. The drug-trafficking charges were based on the premise that the cannabinoid used, XLR-11, was treated as a controlled substance because it was an "analogue" of a listed substance. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that their convictions should be set aside due to Fourth Amendment violations, insufficient evidence, and vagueness of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986. However, the court reversed their mail and wire fraud convictions due to insufficient evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. GALECKI" on Justia Law

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In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle. View "USA V. ESQUEDA" on Justia Law