Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted in 1997 of felony assault with a deadly weapon committed while he was a juvenile. In 2016 and 2017, he pleaded guilty to two aggravated DUIs, which were felonies committed in 2003 while he was an adult. Relying on the Supreme Court's post-conviction decision in Rehaif v. United States, Defendant argued on appeal that his 2018 convictions should be overturned due to the district court's failure to instruct the jury that the government must prove that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.   The Ninth Circuit amended a February 15, 2023, opinion affirming Defendant’s 2018 convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc. It was undisputed that the district court’s failure to instruct on the Rehaif knowledge element was error and that the error was plain. The panel held, however, that Defendant cannot show that this error affected his substantial rights. In so holding, the panel did not need to reach whether being convicted as a juvenile or having been incarcerated for more than a year as a result of a juvenile conviction satisfies the Rehaif mens rea requirement. The panel held that Defendant’s two DUI convictions unambiguously demonstrate that there is no reasonable probability that a jury would find that Defendant did not know he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more in prison at the time he possessed the firearm. View "USA V. RYAN MICHELL" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his jury conviction and sentence for one count of conspiracy to transport, for profit, noncitizens who have entered or remain in the United States unlawfully, four counts of harboring such noncitizens for profit, and three counts of transportation of such noncitizens for profit, all in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1324. Defendant argued that his statements were involuntary because, just prior to the interrogation, an agent had shown him a plastic baggie containing drugs and threatened him with drug charges if he did not cooperate. After holding an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court denied the motion to suppress.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by wholly adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The panel wrote that the district court did what the Federal Magistrates Act requires: it indicated that it reviewed the record de novo, found no merit to Defendant’s objections, and summarily adopted the magistrate judge’s analysis in his report and recommendation.   The panel wrote that, after observing the implausibility of Defendant’s testimony and considering Defendant’s verbal and signed Miranda waiver, age, education level, and fluency in English, the magistrate judge properly recommended finding the statements made during the interrogation voluntary. Moreover, the panel could not hold that the magistrate judge was wrong to reject Defendant’s testimony, as the report and recommendation provided ample reason to find Defendant not credible, and the rest of the record supports the magistrate judge’s analysis. View "USA V. DEMETRIUS RAMOS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office.  Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of California. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel next held that because section 27001 applies evenhandedly to all who wish to use a horn when a safety hazard is not present, it draws a line based on the surrounding factual situation, not based on the content of expression. The panel, therefore, evaluated Section 27001 as a content-neutral law and applied intermediate scrutiny. The panel concluded that Section 27001 was narrowly tailored to further California’s substantial interest in traffic safety and, therefore, that it passed intermediate scrutiny. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought resentencing under Section 1172.6 the day after California enacted that statute. While his resentencing proceeding was ongoing, and shortly before the expiration of the deadline for Petitioner to file for relief pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition. Among other things, his petition alleged that several forms of prosecutorial misconduct had occurred in his trial. A magistrate judge denied Petitioner’s unopposed motion to stay his federal proceedings and recommended that the district court dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition without prejudice pursuant to Younger. The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Younger abstention was warranted and required dismissal.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, reversed the district court’s denial of his motion to stay, and remanded. The panel explained that Younger is not implicated here. Although there is an ongoing state proceeding—the resentencing under Section 1172.6 based on a change in state law—the federal petition, in this case, does not seek an injunction to prevent state officers from moving forward with the Section 1172.6 proceeding. That proceeding is, in substance, a new case based on a new statute, and Petitioner seeks no relief that would interfere with it. The panel held that the denial of Petitioner’s motion for a stay was also error because it was based on the misunderstanding that the district court lacked the authority to stay Petitioner’s habeas petition. View "JONATHAN DUKE V. JOSIE GASTELO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a devout Jehovah’s Witness, objected to California’s loyalty oath because she believed it would violate her religious beliefs by requiring her to pledge primary allegiance to the federal and state governments and to affirm her willingness to take up arms to defend them. he Controller’s Office rejected this proposal and rescinded the job offer. Plaintiff sued the Controller’s Office and the California State Controller in her official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII under both failure-to-accommodate and disparate-impact theories. She also asserted a failure-to-accommodate claim against the Controller’s Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and she alleged that the refusal by both defendants to accommodate her religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.   