Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of various offenses stemming from an eight-person conspiracy to fraudulently obtain and launder millions of dollars in federal Covid-relief funds that were intended to assist businesses impacted by the pandemic. On appeal, Defendants challenged their restitution obligations on both legal and factual grounds.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendants’ restitution obligations, except that the court vacated and remanded for one Defendant’s judgment and commitment order to be amended to specify that, as all parties agree, his restitution obligation runs jointly and severally with those of his trial co-defendants. The panel held that, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), the district court properly imposed restitution in the full amount of the loss caused by the conspiracy instead of just the loss caused by the fraudulent loan applications Defendants personally played a role in submitting. In separately filed memorandum dispositions, the panel affirmed Defendants’ jury convictions, affirmed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to one defendant, and vacated and remanded for that defendant’s resentencing. View "USA V. ARTUR AYVAZYAN" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

In Hawaii, it is a misdemeanor knowingly to manufacture, sell, transfer, transport, or possess a butterfly knife—no exceptions. Plaintiffs sued Hawaii’s Attorney General and Sheriff Division Administrator (“Hawaii”). Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief to establish that section 134-53(a) violates the Second Amendment and injunctive relief against its enforcement. Plaintiffs alleged that, “but for Hawaii law,” they would purchase butterfly knives. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that section 134-53(a) does not violate the Second Amendment, granted Hawaii’s motion, and entered judgment in its favor.   The Ninth Circuit reversed district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hawaii officials. The court held that because the possession of butterfly knives is conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment, and because Hawaii has not demonstrated that its ban on butterfly knives is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms, the court concluded that section 134-53(a) violates Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The panel determined that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Section 134-53(a) because they alleged that the Second Amendment provides them with a legally protected interest to purchase butterfly knives, and for section 134-53(a), they would do so within Hawaii. Plaintiffs further articulated a concrete plan to violate the law, and Hawaii’s history of prosecution under its butterfly ban was good evidence of a credible threat of enforcement. The panel held that possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The panel held that Hawaii failed to prove that section 134-53(a) was consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating weapons. View "ANDREW TETER, ET AL V. ANNE E. LOPEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Following a federal trial, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decisions to (1) instruct the jury that a Section 1983 claim could not be grounded in a Miranda violation alone and (2) exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s coerced confessions expert. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the Miranda issue, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. On remand, Plaintiff concedes that his Miranda claim is no longer viable but maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on his Fifth Amendment coercion claim because the district court improperly excluded his expert witness.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants and remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim that his confession was coerced. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness’s testimony on coerced confessions because the testimony was relevant, false confessions are an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s confession went to the heart of his case. View "TERENCE TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in California state court of one count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of attempted murder on an aiding and abetting theory and sentenced to 56 years to life. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The district court denied his first federal habeas petition on the merits and declined to grant a certificate of appealability (COA); this court also declined to grant a COA. The district court dismissed as second or successive Petitioner’s second federal habeas petition, and the Ninth Circuit court affirmed the dismissal.   In consolidated appeals, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgments dismissing, as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b), Petitioner’s third and fourth federal habeas corpus petitions, and remanded. The panel held that Petitioner’s due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and equal protection claims did not become ripe until his application for resentencing was denied, which occurred well after the district court denied his first and dismissed his second habeas petitions. Because Petitioner could not have raised these claims in his first or second petition, his failure to do so is not an abuse of the writ. Applying Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the panel concluded that the third and fourth habeas petitions were, accordingly, not second or successive under Section 2244(b). View "GREGORY BROWN V. M. ATCHLEY" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241(c), 2246(2) & 1152. He contends that the district court misapplied a sentencing enhancement for abduction and thus improperly added four levels to his sentencing range.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that whether it evaluates the plain meaning of the term “abducted” as it appears in the Guideline itself or considers “abducted” to be ambiguous and looks to the definition in the Guidelines’ commentary, it would reach the same conclusion: the victim was “abducted” when the defendant forced her from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield to perpetrate the sexual assault. View "USA V. JOSHUA SCHEU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Guam-licensed OBGYN physicians in Hawaii who wish to provide abortion services to Guam patients through telemedicine. They point out that women in Guam seeking abortions must obtain chemical abortifacients via telemedicine, given the current lack of doctors who perform abortions in Guam. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Guam’s in-person informed-consent law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying rational basis review, the panel concluded that the in-person informed consent requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause because it furthers Guam’s legitimate governmental interests in preservation of potential life, protection of maternal health, and promotion of the integrity of the medical profession. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge under the Due Process Clause, in which plaintiffs argued that the in-person consultation requirement undermines informed consent because of the possibility that non-medical personnel may provide the required medical disclosures. The panel held that the requirement does not undermine informed consent because it does not mandate that a non-medical professional provide the in-person medical disclosures, nor does it prevent the treating telemedicine doctor from providing medical information to the patient; it merely requires that patients receive certain information in person before receiving an abortion. Finally, the panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Guam’s in-person informed-consent law violates their equal protection rights because it irrationally treats physicians who provide abortions differently than similarly situated telemedicine providers. The panel held that Guam can require an in-person consultation for abortions because the in-person requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of safeguarding fetal life. View "SHANDHINI RAIDOO, ET AL V. DOUGLAS B. MOYLAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of attempting to commit racially motivated violence. On appeal, Defendant argued that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court held his trial in violation of the public trial right under United States v. Allen, 34 F.4th 789 (9th Cir. 2022). Defendant also contended that his prosecution was unconstitutional because 18 U.S.C. Section 249(a)(1) exceeds Congress’ authority under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Defendant forfeited his claim, that plain error review applies, and that the balance of costs in this case counsels against reversal. Applying the deferential test set forth in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the panel wrote that the rationality of concluding that violence (or attempted violence) perpetrated against victims on account of the victims’ race is a badge or incident of slavery is well established. The panel rejected Defendant’s contention that Section 249(a)(1) is subject to heightened scrutiny apart from the Jones test. View "USA V. OLE HOUGEN" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the BIA, the panel held that the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the BIA comports with Article II of the Constitution. The panel rejected Petitioner’s suggestion that Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their appointment in the Attorney General. The panel next held that the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II, which requires that officers remain accountable to the President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates. The panel explained that the Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration Judges and BIA members and that nothing restricts the Attorney General’s ability to remove them at will. Thus, these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for their positions—and by extension, on the President. View "FORTUNATO AMADOR DUENAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants L.A. Central Plaza LLC and Central Liquor & Market, Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the merits, the district court instead sua sponte dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff’s amended complaint had failed adequately to plead the elements of Article III standing. Plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal.   The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. The panel held that because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to prove his case as to standing, the district court had discretion in resolving Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, to also consider sua sponte whether to grant summary judgment against Jones on the issue of standing. The panel held, however, that when presented with the issue of standing in the context of Plaintiff’s fully briefed summary judgment motion, the district court could not ignore the factual evidence of standing presented at summary judgment and instead sua sponte examine the adequacy of the complaint’s allegations of standing. View "GEORGE JONES V. L.A. CENTRAL PLAZA, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law