Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the district court’s judgment on the third revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction because, at the time of his third violation, he was serving a term of supervised release that exceeded the applicable statutory maximum.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the rationale of United States v. Castro Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), which involved the same issue in the context of probation revocation, the panel held that because Defendant was serving a term of supervised release when he committed the instant violation, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release and impose an additional term of imprisonment, regardless of any error in the sentence imposed on the second revocation. The panel declined to reach Defendant’s argument that the term of supervised release imposed on his second revocation exceeded the statutory maximum. Consistent with Castro Verdugo and earlier precedent, the panel held that an appeal challenging a supervised release revocation is not the proper avenue through which to attack the validity of the underlying sentence. View "USA V. CARLOS ESTRADA" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). These officials exercise significant authority within our immigration system, making them officers under the Appointments Clause.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition. The panel rejected Petitioner’s suggestion that Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their appointment in the Attorney General. The panel next held that the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II, which requires that officers remain accountable to the President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates. The panel explained that Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration Judges and BIA members, and that nothing restricts the Attorney General’s ability to remove them. Thus, these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for their positions—and by extension, on the President. View "FORTUNATO AMADOR DUENAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that the practice of requiring lockdown inmates to use a paging system to request law library materials—instead of physically visiting the law library— deprived him of access to the courts because the paging system required inmates to request the specific source by name, and thereby prevented him from discovering a Nevada Supreme Court decision that supported his claim for postconviction relief. Specifically, Plaintiff, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, argued that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Nika v. State, 198 P.3d 839, 850 (Nev. 2008), resurrected his habeas claim related to a jury for the instruction on mens rea, but because of the paging system, he did not learn of Nika until seven years after it was decided, at which point he had already filed three unsuccessful habeas petitions. Upon discovering Nika, Plaintiff filed additional petitions in 2016 and 2019, which were denied.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim that the prison officials denied him meaningful access to the courts under the First Amendment. The panel held that because Plaintiff could not show actual injury—the hindrance of a nonfrivolous underlying legal claim—he lacked standing. Plaintiff offered no reason, beyond speculation, to think that the Nevada courts would have reached a different decision had he filed a habeas claim within a year of Nika instead of seven years later. His habeas claim would have failed no matter when it was raised. View "BRENDAN NASBY V. STATE OF NEVADA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff on behalf of herself and her five minor children, appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendant police officers and the City and County of San Francisco (“Defendants”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. There were some facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that suggest Defendants may have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.   However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. In applying the qualified immunity analysis to claims of unlawful arrest, there is a two-step inquiry: whether there was probable cause for the arrest and whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest. The panel held that although a reasonable jury could find that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even construing all facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the law did not clearly establish that probable cause was lacking View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law

Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that he faced harassment, retaliation, and physical harm. Relevant here, he alleged that prison officer Lieutenant Carmen Herrera repeatedly threatened him, denied him law library access, and assaulted him several times, causing a broken arm and wrist. Plaintiff also alleged that physician’s assistant Jose Esquetini refused to treat his broken bones or take x-rays for six weeks to cover up Herrera’s assaults. Chambers asserts that he was then assaulted by Officer Enrique Velez, who allegedly sprayed him in the mouth and face with mace.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. Affirming the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim, the panel agreed with Plaintiff that the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule explicitly disavowed any Bivens claims based on First Amendment retaliation. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim failed to state a claim under Egbert. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim similarly failed under Bivens, but dismissal of that claim should be with prejudice because even plausible allegations could not constitute a Bivens claim for excessive force under Egbert, and amendment would be futile. The panel determined that it was unclear whether the Bivens claim was viable because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts about his injuries, examination, or treatment. View "ROSCOE CHAMBERS V. C. HERRERA, ET AL" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to a single count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), Defendant argued at his sentencing that the district court should not consider certain prior convictions in determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. According to Defendant, subsequent case authority made clear that the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions constitutionally invalid. Defendant argued that the district court should not consider his prior 2004 federal convictions in determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because the subsequent authority in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), made clear that the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions constitutionally invalid.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, under Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), neither the Constitution nor any federal statute granted Sadler a right to collaterally challenge the validity of his 2004 convictions in connection with their use in enhancing his sentence in this Section 922(g) prosecution. The panel also held that the Guidelines’ provisions and commentary did not create any such right. Defendant argued that the commentary accompanying Guidelines Section 2K2.1 requires that any conviction that is disregarded for criminal history purposes must also be disregarded in applying Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhanced base offense level for a felon-in-possession offense that follows a conviction for a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime. View "USA V. JASON SADLER" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the robbery of two jewelry stores in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(a). For his crimes, he was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment, including a mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a “crime of violence.” On appeal, Defendant argued that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and, therefore, cannot serve as a predicate for his Section 924(c) conviction and mandatory minimum sentence.   The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court explained that under the “elements clause” of Section 924(c), the phrase “crime of violence” is defined as “an offense that is a felony and . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The phrase “physical force” means violent force or force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. The panel applied the “categorical approach,” asking whether the federal felony at issue always requires the government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. The panel held that under United States v. Dominguez, completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c). The panel concluded that, even if it were not bound by Dominguez II, it would still find that Dominguez I’s analysis of the completed Hobbs Act robbery was not clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. View "USA V. LEON ECKFORD" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of leave to amend his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that neither witness tampering by attempting to kill a witness nor witness tampering by use of force is a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the panel held that Section 1512, as a whole, is not categorically a crime of violence because it criminalizes conduct that does not necessarily require physical force. The panel then applied the modified categorical approach because Section 1512 contains several, alternative elements of functionally separate crimes that carry different penalties, and the statute therefore is “divisible.” The panel held that Dorsey was convicted under a divisible part of the witness-tampering statute that qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause: either attempted killing in violation of Section 1512(a)(1) or use of force in violation of 1512(a)(2). The panel also held that the use of physical force in violation of Section 1512(a)(2) is a categorical match with Section 924(c)’s elements clause because it requires proving that the defendant intentionally used physical force against another. View "DEVAUGHN DORSEY V. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Syrian national, appealed his conviction after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted U.S. military personnel and property in Iraq. The jury delivered a mixed verdict on the six-count indictment. It convicted Defendant for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction (Count One), conspiring to damage U.S. government property (Count Two), and conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same (Counts Three and Four). The jury acquitted Defendant of conspiring to murder Americans (Count Five) and providing material support to terrorists (Count Six).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the conviction. Reversing in part, the panel agreed with the parties that Defendant’s convictions on Counts Three and Four, for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same, could not stand after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). On those counts, the panel remanded with direction to the district court to vacate the convictions. The panel affirmed Defendant’s convictions on Counts One and Two for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage U.S. Government property by means of an explosive. As to Count Two, the panel held that 18 U.S.C. Section 844(f) and (n) applied to Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct. The panel held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes as well as to civil statutes. View "USA V. AHMED ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law