Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
JONATHAN DUKE V. JOSIE GASTELO
Petitioner sought resentencing under Section 1172.6 the day after California enacted that statute. While his resentencing proceeding was ongoing, and shortly before the expiration of the deadline for Petitioner to file for relief pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition. Among other things, his petition alleged that several forms of prosecutorial misconduct had occurred in his trial. A magistrate judge denied Petitioner’s unopposed motion to stay his federal proceedings and recommended that the district court dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition without prejudice pursuant to Younger. The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Younger abstention was warranted and required dismissal.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, reversed the district court’s denial of his motion to stay, and remanded. The panel explained that Younger is not implicated here. Although there is an ongoing state proceeding—the resentencing under Section 1172.6 based on a change in state law—the federal petition, in this case, does not seek an injunction to prevent state officers from moving forward with the Section 1172.6 proceeding. That proceeding is, in substance, a new case based on a new statute, and Petitioner seeks no relief that would interfere with it. The panel held that the denial of Petitioner’s motion for a stay was also error because it was based on the misunderstanding that the district court lacked the authority to stay Petitioner’s habeas petition. View "JONATHAN DUKE V. JOSIE GASTELO" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
BRIANNA BOLDEN-HARDGE V. CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ET AL
Plaintiff a devout Jehovah’s Witness, objected to California’s loyalty oath because she believed it would violate her religious beliefs by requiring her to pledge primary allegiance to the federal and state governments and to affirm her willingness to take up arms to defend them. he Controller’s Office rejected this proposal and rescinded the job offer. Plaintiff sued the Controller’s Office and the California State Controller in her official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII under both failure-to-accommodate and disparate-impact theories. She also asserted a failure-to-accommodate claim against the Controller’s Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and she alleged that the refusal by both defendants to accommodate her religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
THe Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s alleged injury was redressable only through a claim for damages. The panel held that she lacked the actual and imminent threat of future injury required to have standing to seek prospective relief on any of her claims, but she could attempt to cure this defect by amendment. The panel held that Plaintiff could seek damages from the Controller’s Office on her claims under Title VII. As currently pleaded, she could not obtain damages for her free exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The panel held, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend to seek damages from the State Controller in her individual capacity. View "BRIANNA BOLDEN-HARDGE V. CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ET AL" on Justia Law
CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL
The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless. View "CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law
MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA
The United States Forest Service, together with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, managed the rapidly changing fire conditions and actively communicated with the public about the Lolo Peak Fire. After the fire, various affected landowners sued the federal government. They claim that the Forest Service is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failing to comply with its duty to consult with them about fire-suppression activities on and near their properties. Specifically, they argued that the Forest Service was required to consult with landowners through individualized—rather than public—communication channels. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owners’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel applied the requisite two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applied. First, the panel examined whether there was a federal statute, regulation, or policy that prescribed the Forest Service’s course of action regarding the agency’s communications with the landowners during the Lolo Peak fire in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana in July 2017. The panel held that the Forest Service’s specific communications with the landowners exceeded the incident decision’s instruction and involved an element of judgment or choice sufficient to satisfy the first step of the discretionary function exception. The panel held that the Forest Service’s decisions about notifying the landowners about fire-suppression activities likely to occur on and near their properties were susceptible to a policy analysis. View "MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law
CHONG YIM, ET AL V. CITY OF SEATTLE
Plaintiffs are landlords who filed an action against the City, alleging violations of their federal and state rights of free speech and substantive due process. The district court held that the Ordinance regulates speech, not conduct and that the speech it regulates is commercial speech. The district court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to hold that the Ordinance was constitutional as a “reasonable means of achieving the City’s objectives and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve them.”
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the City of Seattle’s Fair Chance Housing Ordinance, which prohibits landlords from inquiring about the criminal history of current or potential tenants and from taking adverse action, such as denying tenancy, against them based on that information.
