Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an Arizona prisoner, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing as untimely Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The panel held that a post-conviction relief application in Arizona ceases to be “pending” under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling AEDPA’s one-year limitation period as long as a state avenue for relief remains open, whether or not a petitioner takes advantage of it. Applying the same statute, the panel also held that Petitioner’s post-conviction application ceased to be pending when the time for him to seek further relief in the state courts expired, which was not precisely when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Applying those principles and correcting some misunderstandings as to when certain events occurred and certain periods expired, the panel reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "PAUL MELVILLE, JR. V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law

A California jury sentenced Petitioner to death for a 1988 murder. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. This appeal arose from the district court’s decision granting penalty phase relief on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State appealed that decision, and Petitioner cross-appealed the denial of guilt phase relief.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on claims at the guilt phase. Reviewing under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d), the panel held in the government’s appeal that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in evaluating Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. The panel concluded that had the three categories of evidence that counsel should have discovered been presented to the jury, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted against the death penalty. The panel did not need to reach whether the denial of relief on Petitioner’s penalty-phase claim that he was deprived of due process by the State’s presentation of false evidence violated 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d). On Petitioner’s cross-appeal from the denial of relief at the guilt phase, the panel held that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and its progeny in upholding the admission of Petitioner’s confession. View "TAUNO WAIDLA V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

In this case, multiple defendants alleged that one Assistant U.S. Attorney engaged in potential professional misconduct. Rather than screening out the accused Assistant U.S. Attorney, the district court disqualified all 180 federal prosecutors from the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office from defending against the misconduct allegations. The district court then ordered the Department of Justice to supply an attorney from outside Arizona to litigate Defendants’ motions.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order disqualifying the entire District of Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office and directing the Department of Justice to supply an attorney from outside Arizona to represent the government in pending motions. The panel held that the district court’s sweeping disqualification order was an abuse of discretion. The panel wrote that based on separation-of-powers principles and the consensus among courts, disqualification of an entire U.S. Attorney’s Office is an extreme remedy—only appropriate in the most extraordinary circumstances. e panel held that the record does not support an officewide disqualification, and without any evidence of officewide involvement, it was pure speculation to conclude that any conflict or misconduct pervaded the entire U.S. Attorney’s Office. The panel also held that no clear violation of law or ethics supports an officewide disqualification. The panel wrote that the district court—whose decision to disqualify was informed, in part, by a comparison to an internal investigation of a private company—does not appear to have sufficiently appreciated the separation-of-powers concern. View "USA V. DAVID WILLIAMS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff previously worked for the Springfield Utility Board (SUB). As part of an internal investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct, SUB restricted Plaintiff from speaking with potential witnesses and other SUB employees regarding the subject of the investigation while it was underway. Plaintiff sued SUB, certain SUB employees, and SUB’s retained counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the investigation-related speech restrictions violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel held that the communication restriction complained of by Plaintiff did not violate the First Amendment because it did not limit Plaintiff’s ability to speak about matters of public concern. Nothing in Defendants’ instructions barred him from speaking about any alleged mismanagement at the Springfield Utility Board or other topics that would potentially relate to a matter of public concern. Rather, the restrictions merely barred him from personally discussing his own alleged violation of Springfield Utility Board policies—a matter of private, personal concern—with potential witnesses or fellow Springfield Utility Board employees. View "TODD ROBERTS V. SPRINGFIELD UTILITY BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Senator Warren, alleging that her letter violated their First Amendment rights by attempting to intimidate Amazon and other booksellers into suppressing their book titled The Truth About COVID-19: Exposing the Great Reset, Lockdowns, Vaccine Passports, and the New Normal. They sought a preliminary injunction requiring Senator Warren to remove the letter from her website, issue a public retraction, and refrain from sending similar letters in the future. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to raise a serious First Amendment question and that the equitable considerations did not weigh in their favor.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The panel held that the alleged reputational harm to Plaintiffs provided a sufficient basis for standing. Senator Warren’s letter disparaged the book by claiming that the book perpetuated dangerous falsehoods that have led to countless deaths. It also directly impugned the professional integrity of one of the authors. Plaintiffs have shown that these remarks, which Senator Warren broadcast to the public by posting the letter on her website, damaged their reputations. Reputational harm stemming from an unretracted government action is a sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes. In addition, the panel held that the requested preliminary injunction would likely redress Plaintiffs’ reputational injuries. The panel applied a four-factor framework formulated by the Second Circuit and agreed with the district court that Senator Warren’s letter did not cross the constitutional line between persuasion and coercion. View "ROBERT KENNEDY, JR., ET AL V. ELIZABETH WARREN" on Justia Law

The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the Upper Skagit tribe) claimed that the usual and accustomed fishing areas of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe (the Sauk tribe) under a 1974 decision do not include the Skagit River, and therefore that decision did not authorize the Sauk tribe to open salmon fisheries on that river. The dispute, in this case, relates to the meaning of Finding of Fact 131 in Final Decision I, which defines the Sauk tribe’s U&As   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Upper Skagit tribe. The court concluded that the district court intended to omit the Skagit River from the Sauk tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing areas. The panel agreed with the Upper Skagit tribe’s contention that Finding of Fact 131 clearly and unambiguously established Judge Boldt’s intent not to include the Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As. The panel held that if Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit River in the U&As of the Sauk tribe, he would have used that specific term, as he did elsewhere. The panel held that the Lane Report, on which Judge Boldt heavily relied, reinforced its conclusion. The panel held that none of the statements undermined its conclusion that Judge Boldt’s intent was clear or showed that he intended to include the Skagit River in the U&As contrary to the plain text of Finding of Fact 131. View "UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE, ET AL V. SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, Plaintiff completed several education courses which entitled him to sentence deductions under Nevada law. After he was released and his parole ended, Plaintiff sued, asserting that Defendants’ failure to apply earned credit-deductions to his sentence deprived him of liberty without due process and denied him equal protection of the law by targeting him for the denial of credits because he is a sex offender.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s  Section 1983 against the Nevada Department of Corrections and several Department officials alleging that they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by failing to deduct education-credits he earned from his sentence, and remanded. The panel first rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because they necessarily implied that the duration of his sentence was invalid. The panel held that Heck did not apply in this case. Plaintiff was no longer in custody and was thus unable to raise claims for credit deductions in a petition for habeas corpus. The panel held that the district court erred by interpreting Plaintiff’s due process claim as asserting only a deprivation of minimum-sentence deductions affecting his parole eligibility date and ignoring his claim for maximum-sentence deductions. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim because Plaintiff had not alleged facts supporting discrimination. View "PHILIP GALANTI V. NDOC, ET AL" on Justia Law