Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court increased Defendant’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on a finding that Defendant’s prior Montana conviction for partner or family member assault (“PFMA”) under Mont. Code Ann. Section 45-5- 206(1)(a) is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.   The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. Applying the categorical approach, the panel held that PFMA is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines because the definition of “bodily injury” incorporated into PFMA includes more conduct than the “use of physical force” required by U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)(1). Under Montana’s unusual definition, bodily injury “includes mental illness or impairment,” and Montana courts have concluded that one can cause “bodily injury” solely through the infliction of mental anguish unaccompanied by any actual or threatened physical violence. Because the court must determine whether PFMA categorically requires violent force—not whether Defendant actually used it in his prior offense—the panel held that PFMA is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "USA V. BENITO CASTRO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Law Enforcement Ranger in Idaho, challenged adverse employment actions taken against him by the Department of the Interior and BLM officials. He sued Defendants, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   In an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action alleging due process violations and seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The panel held that Plaintiff had no claim for money damages under Bivens. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arose in a different context than what the Court has recognized. Congress has also already provided a remedy in this context under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Because this case involves an alternative remedial structure, this case exists in a novel context outside the preexisting Bivens framework. Extending Bivens here would risk impermissible intrusion into the functioning of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. View "DAVID HARPER V. MICHAEL NEDD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The County of Marin (“the County”), at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, took action to limit the spread of COVID-19 and protect its vulnerable citizens by issuing a public health order that placed certain restrictions on allowable activities. The County continually modified its original health order based on data and increased knowledge of how the virus spreads. During the time that a modified version of the health order was in effect, the County learned of aviation activities by Seaplane Adventures, LLC (“Seaplane”) that violated the applicable health order and began a dialogue with Seaplane regarding its failure to comply with the County’s health order. Seaplane ultimately ceased its operations that were in violation of the County’s health order and filed the suit before us today. Seaplane appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that regardless of what the relevant comparison category was for comparing whether the County’s actions were rooted in a rational basis, given that a deadly virus was tearing into the most vulnerable throughout the County, country, and world, the actions of the County met the rational basis standard as it took actions to mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 virus. To the extent that Seaplane was alleging differential treatment between Seaplane and other air carriers providing recreational flights in violation of the health order, the rational basis for the County’s action was also abundantly clear: it simply did not know of the other violators. View "SEAPLANE ADVENTURES, LLC V. COUNTY OF MARIN" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact of a child under age twelve. He argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and therefore his appeal waiver is invalid because the district court failed to inform him that his conviction could potentially lead to subsequent civil commitment, community notification, and geographic restrictions on his residence and workplace.
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The panel held that Defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the appellate waiver included in his plea agreement was therefore in force. The panel held that the district court’s failure to inform Defendant that his conviction could potentially lead to subsequent civil commitment, community notification, and geographic restrictions on his residence and workplace did not render his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary because these three post-release effects were collateral rather than direct consequences of the plea. Following United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the panel held that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), holding that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise a client whether a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation, does not require a court, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, to advise a defendant about possible civil commitment, geographic restrictions, and community notification consequences of a guilty plea. View "USA V. MAURICE HOLLINS" on Justia Law

Believing that two men were about to engage in the armed robbery of a gas station, defendant police officers ("Defendants") approached the Plaintiff's’ vehicle with guns pointed and forcibly removed him. The district court denied the Defendants' claim to qualified immunity, and the Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, it was not clearly established that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur. Second, clearly established law did not prevent the officers from suspecting Plaintiff might be armed. Here, Defendants believed Plaintiff was about to commit and armed robbery, which is a crime typically involving the use of a weapon. Nothing gave the panel any reason to second guess the officer's "on the ground" determination.The court also rejected Plainitff's claim that it was a violation of a clearly established right to point a firearm at the Plaintiff and demand he exits his vehicle without first identifying themselves as law enforcement. View "DEJUAN HOPSON V. JACOB ALEXANDER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Nevada enacted Senate Bill 248 (“S.B. 248”), Act of June 2, 2021, ch. 291, 2021 Nev. Stat. 1668, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. S.B. 248 requires debt collectors to provide written notification to debtors 60 days before taking any action to collect a medical debt. Plaintiffs are entities engaged in consumer debt collection. They filed suit in district court against Defendant, Commissioner of the Financial