Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition seeking relief from his state conviction for felony first-degree murder, armed robbery and kidnapping, and from his capital sentence. At issue was whether defendant's conviction and sentence was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law or a reasonable determination of the facts under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDA"), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's habeas petition and held that defendant failed to show that he was entitled to relief on his appeal when his petition was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, he failed to show that the Arizona Supreme Court acted unreasonably in rejecting his arguments that admission of his incriminating statements to correctional officers violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and Massiah v. United States; he failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing where he did not establish "specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief;" and where the incriminating statements were admissible and the evidence presented provided a sufficient basis for the imposition of a capital sentence.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 210 months imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release for receipt/distribution of child pornography. At issue was whether the district court correctly relied on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) to guide its discretions in choosing which of two counts to dismiss when required to do so by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the district court noted that Ninth Circuit precedent prohibited conviction and sentencing for both possession and receipt/distribution of child pornography when the charges were predicated on the same set of images. Also at issue was whether the district court's sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The court held that, in choosing which count to vacate, the district court clearly evaluated the totality of the circumstances of defendant's case under United States v. Hector along with the section 3553(a) factors and therefore, did not abuse its discretion. The court also held that the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable where the district court carefully and correctly considered the factors set forth in section 3553(a) in sentencing the defendant.

Plaintiffs, 54 residents of Ryderwood residential community, filed an action against the Ryderwood Improvement and Service Association ("RISA") alleging that the age restrictions imposed by RISA violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3617, and that RISA had never satisfied the requirements of the Housing for Old Persons Act exemption ("HOPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-76, section 2, 109 Stat. 787. At issue was whether RISA was exempt from the FHA's prohibitions on familial status discrimination under one of the housing for older persons exemptions set out in section 3607(b). The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings holding that a residential community that had continuously operated as a retirement community for persons age 55 or older could qualify for the housing for older persons exemption from the FHA's prohibition on familial status discrimination by establishing that it currently satisfied the exemptions' three statutory and regulatory criteria at the time of the alleged violation, even if the community enforced age restrictions when it first achieved compliance with the exemption's age verification requirement.

Plaintiff, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and plaintiff-intervenor appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Lucent Technologies, Inc. ("Lucent"), plaintiff-intervenor's former employer, on claims that he was terminated in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, ("FEHA"), Cal.Gov't Code 12920.5. DFEH also challenged the district court's finding of diversity jurisdiction and plaintiff-intervenor challenged the district court's denial of his motion to intervene. The court held that the district court correctly determined that it possessed jurisdiction where the statutory scheme did not support a finding that DFEH was a real party in the controversy for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The court also held that the district court's denial of plaintiff-intervenor's motion to intervene as a right was not in error where he failed to demonstrate that he was not adequately represented by California and that the court did not abuse its discretion in placing various limitations on him as a permissive intervenor. The court further held that summary judgment was proper where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to DFEH's claims and where DFEH failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The court finally held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff-intervenor's wrongful termination claim where DFEH could not prevail on any of its claims under the FEHA.

Defendant filed a motion for acquittal where he was convicted for being an alien who reentered the United States after previously being deported. At issue was whether the district court properly instructed the jury that there was a presumption of defendant's alienage and that the burden of proof was shifted to defendant to establish that he had obtained American citizenship by having been born to a U.S. citizen father. The court held that defendant faced no burden to claim derivative citizenship in an effort to negate the government's charge that he was an alien. The court also held that the government did not have the burden of disproving each element of derivative citizenship but needed only to prove that "alienage" was among the elements of the crime. The court further held that it was possible that a rational trier of fact could consider the evidence of defendant's father's citizenship, determine that defendant might meet the requirements for derivative citizenship, but then concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on his actions and admissions, he was not actually an American citizen. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to acquit and allowed for the possibility of retrial on remand.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition where he was convicted of aggravated murder in 1982 and was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence with a 30 year minimum term. At issue was whether defendant had a liberty interest in becoming parole-eligible before the expiration of the minimum term of his sentence. Also at issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when the Parole Board lacked "some evidence" to support its finding that he could not be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The court held that the language of Oregon's murder review statute created a presumption in favor of early eligibility for a parole hearing when certain designated findings were made and thereby gave rise to a constitutional liberty interest. The court held that petitioner's due process rights were not violated when he was afforded access to his records in advance of the hearings, he was given the opportunity to submit information to the Parole Board and to make a statement during the hearing, and was eventually provided with a written statement for the reasons why he was denied early eligibility for parole.

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.

Defendant appealed convictions of resisting a government employee or agent and obstructing a license plate where the charges arose out of a traffic stop that escalated into an altercation between defendant and four park rangers. Defendant had a broken leg and was driving a motorhome that was towing a pick-up truck when he was stopped. At issue was whether defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence, whether defendant was entitled to a necessity defense when he resisted the park rangers due to his broken leg, and whether a towed-vehicle, by definition, was not "self-propelled" for purposes of 36 C.F.R. 4.2(b). The court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support defendant's conviction where a reasonable factfinder could find that defendant willfully resisted arrest when he tensed his arms and made fists, jerked his right arm out of two park rangers' grips, did not get on the ground when ordered to do so, and rotated his body to the right. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the rejection of defendant's necessity defense where he failed to demonstrate that no rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, would reject his necessity defense. The court further held that it would be illogical to consider "self-propelled" as an impermanent quality and affirmed defendant's conviction for obscuring a license plate under section 4.2(b).

Plaintiff, a Washington State prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") action against defendants who are private entities that operate as chaplains within the Washington State prison system. At issue was whether defendants were state actors for purposes of section 1983 and RLUIPA when they declined plaintiff's request for a Torah, a Jewish calendar, and a rabbi visit on the ground that they did not consider him to be Jewish. The court held that defendants were not state actors where defendants' actions did not present the required "close nexus between the State and the challenged action" when plaintiff's alleged deprivation was not caused by the exercise of governmental policy and when there was no evidence that defendants were state actors under the public-function analysis and the joint participation analysis.

Defendant appealed a denial of his motion to suppress evidence against him when he was charged with counterfeiting currency and possessing with the intent to use counterfeit currency. At issue was whether the arresting officer's examination of folded bills, partially concealed in the weatherstripping of the car in which defendant was a passenger, violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated where the officer had probable cause to search the car and to examine suspected contraband within it when the officer identified several interrelated factors that, under the totality of the circumstances, created a fair probability that a search of the car would yield evidence of the crime and when defendant did not establish that the officer required independent probable cause to unfold the bills.