Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was tried for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to do the same during a one-day bench trial. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for findings of fact under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c). Although he acknowledged that the motion might be untimely because the rule requires that such a motion be made “before the finding of guilty or not guilty,” Defendant argued that he had been unaware that the court intended to deliver its finding without a hearing. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment of conviction. The panel held that the district court plainly erred by making only a written finding of guilt after trial, in violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The panel concluded that, although the usual remedy would be a remand to announce the finding in open court, the district court had already reiterated its finding of guilt publicly during Defendant’s sentencing, rendering such a remedy superfluous.   The panel further held that, because the finding of guilt was legally insufficient, the district court erred in denying as untimely Defendant’s motion for specific findings of fact. Instead, the panel vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for the district court to make specific findings of fact. View "USA V. JOSE RAMIREZ-RAMIREZ" on Justia Law

After the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three Hispanic women during jury selection, Petitioner raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The trial court denied the challenge, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition raising a Batson challenge to a jury conviction. The panel held that, even if a combined race and gender class such as Hispanic women is a cognizable group for purposes of Batson, that new rule would not apply to Petitioner’s case. The panel concluded that, under circuit precedent in Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001), and Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the recognition of a mixed race and gender class would be a new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases that were final before the new rule was announced.   The panel further held that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race alone because the totality of the circumstances, including a comparison between the prospective jurors the prosecutor struck and those he did not, did not raise an inference that race motivated the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision on Batson step one was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts. View "GIANG NGUYEN V. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM" on Justia Law

The district court issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: Respondent’s due process claims regarding the destruction of police records (Claims 17 and 18); and the state trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on Cal. Penal Code Section 272, which Respondent asserted was a lesser included offense of one of the felony charges (Claim 48n).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Respondent’s amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction, on retrial, and death sentence for two first-degree murders and one second-degree murder.   The panel held that the California Supreme Court reasonably applied Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), instead of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the record does not support Respondent’s assertion that the purged records contained material exculpatory evidence. The panel also held that the California Supreme Court did not act unreasonably when, applying Youngblood, it affirmed the trial court’s factual finding that there was no evidence that the police department acted in bad faith.   The panel held that the instructions in Respondent’s case—which did not give the jury “an all-or-nothing choice” between the capital first-degree murder charge and innocence, but rather gave the jury the option of finding Reno guilty of the lesser included non-capital offenses of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter—did not run afoul of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and there was no constitutional error. View "RENO V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder. The crime was committed when Petitioner was sixteen years old, but the Supreme Court had not yet held that the death penalty could not be imposed on defendants younger than eighteen when the crime occurred. To avoid that possibility, he entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).   After the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that the imposition of LWOP for those convicted of a crime committed while under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in Arizona state court. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition, and the district court granted a conditional writ.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The panel held that the plea agreement did not waive Petitioner’s right to pursue a PCR challenge of his sentence. The panel further explained, that under Miller, a sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence than LWOP. Here, the trial judge made it clear that he did not have this discretion. Because the judge correctly recognized that his only sentencing option was LWOP, Petitioner’s sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. The panel concluded that there was at least a reasonable possibility that a sentencing proceeding conducted in accordance with Miller’s requirements would result in a non-LWOP sentence. View "FREDDIE CRESPIN V. CHARLES RYAN" on Justia Law