The panel did not decide whether the Ordinance regulates commercial speech and calls for the application of intermediate scrutiny, or whether the Ordinance regulates non-commercial speech and is subject to strict scrutiny review because it concluded that the Ordinance did not survive the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The panel held that the Ordinance’s inquiry provision impinged upon the First Amendment rights of landlords. The panel rejected the landlords’ claim that the adverse action provision of the Ordinance violated their substantive due process rights because the landlords did not have a fundamental right to exclude, and the adverse action provision survived rational basis review. Further, the panel remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the presumption of severability was rebuttable and for further proceedings. View "CHONG YIM, ET AL V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL
Individuals Plaintiffs, Uber, Inc. (Uber) and Postmates, Inc. (Postmates, and collectively Plaintiffs) appealed the district court’s orders denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the State of California and the Attorney General of California (Defendants), from enforcing California Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 296 (A.B. 5), as amended by California Assembly Bill 170, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 415 (A.B. 170) and California Assembly Bill 2257, 2020 Cal. Stats. Ch. 38 (A.B. 2257, and collectively A.B. 5, as amended), against them. A.B. 5, as amended, codified the “ABC test” adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).1 A.B. 5, as amended, however, incorporated numerous exemptions into its provisions.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part district court orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded. The panel first held that, even under the fairly forgiving rational basis review, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B. 5, as amended, violated the Equal Protection Clause for those engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services. Thus, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the primary impetus for the enactment of A.B. 5 was the disfavor with which the architect of the legislation viewed Uber, Postmates, and similar gig-based business models. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that A.B. 5, as amended, completely prohibited them from exercising their “right to engage in a calling.” View "LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law
JOSE MURGUIA V. HEATHER LANGDON, ET AL
Plaintiff called 911 seeking emergency mental health assistance for the mother of his children, with whom he lived and had five children. This call set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the death of Plaintiff’s ten-month-old twin sons at their mother’s own hand.
Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 involving the application of the “state-created danger” doctrine in the context of a welfare check; the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action for failure to state a claim, and remanded. The panel first made clear that the only two exceptions to the general rule against failure-to-act liability for Section 1983 claims presently recognized by this court were the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception. The panel, therefore, rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the failure to comply with a legally required duty can give rise to a substantive due process claim. The panel further held that the district court correctly held that the special-relationship exception did not apply here.
The panel next held that Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim against deputies failed because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which one could plausibly conclude that Defendants created or enhanced any danger to the twins. The panel held that Plaintiffs adequately stated their Section 1983 claims against the City of Tulare Police Sergeant under the state-created danger exception. Finally, because the panel reversed the dismissal of some of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the social worker and Sergeant, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the County and City of Tulare. View "JOSE MURGUIA V. HEATHER LANGDON, ET AL" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON
This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law
FORBES MEDIA LLC, ET AL V. USA
Under private parties to provide technical assistance to law enforcement to aid in the execution of arrest warrants. Here, a journalist and associate editor at Forbes (“Petitioners”) filed petitions in the Northern District of California and the Western District of Washington seeking to unseal past All Writs Act (“AWA”) orders issued to an online travel-booking technology company related to ongoing criminal investigations in which the United States had obtained arrest warrants but had been thus far unable to make the arrests. The district courts in California and Washington denied Petitioners’ motions.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the two district court orders denying petitions to unseal court records, the panel held that neither the First Amendment nor the common law provides a right of public access to third-party AWA technical assistance materials relating to ongoing criminal investigations involving unexecuted arrest warrants. In determining that the First Amendment’s right of access did not attach, the panel applied the “experience and logic” test set forth in PressEnter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986), and concluded that it was aware of no historical tradition of public access to proceedings and materials under the AWA to obtain technical assistance from third parties in executing arrest warrants.
Further, the court explained, given the similarities cross-cutting AWA third-party technical assistance proceedings, grand jury proceedings, and preindictment search warrant materials, as a matter of analogical reasoning, the materials Petitioners sought here were not within the common law right of access. View "FORBES MEDIA LLC, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
ROGAN O’ HANDLEY V. SHIRLEY WEBER, ET AL
Plaintiff contends that the social media company Twitter Inc. and California’s Secretary of State, Shirley Weber, violated his constitutional rights by acting in concert to censor his speech on Twitter’s platform. He alleged that the Secretary of State’s office entered into a collaborative relationship with Twitter in which state officials regularly flagged tweets with false or misleading information for Twitter’s review and that Twitter responded by almost invariably removing the posts in question. Plaintiff further alleged that Twitter limited other users’ ability to access his tweets and then suspended his account. The district court determined that Twitter’s interactions with state officials did not transform the company’s enforcement of its content-moderation policy into state action.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims against Twitter. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Secretary of State Weber because her office did not violate federal law when it notified Twitter of tweets containing false or misleading information that potentially violated the company’s content-moderation policy.
The panel held that Twitter’s content-moderation decisions did not constitute state action because (1) Twitter did not exercise a state-conferred right or enforce a state-imposed rule under the first step of the two-step framework set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, and (2) the interactions between Twitter and the Secretary of State’s Office of Elections Cybersecurity did not satisfy either the nexus or the joint action tests under the second step. View "ROGAN O' HANDLEY V. SHIRLEY WEBER, ET AL" on Justia Law