Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appointees to a university committee created to satisfy federal legal requirements sought to enjoin the university from releasing the letters appointing them to the official committee. The appointees claimed that the disclosure of such letters, which contain their personal identifying information, would violate their First Amendment right of expressive association. The district court held that there was a serious question on the merits of that argument and preliminarily enjoined the disclosure.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting the University of Washington from releasing, in response to a public records request, letters appointing Plaintiffs to the University’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. The panel determined that here, the letters of appointment existed (and were part of the University’s public records) only because the committee members were appointed by the University according to statutory and regulatory criteria to ensure diverse representation. Their group association as committee members was not intended to enhance effective advocacy of their views or to pursue their lawful private interests but rather to fulfill federal requirements. Because, in performing their work on the committee, the members were not engaged in an association deemed to be “expressive” under Supreme Court or this Circuit’s precedent, the First Amendment right of expressive association did not protect them from the University’s disclosure of personal identifying information contained in their letters of appointment. Further, because the committee members’ work was unprotected by the First Amendment on an individual basis, their collective work on the committee was likewise unprotected. View "JANE SULLIVAN, ET AL V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Although the Board entertained the government’s challenge to a portion of the immigration judge’s decision in Petitioner’s case, it declined to consider Petitioner’s challenges to that decision because Petitioner had not filed a cross-appeal. Petitioner argued that the Board erred when it concluded that he was required to file a separate cross-appeal to challenge the immigration judge’s alternative order on the merits of his claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel observed that section 1003.3 does not expressly address cross-appeals. However, the panel wrote that the cross-appeal rule is an “unwritten but longstanding rule” under which “an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.” The panel explained that the Supreme Court has described this rule as “firmly entrenched,” and it has noted that “in more than two centuries of repeatedly endorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of our holdings has ever recognized an exception to the rule.” The panel noted that it was not suggesting that the Board was required to follow the traditional rule governing cross-appeals. Rather, the Board has authority to prescribe its own rules of procedure so long as the Board acts within the broad limits imposed by the Due Process Clause. The panel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s arguments for a waiver of the cross-appeal rule because he failed to exhaust that claim before the Board. View "JORGE LOPEZ HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pled “no contest” or “nolo contendere” to willfully resisting, obstructing, and delaying a peace officer in violation of section 148(a)(1) of the California Penal Code. Although Plaintiff entered the equivalent of a guilty plea, the state court never entered an order finding him guilty of the charge to which he pleaded. Instead, the court ordered that its acceptance of Plaintiff’s plea would be “held in abeyance,” pending his completion of ten hours of community service and obedience of all laws. After the six months of abeyance elapsed, the charges against Plaintiff were “dismissed” in the “interest of justice” on the prosecutor’s motion. Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court held that Plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest and municipal liability claims, as well as the district court’s adverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the Heck bar does not apply in a situation where criminal charges are dismissed after entry of a plea that was held in abeyance pending the defendant’s compliance with certain conditions. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Stockton and Stockton Police Department. Longstanding precedent establishes that both California municipalities and police departments are “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983. View "FRANCISCO DUARTE, ET AL V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff protested outside the federal courthouse in Portland, Oregon. He alleged that federal officers unlawfully arrested protesters and used excessive force, including by indiscriminately using tear gas against peaceful protesters. Together with other protesters, he brought this action against Defendant, then the Director of the Federal Protective Service’s Northwest Region, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.   The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that no Bivens cause of action is available in this case. Applying the two-step analysis set forth in Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), the panel held that a Bivens remedy could not be extended to this case because it presented a new context, and at least two independent factors indicated that the court was less equipped than Congress to determine whether the damages action should proceed.   The court wrote this case differed from Bivens because (1) Defendant, a high-level supervisor, was of a different rank than the agents in Bivens; (2) Defendant’s alleged actions, which consisted of ordering or acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct, took place at a higher level of generality than the actions of the agents in Bivens; and (3) the legal mandate under which Defendant acted differed from that of the agents in Bivens in that Defendant was directing a multi-agency operation to protect federal property and was carrying out an executive order. Allowing a Bivens action to proceed in this case could expose sensitive communications between Defendant and other high-level executive officers. View "MARK PETTIBONE, ET AL V. GABRIEL RUSSELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

One week after an armed robbery of a Sprint store in Los Angeles, Defendant was stopped and frisked by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). A handgun was recovered from the car and later introduced at Defendant’s trial as the weapon used in the Sprint store robbery. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and brandishing a firearm.   At issue on appeal is whether officers violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by exceeding the scope of their patdown search and seizing the car key, and, if a constitutional violation occurred, whether the handgun evidence was nevertheless admissible because Defendant’s flight from officers attenuated the discovery of the handgun.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1, reversed his conviction for brandishing a firearm, and remanded for a reduction of sentence or retrial on the Section 924(c) count. The court concluded that the handgun evidence was illegally obtained and should have been excluded at trial and that this error prejudiced Defendant as to the brandishing conviction but was harmless as to the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that Defendant did not objectively demonstrate his intent to abandon the car key. The panel wrote that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the handgun evidence at Defendant’s trial unless an exception to the rule applies. View "USA V. TERRANCE BAKER" on Justia Law