In an action involving federal and state constitutional challenges to the City of Lacey’s recently passed RV Parking Ordinance, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court:Is the right to intrastate travel in Washington protected under the Washington State Constitution, or other Washington law? If Washington state law protects the right to intrastate travel, does the RV Parking Ordinance codified in LMC Section 10.14.020– 045 violate Plaintiff’s intrastate travel rights? In certifying the question, the court noted that it is well established that adjudication of federal constitutional claims should be avoided when alternative state grounds are available, even when the alternative ground is one of state constitutional law.Because this issue was complex and involved policy considerations that were best left to the State of Washington’s own courts, the court concluded that it was prudent to certify this question to the Washington Supreme Court so that it could determine its own law in the first instance. View "JACK POTTER V. CITY OF LACEY" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the Marine Corps surveillance violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which codified the longstanding prohibition against military enforcement of civilian law. Rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit explained that the military may still assist civilian law enforcement agencies if Congress expressly authorized it, and here, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense to offer military assistance to Border Patrol in hopes of securing the southern land border. The court concluded that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s suppression motion based on the alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. The court also denied Defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecution’s striking two Asian jurors from the venire, concluding that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for doing so. View "USA V. CLEMENTE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that the City of Vallejo violated the Fourth Amendment, by adding license checks to what was concededly a sobriety checkpoint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants.Reviewing a line of relevant Supreme Court decisions, the court derived a “two-step analysis” for assessing the validity of a checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. Applying that two-step analysis to this case, the panel first held that because the City’s checkpoint did not have any impermissible primary purpose of advancing the general interest in crime control, it was not per se invalid. The panel then applied the factors for assessing reasonableness set forth in Lidster and concluded that the City’s systematic addition of driver’s license checks to an otherwise valid sobriety checkpoint was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.The court held that, once Plaintiff refused to produce his license for examination at the checkpoint, the officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was committing an offense in violation of California Vehicle Code Section 12951(b), and his continued detention and arrest were therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the officer’s action of physically removing Plaintiff from his car by grabbing his arm was objectively reasonable as a matter of law given Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with her commands up to that point and the modest nature of the force used. View "DAVID DEMAREST V. CITY OF VALLEJO" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of racketeering conspiracy and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court imposed a special condition of supervised release set forth in the parties’ plea agreement that prohibited Defendant from associating with any member of the Norteño or Nuestra Familia gangs. On appeal, Defendant argues that this condition violates his fundamental right to familial association because it does not exclude his siblings who might be gang members.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the special condition. The court The declined the Government’s invitation to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the invited error doctrine. The panel wrote that the record does not suggest that Defendant either caused the alleged error intentionally or abandoned a known right. The court therefore treated the right as forfeited, as opposed to waived, and reviewed the district court’s decision to impose the gang condition for plain error.The court wrote that Defendant’s relationship with a sibling or half sibling does not inherently constitute an “intimate relationship” with a “life partner,” child, or fiancée, and thus does not give rise to a “particularly significant liberty interest” that would require the district court to undertake additional procedural steps at sentencing.The court rejected Defendant’s contention that the condition is substantively unreasonable. The panel explained that given Defendant’s history of coordinating and executing violent gang attacks, a prohibition on gang association does not constitute an unreasonable deprivation of liberty. View "USA V. JOHNNY MAGDALENO" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—a collection of organizations and individuals interested in petitioning in Montana—alleged that both of these restrictions violated their speech and association rights under the First Amendment. In upholding both restrictions, the district court held that strict scrutiny did not apply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either restriction imposed a severe burden on their rights. It went on to find that both restrictions sufficiently furthered Montana’s important regulatory interest to survive less exacting review.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s holding with regards to the residency requirement because it (1) imposed a severe burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) was not narrowly tailored to further Montana’s compelling interest.The court affirmed the district court’s holding with regards to the pay-per-signature restriction because it concluded that (1) on the basis of the record produced here, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the pay-per-signature ban imposed a severe burden on First Amendment rights and therefore less exacting review applied; and (2) the state had established that an important regulatory interest was furthered by this restriction. View "NATHAN PIERCE V. CHRISTI JACOBSEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant and the Maricopa County Community College District (the “College District”). Plaintiffs allege that a module on Islamic terrorism within a course in world politics taught by Defendant at Scottsdale Community College (the “College”) violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s disparaging treatment of Islam was part of an official policy embraced by the College District. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The court held that Plaintiffs could not sustain a claim for municipal liability against the College District. First, Plaintiffs abandoned their municipal liability claim on appeal by failing to address it in their Reply Brief even after the College District raised the argument in its Answering Brief on appeal.But even on the merits, the claim could not survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant has taught his World Politics class for 24 years, they did not allege that the course in other years contained the same content that offended Plaintiff, or that Defendant’s views or teaching methods were so persistent and widespread as to constitute part of the College District’s standard operating procedure. Further, the court held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claims. View "MOHAMED SABRA V. MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLL" on Justia Law