Institutions Division of Nevada’s Department of Business and Industry, bringing a facial challenge to the law. They moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, contending that S.B. 248 is unconstitutionally vague, violates the First Amendment and is preempted by both the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel first rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the term “action to collect a medical debt” in S.B. 248 was unconstitutionally vague, noting that the implementing regulations set forth examples of actions that do, and do not, constitute actions to collect a medical debt. The panel held that: S.B. 248 regulates commercial speech and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny; communications to collect a medical debt “concerned lawful activity” and were not “inherently misleading.” The panel next rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the FCRA expressly preempts S.B. 248 under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681t(b)(1)(F). View "AARGON AGENCY, INC., ET AL V. SANDY O'LAUGHLIN" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the district court’s sentencing order, which imposed a heightened base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing on an open record. The court explained Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) applies if the offense involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” Application Note 2 to Section 2K2.1 defines such a firearm as one: that has the ability to fire many rounds without reloading because, at the time of the offense (A), the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. Because the parties assumed that Application Note 2 applies, the panel deemed waived any arguments concerning whether Application Note 2 is inconsistent with the Guideline or whether Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) is ambiguous so as to defeat resort to Application Note 2. Because these issues were waived, the panel applied Application Note 2 for the purposes of this appeal.   The panel held that the district court clearly erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant’s magazine could accept more than 15 rounds, where the government did not physically produce or inspect the firearm or the magazine, and, without physical evidence, the government largely relied on its expert agent, who was, at most, equivocal. View "USA V. FRANCISCO LUCAS, JR." on Justia Law

After a grand jury indicted Defendant, he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to three counts of cocaine distribution and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At sentencing, the district court concluded that the two-level Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applied but found—albeit deeming it a “close call”—that Defendant was entitled to safety valve relief under Section 2D1.1(b)(18). It also found that Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was well-supported by a historical tradition of Second Amendment regulation and rejected Defendant’s constitutional objection. Calculating a total offense level of 15, the court sentenced Defendant to a below-Guidelines term of 15 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) under Bruen.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Applying the two-part test adopted by Bruen, the panel assumed, without deciding, that step one is met—when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. At step two, however, the panel found Section 2D1.1(b)(1) constitutional because it clearly comports with a history and tradition of regulating the possession of firearms during the commission of felonies involving a risk of violence. View "USA V. MIGUEL ALANIZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that when he was a first-year student-athlete at the University of Arizona, his teammates subjected him to frequent “sexual and homophobic bullying” because they perceived him to be gay. He claims that the Arizona Board of Regents and the University of Arizona (“University Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to his claims of sexual harassment and that they retaliated against him in violation of Title IX. He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two of his coaches (collectively, “Defendant Coaches”). Finally, he sought punitive damages against the Defendant Coaches. The district court dismissed the action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. The panel held that Title IX bars sexual harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. The panel held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex-based discrimination under Title IX. The panel held that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the first, third, and fourth elements of his Title IX harassment claim, but the operative complaint failed to allege a deprivation of educational opportunity. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the harassment claim, vacated the portion of the district court’s order denying leave to amend, and remanded for the district court to consider Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint again, should he renew that request before the district court. The panel held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged that Plaintiff suffered harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and that Defendants retaliated against him when they failed to investigate his accusations adequately. View "MICHAEL GRABOWSKI V. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The State of Nevada sentenced Petitioner to die for brutally raping and murdering a 16-year-old in 1979. Petitioner pled not guilty by reason of insanity but was convicted by the jury after a trial in the District Court for White Pine County in Ely, Nevada. Petitioner argued that he is intellectually disabled and, therefore cannot constitutionally be executed under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Nevada trial court found he was not intellectually disabled, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which is subject to the restrictions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that he is not intellectually disabled is unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably found that a 1981 IQ test was of “little value”. The panel wrote that first, the Nevada Supreme Court explicitly rejected Petitioner’s argument that the trial court had erred in crediting the 1981 IQ test over another expert’s testing. The second reason was that the record as a whole portrays Petitioner as a person who does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court said that it “need not decide the relevance, if any, of” the Flynn Effect, which causes average IQ test scores to inflate over time, “and the necessity of adjusting the 1981 IQ score” because that test occurred well after Petitioner turned 18. View "ROBERT YBARRA, JR. V. WILLIAM GITTERE" on Justia Law