This case involved a Washington licensing scheme that disciplines healthcare providers for practicing conversion therapy on minors. The 9th Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.Judge O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Ikuta, Nelson and Vandyke, issued a statement respecting from the court's decision to deny rehearing en banc because the decision correctly applied existing precedent. However, Judge Scannlain noted that the court should have used this case as an opportunity to resolve a circuit split and to "clarify that regulation of the medical profession is not a First-Amendment-free zone."Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Bumatay wrote that because the speech underpinning conversion therapy is overwhelmingly—if not exclusively— religious, the court should have granted Plaintiff's petition for en banc review to evaluate his Free Speech claim under a more exacting standard. View "BRIAN TINGLEY V. ROBERT FERGUSON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving a sentence of supervised release for a prior federal conviction from Nevada when he was arrested and indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud. Soon after Defendant’s arrest, the government obtained an order permitting it to seize the funds in his inmate trust account and apply them to a restitution obligation for a prior federal conviction from Washington. Defendant pleaded guilty in the conspiracy case, admitted a violation of his supervised release in his Nevada case, and was sentenced in both cases. Defendant urges that the seizure of his inmate funds violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his Fifth Amendment due process right. He also contends that the district court’s imposition of an undisputedly illegal sentence for his supervised release violation is reversible error.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part, vacated the sentence imposed for the violation of supervised release, and remanded for re-sentencing on the supervised release violation. The panel concluded that the government’s seizure of Defendant’s inmate funds did not violate his right to either counsel of choice or due process. The court also concluded that the district court’s imposition of an illegally excessive sentence for Defendant’s supervised release violation was plain error that requires vacatur of that sentence and remand for re-sentencing. View "USA V. LONNIE LILLARD" on Justia Law

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also found various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That property included the collective membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to designate membership in an association or other organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and Eighth Amendments.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the indictment alleges that the association was organized for unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. The panel did not resolve the Government’s contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment.    On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks would violate the First and Eighth Amendments. Nor did the panel reach the question of whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the marks. The panel held that the forfeiture was improper for a different reason—the Government effectively sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the marks. View "USA V. MONGOL NATION" on Justia Law

A Huntington Beach City Councilperson appointed Plaintiff to the city’s Citizen Participation Advisory Board (“CPAB”). Each councilperson appoints one member to the seven-person CPAB and may remove that member without cause. After being appointed to the CPAB, Plaintiff was photographed at an immigrants’ rights rally standing near individuals whom the councilperson believed to be “Antifa.” After determining that Plaintiff’s public denouncement of Antifa was insufficient, the councilperson removed Plaintiff from the CPAB, citing lack of shared values.   Plaintiff sued the City of Huntington Beach, claiming retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights to free speech, association, and assembly and alleging the councilperson’s demand for a public statement amounted to unconstitutionally compelled speech. The district court dismissed the complaint.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, the panel held that the First Amendment does not protect a volunteer member of a municipal advisory board from dismissal by the city councilperson who appointed her and who is authorized under a city ordinance to remove her. The panel held that given the statutory structure and duties of the CPAB, the public could readily infer that a CPAB member’s actions and statements while serving in the role reflected the current views and goals of the appointing councilperson. Like each of her fellow board members, Plaintiff was the “public face” of her appointor. She could therefore be dismissed for lack of political compatibility. The panel further rejected Plaintiff’s compelled speech claim. View "SHAYNA LATHUS V. CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH" on Justia Law

Defendant asserted that permitting a juror to participate remotely via Zoom violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the error was structural and could not be waived, and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial without having to show prejudice. Defendant asserted that the alleged error is akin to depriving him of his right to a jury trial, depriving him of his right to a fair and impartial jury, depriving him of a representative jury, and/or depriving him of his right to confront witnesses   The Ninth Circuit affirmed his robbery convictions. The court assumed without deciding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the in-person participation of jurors during their trial. The panel wrote that none of these comparisons is apt, as there is no indication in the record—and no reason to suppose—that the remote participation of a duly empaneled juror interfered with the functioning of the jury, somehow made that juror partial or unrepresentative, or impacted the procedures used for the presentation of witnesses. The panel wrote that allowing remote juror participation does not impact the entire framework of the trial in ways that cannot be accurately measured on review. The court explained that none of those errors Defendant alleged will necessarily arise simply because a juror is participating remotely. The panel wrote that there is no case law or record evidence to support a presumption that the remote participation of a juror will always render a trial unfair and the judgment unreliable. View "USA V. EDWARD KNIGHT" on Justia Law