Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation have a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana under which the Tribes have agreed to commission state police to act as tribal police where there is a gap between their respective criminal jurisdictions. Defendant challenges the validity of the cross-deputization agreement, arguing that the Tribes lack the inherent sovereign authority to enter into a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel emphasized that the cross-deputization agreement deputizes state officers to enforce tribal law, not state law, and emphasized that Congress has expressly provided for the Tribes’ authority to enter into such compacts.   Defendant also argued that the Tribes explicitly conditioned the cross-deputization agreement on federal approval, which they did not receive. The panel did not read the agreement’s use of the word “approve” as giving the Bureau of Indian Affairs veto power over the agreement.   The panel wrote that even if the lack of a signature from the BIA representative on the 2003 amendment to the agreement impaired the validity of the amendment, it would not invalidate the trooper’s commissioned status. The panel wrote that the trooper’s failure to carry an identification card was plainly a violation of the agreement.  The panel noted, however, that none of the sovereign parties to the agreement appears to consider the violation sufficiently serious to seek any remedy for it. View "USA V. ERIC FOWLER" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that she should be able to withdraw her guilty plea at the sentencing hearing because the district court “rejected” the non-binding sentencing recommendation under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). She asserted that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the criminal judgment. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that Defendant had no right to withdraw her plea. Explaining that the district court’s use of “reject” in the context of Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement has no legal effect, the panel wrote that the “rejection” of a recommended sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement could logically mean only that the court rejected the recommendation itself, and the district court thus did not plainly err in not providing Defendant an opportunity to withdraw her plea. The panel wrote that Defendant was permitted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing only if she could show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal and that she has not done so. The panel held that Defendant’s remaining arguments fail. The magistrate judge’s failure to specifically mention a “jury” trial during the plea colloquy, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(C), did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The district court properly considered and explained its reasons for rejecting Defendant’s variance requests. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 100-month sentence. View "USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA" on Justia Law

A Social Security Administration ALJ, appointed by agency staff rather than by the Commissioner as required, reviewed and denied claimant’s initial claims. Without challenging the ALJ’s appointment, the claimant appealed to the district court and prevailed in part. The district court vacated the 2017 ALJ decision and ordered a new hearing because the ALJ failed to properly consider certain evidence. The case returned to the same ALJ, who by then had been properly ratified by the Acting Commissioner. The ALJ again denied benefits, and claimant appealed to the district court, raising the issue of an Appointments Clause violation. The district court affirmed the ALJ decision and denied the Appointments Clause claim because the 2017 decision had been vacated and the ALJ was properly appointed when she issued the 2019 decision.   Because the ALJ’s decision was tainted by a prior Appointments Clause violation, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of claimant’s application for benefits under the Social Security Act and remanded with instructions to the Commissioner to assign the case to a different, validly appointed ALJ to rehear and adjudicate claimant’s case de novo. The panel held that under Lucia, the claimant was entitled to a new hearing before a different ALJ. The panel concluded that claimants are entitled to an independent decision issued by a different ALJ if a timely challenged ALJ decision is tainted by a pre-ratification ALJ decision. View "BRIAN CODY V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a licensed marriage and family therapist for more than twenty years and his Christian views inform his work. Plaintiff sued state officials (“Washington”) in May 2021, seeking to enjoin SB 5722. Equal Rights Washington (“ERW”), the lead organization supporting SB 5722’s passage, intervened as a defendant. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, which Washington and ERW both opposed, and Defendants filed motions to dismiss his complaint.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. The panel held that Plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in an individual capacity and the claims were prudentially ripe. Plaintiff’s complaint showed a plan or desire to violate Washington’s law; Washington confirmed that it will enforce the ban on conversion therapy “as it enforces other restrictions on unprofessional conduct;” and Plaintiff alleged that the law had chilled his speech and that he has self-censored himself out of fear of enforcement. Plaintiff did not, however, have standing to bring claims on behalf of his minor clients.   Further, the panel held that Washington’s licensing scheme for health care providers did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The panel held that the law was a neutral law targeted at preventing the harms associated with conversion therapy, and not at the religious exercise of those who wish to practice this type of therapy on minors. Finally, Washington’s law was not unconstitutionally vague. The law gave fair notice of what conduct was proscribed to a reasonable person and contained standards limiting the discretion of those who will enforce it. View "BRIAN TINGLEY V. ROBERT FERGUSON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of 25 felonies (mostly residential burglaries) committed against multiple victims over a three-month period. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences on all but two of the 25 counts, resulting in an overall sentence of 292 years imprisonment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Rejecting Petitioner’s constitutional claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that proportionality should be assessed based on each individual conviction and sentence, not the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences and that none of Petitioner’s individual sentences were disproportionate. Petitioner argued that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) deferential standard of review does not apply to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision because that court did not consider the cumulative impact of his sentence and that he was entitled instead to de novo review on this claim. The panel concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals made a merits determination and that AEDPA deference applies.   Applying AEDPA deference, the panel noted that there is no clearly established law from the Supreme Court on whether Eighth Amendment sentence proportionality must be analyzed on a cumulative or individual basis when a defendant is sentenced on multiple offenses, and that other than the basic principle of proportionality, the only thing that the Supreme Court has established is that the rule against grossly disproportionate sentences is violated only in the exceedingly rare and extreme case. The panel concluded that it cannot say that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law. View "ATDOM PATSALIS V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law