THe Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s alleged injury was redressable only through a claim for damages. The panel held that she lacked the actual and imminent threat of future injury required to have standing to seek prospective relief on any of her claims, but she could attempt to cure this defect by amendment. The panel held that Plaintiff could seek damages from the Controller’s Office on her claims under Title VII. As currently pleaded, she could not obtain damages for her free exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The panel held, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend to seek damages from the State Controller in her individual capacity. View "BRIANNA BOLDEN-HARDGE V. CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless. View "CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service, together with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, managed the rapidly changing fire conditions and actively communicated with the public about the Lolo Peak Fire. After the fire, various affected landowners sued the federal government. They claim that the Forest Service is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failing to comply with its duty to consult with them about fire-suppression activities on and near their properties. Specifically, they argued that the Forest Service was required to consult with landowners through individualized—rather than public—communication channels. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owners’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel applied the requisite two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applied. First, the panel examined whether there was a federal statute, regulation, or policy that prescribed the Forest Service’s course of action regarding the agency’s communications with the landowners during the Lolo Peak fire in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana in July 2017. The panel held that the Forest Service’s specific communications with the landowners exceeded the incident decision’s instruction and involved an element of judgment or choice sufficient to satisfy the first step of the discretionary function exception. The panel held that the Forest Service’s decisions about notifying the landowners about fire-suppression activities likely to occur on and near their properties were susceptible to a policy analysis. View "MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are landlords who filed an action against the City, alleging violations of their federal and state rights of free speech and substantive due process. The district court held that the Ordinance regulates speech, not conduct and that the speech it regulates is commercial speech. The district court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to hold that the Ordinance was constitutional as a “reasonable means of achieving the City’s objectives and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve them.”   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the City of Seattle’s Fair Chance Housing Ordinance, which prohibits landlords from inquiring about the criminal history of current or potential tenants and from taking adverse action, such as denying tenancy, against them based on that information.   The panel did not decide whether the Ordinance regulates commercial speech and calls for the application of intermediate scrutiny, or whether the Ordinance regulates non-commercial speech and is subject to strict scrutiny review because it concluded that the Ordinance did not survive the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The panel held that the Ordinance’s inquiry provision impinged upon the First Amendment rights of landlords. The panel rejected the landlords’ claim that the adverse action provision of the Ordinance violated their substantive due process rights because the landlords did not have a fundamental right to exclude, and the adverse action provision survived rational basis review. Further, the panel remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the presumption of severability was rebuttable and for further proceedings. View "CHONG YIM, ET AL V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Individuals Plaintiffs, Uber, Inc. (Uber) and Postmates, Inc. (Postmates, and collectively Plaintiffs) appealed the district court’s orders denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the State of California and the Attorney General of California (Defendants), from enforcing California Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 296 (A.B. 5), as amended by California Assembly Bill 170, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 415 (A.B. 170) and California Assembly Bill 2257, 2020 Cal. Stats. Ch. 38 (A.B. 2257, and collectively A.B. 5, as amended), against them. A.B. 5, as amended, codified the “ABC test” adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).1 A.B. 5, as amended, however, incorporated numerous exemptions into its provisions.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part district court orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded. The panel first held that, even under the fairly forgiving rational basis review, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B. 5, as amended, violated the Equal Protection Clause for those engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services. Thus, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the primary impetus for the enactment of A.B. 5 was the disfavor with which the architect of the legislation viewed Uber, Postmates, and similar gig-based business models. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that A.B. 5, as amended, completely prohibited them from exercising their “right to engage in a calling.” View "LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff called 911 seeking emergency mental health assistance for the mother of his children, with whom he lived and had five children. This call set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the death of Plaintiff’s ten-month-old twin sons at their mother’s own hand.   Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 involving the application of the “state-created danger” doctrine in the context of a welfare check; the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action for failure to state a claim, and remanded. The panel first made clear that the only two exceptions to the general rule against failure-to-act liability for Section 1983 claims presently recognized by this court were the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception. The panel, therefore, rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the failure to comply with a legally required duty can give rise to a substantive due process claim. The panel further held that the district court correctly held that the special-relationship exception did not apply here.   The panel next held that Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim against deputies failed because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which one could plausibly conclude that Defendants created or enhanced any danger to the twins. The panel held that Plaintiffs adequately stated their Section 1983 claims against the City of Tulare Police Sergeant under the state-created danger exception. Finally, because the panel reversed the dismissal of some of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the social worker and Sergeant, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the County and City of Tulare. View "JOSE MURGUIA V. HEATHER LANGDON, ET AL" on Justia Law