Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder in the guilt phase of his trial but the jury deadlocked over his sentence in the penalty phase of his case. At issue was whether the trial court violated petitioner's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy where the trial court failed to ask the jury if it had unanimously rejected the death penalty, and instead was deadlocked over a lesser sentence, before discharging the jury. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion or subject petitioner to double jeopardy by declining to poll the jury where the jurors were clearly deadlocked, appeared frustrated after lengthy proceedings, could have been inclined to treat preliminary compromise as a final verdict, and never indicated that they had reached a final finding acquitting petitioner. The court also held that in the retrial of the penalty phase the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude the state from including the death penalty as a sentencing option.

Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) where defendant was indicted and convicted for possession of a firearm while he was subjected to a Tucson City Court order directing him to have no contact with his former girlfriend and her family. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal where the no-contact order did not satisfy the requirements of section 922(g)(8). The court held that the district court erred when it denied defendant's motion for acquittal where, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, the charge failed as a matter of law when it failed to contain explicit terms substantially similar in meaning to the language of section 992(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Defendants appealed a denial of qualified immunity from plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment claims against them where plaintiff's claims arose out of his arrest on suspicion of smuggling methamphetamine into the Merced County Jail and out of a subsequent search of plaintiff's law office. At issue was whether defendants qualified for immunity for arresting plaintiff after receiving information about the drug smuggling from a jailhouse informant. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where they did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights when, after developing probable cause to arrest plaintiff, they forthrightly applied to the same judge, acting as a neutral magistrate, for a search warrant; where they executed the warrant under the supervision of a court-appointed master to ensure the integrity of plaintiff's law office and his client's files; and where defendants did not "knowingly violate the law" and they were not "plainly incompetent."

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") May 2005 order denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal and its March 2006 order denying his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). At issue was whether the BIA properly denied petitioner asylum and withholding of removal, whether the BIA properly denied petitioner's claim for protection under the CAT, and whether petitioner's due process rights were violated. The court held that the BIA properly concluded that petitioner's drug-trafficking offense rendered him ineligible for asylum and withholding relief where the record did not compel the conclusion that probable cause was lacking. The court also held that the BIA properly denied petitioner protection under the CAT where substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that he was not likely to be tortured upon return to the Philippines. The court further held that there was nothing in the record compelling the conclusion that certain witness testimony somehow precluded petitioner from presenting his claims for relief.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after plaintiff was arrested for, among other things, possession of false identification documents, when he reported to an agent with the Enforcement Division of the Nevada Gaming Control Board ("NGCB") that MGM management had unlawfully denied him payment of his tickets at their casinos. The agent arrested plaintiff after casino records indicated that he had previously redeemed tickets under two different names and the charges against plaintiff were later dismissed. At issue was whether plaintiff's false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, and premises liability claims were properly dismissed under Nevada law and whether plaintiff's false arrest and conspiracy to commit false arrest claims were properly dismissed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiff admitted to the agent that he possessed and used an unofficial identification card and credit card with a different name to gamble at several Las Vegas casinos; where plaintiff's admissions provided the agent with probable cause to believe he had committed a crime and therefore permitting the agent to arrest him; and where, as a result, plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state plausible claims for false arrest, conspiracy to commit false arrest, false imprisonment, and premises liability under state and federal law.

Defendant, a seventeen-year old high school student, appealed his convictions on felony murder after the murder of nine individuals, including six monks, at a Buddhist temple. Although defendant eventually confessed to participating in the nine murders, he challenged his confession, asserting that the Miranda advisements he was given were inadequate and that his confession was involuntary. The court held that the advisement provided to defendant, which consumed twelve pages of transcript and completely obfuscated the core precepts of Miranda, was inadequate. The court also held that that nearly thirteen hours of relentless overnight questioning of a sleep-deprived teenager by a tag team of officers overbore the will of that teen, rendering his confession involuntary. The court further concluded that the state court rulings to the contrary were an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of governing Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, having reviewed the facts and circumstances of the case in light of Florida v. Powell, the court reaffirmed its prior rulings.

Plaintiffs, operators of a business that promoted gun shows throughout California, sued the County of Alameda and county officials alleging that a county ordinance, which made it a misdemeanor to bring onto or to possess a firearm or ammunition on county property, violated their Constitutional rights. At issue was whether the Second Amendment prohibited a local government from banning gun shows. Also at issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. The court initially held that only regulations which substantially burden the right to keep and to bear arms triggered heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment. Therefore, the court held that to the extent the district court's leave to amend was with prejudice, it must be vacated where plaintiffs could still be able to allege sufficient facts to state that the ordinance substantially burdened their right to keep and to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The court also held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs' First Amendment claim where the ordinance passed the United States v. O'Brien test. The court further held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim where plaintiffs' claim would fail so long as the ordinance's distinction between military reenactments and gun shows were rational.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 70 months imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release when he was convicted of possession of child pornography. At issue was whether his sentence was procedurally erroneous due to the district court's refusal to accept his Kimbrough v. United States argument absent guidance from the court and whether his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that it was unable to ascertain whether the district court committed procedural error by failing to appreciate its Kimbrough discretion to vary from the child pornography Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2, on policy grounds or whether it recognized, but declined to exercise that discretion. The court also held that only when it was satisfied that the district court appreciated its Kimbrough discretion would it consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to resentence exercising its Kimbrough Discretion.

Defendant, while under federal supervision, was arrested and charged in Ada County, Idaho for a number of state offenses and in light of the arrests, the government petitioned the district court to revoke defendant's federal supervised release. At issue was whether probation officers' sentencing recommendations following the revocation of supervised release must be disclosed. The court held that post-revocation sentencing recommendations, like post-conviction sentencing recommendations, must be disclosed unless the district court directed otherwise by local rule or by order in a case. Therefore, the court held that the district court complied with United States v. Baldrich's requirements that the court disclose any factual information in the confidential recommendation on which it relied in sentencing. The court also held that Rule 32(e)(3) and its implementing local rule counterpart, District of Idaho Local Criminal Rule 32.1, comported with the Equal Protection Clause and there was no violation of defendant's constitutional rights.