After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant pled guilty to smuggling ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 554(a). Defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal challenges that denial. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress because of the consistent conclusions of Judge Gould and Judge Bea, which represent a majority of the panel, even though the reasoning of Judge Gould and Judge Bea in their separate concurrences is different.   The Ninth Circuit noted that one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of searches and seizures conducted without prior approval by judge or magistrate is a Terry stop, which allows an officer to briefly detain an individual when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that an individual is engaged in a crime, during which stop an officer may also conduct a limited protective frisk if the officer has reason to believe the individual has a weapon. The panel noted that another exception is when an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual. View "USA V. SERGIO GUERRERO" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him of first-degree murder and several other offenses. He appeals the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus petition.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition brought by Petitioner, who was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him of first-degree murder and other offenses. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s certified claim that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).   Because the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Johnson, the panel reviewed de novo Petitioner’s Batson claim to determine whether he raised an inference of racial bias at Step One. The panel noted that trial courts are often well-situated to decide the Step One question without conducting a formal comparative juror analysis, but wrote that when an appellate court must decide whether the trial court that denied a Batson motion should instead have drawn an inference that discrimination occurred, Batson supports the use of comparative juror analysis.   Accordingly, pursuant to Batson’s three-step framework, the panel could not say the California Supreme Court erred by ruling that Petitioner did not make a prima facie showing to shift the burden to the prosecutor to explain the actual motivation for the peremptory challenges. View "JAIME HOYOS V. RONALD DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant, an at the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Honolulu, repeatedly punched and kicked another inmate. The inmate suffered multiple serious injuries, including a broken jaw. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 113(a)(6).   The inmate did not testify, but the district court admitted his statements—that he was assaulted and that his pain level was an eight out of ten—through the testimony of a nurse and a surgeon who treated him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction for assault. The panel held that the district court properly admitted the statements made by the inmate to his medical providers, as the statements fell within the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The panel also held that admission of these statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because their primary purpose was to evaluate and treat the inmates injuries rather than to establish past facts for trial. View "USA V. TALOA LATU" on Justia Law

Defendant, a prison guard, shot Plaintiff with three sponge-tipped plastic rounds during a prison fight, breaking Plaintiff’s leg and injuring his butt and thigh. Following the fight, prison nurse assessed Plaintiff’s injuries and transferred him to an emergency room without fully completing her notes or conducting a full body examination.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants in Plaintiff’s action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The panel first held that the district court correctly concluded that there was no constitutional violation. The guard’s decision to shoot Plaintiff with sponge rounds was not excessive use of force. He had a duty to keep prison staff and the prisoners in his care safe and he used the lowest level of force available to him. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was no evidence showing that Arnett had any improper motive, let alone that he acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”   As to the nurse, rather than deliberate indifference, her actions seemed to reflect the conduct of a medical professional who quickly and successfully ensured that her patient received the appropriate level of care. The court held that Defendants were therefore entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity and summary judgment was properly entered in their favor. View "KEVIN SIMMONS V. G. ARNETT" on Justia Law

At issue was whether police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for Plaintiff’s refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California Penal Code Section 415(2); and (2) obstructing an officer under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena police officers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that plaintiff was unlawfully arrested. Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1), that means it was disputed whether probable cause existed under Section 415(2). The panel disagreed, stating first that it was well-established that if the facts support probable cause for one offense, an arrest may be lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense that lacked probable cause. Second, by the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, the officers learned enough facts to believe that Plaintiff had violated Section 415(2) and therefore had probable cause to make the arrest.   Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, there was no need to proceed to the second question of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct was not “clearly established.” Further, the panel held that no “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited the officer from arresting Plaintiff under the facts confronting him View "JAVIER VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA" on Justia Law