Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police stopped Defendant for a traffic violation, which led to the discovery of a firearm that Defendant, a convicted felon, could not lawfully possess.   The Ninth Circuit held that the officers did not unreasonably prolong the stop and that Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his car. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. But, on one aspect of Defendant’s supervised release, the court remanded for the district court to conform its written judgment to the court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence.   The court wrote that an officer’s asking Defendant two questions about weapons early in the counter—once before the officer learned that Defendant was on federal supervision for being a felon in possession and once after—was a negligibly burdensome precaution that the officer could reasonably take in the name of safety. Further, the officers’ subjective motivations are irrelevant because the Fourth Amendment’s concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. A criminal history check and the officers’ other actions while Defendant was outside the car were within the lawful scope of the traffic stop.   As to whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched Defendant’s car, the panel held that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant unequivocally and specifically consented to a search of the car for firearms. The panel remanded for the district court to conform the written judgment to its oral pronouncement of conditions concerning outpatient substance abuse treatment and vocational services programs. View "USA V. XZAVIONE TAYLOR" on Justia Law

During the George Floyd protests in the summer of 2020, the Seattle Police Department and the Mayor of Seattle took the unprecedented step of surrendering an entire precinct and a large area of the surrounding neighborhood to protestors for a month, who declared it the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (“CHOP”). Top City of Seattle (“City”) officials, including members of the City Council, were in their thrall, supporting and encouraging CHOP, with the mayor calling it a reprise of “the summer of love” despite growing evidence of its lawlessness and danger—and a mounting body count. Plaintiff, the mother of a nineteen-year-old son with special needs who was shot to death within CHOP, brought this action to recover damages for her loss of companionship with her son.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. The panel stated that, unlike almost every other circuit, this circuit recognized Plaintiff’s substantive due process right to the companionship of her adult son. And Plaintiff properly alleged that the City acted with deliberate indifference to the danger it helped create, which caused her son’s death. It was self-evident that the Seattle Police Department’s wholesale abandonment of its East Precinct building, combined with Mayor Durkan’s promotion of CHOP’s supposedly festival-like atmosphere, would create a toxic brew of criminality that would endanger City residents. But the danger to which the City contributed was not particularized to Plaintiff or her son, or differentiated from the generalized dangers posed by crime, as the circuit’s precedent required. View "DONNITTA SINCLAIR V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against the TSA, alleging discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act when she was terminated from her limited-duty position. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, she suffered two injuries while working for the TSA. She alleged that she was terminated due to her disability, and despite the availability of limited duty positions that she could fill, such as “exit lane monitor,” “secondary ticket checker,” or “bypass door monitor.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim for the second time.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing, as preempted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”), Plaintiff’s claim against the TSA. The panel joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ATSA, as applicable to security screeners, preempts the Rehabilitation Act. The ATSA authorized the Administrator of the TSA to set aside employment standards for security screeners as necessary to fulfill the TSA’s screening functions under the ATSA. A statutory note to the ATSA provides that the Administrator is authorized to do so notwithstanding any other provision of law. The panel held that use of the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” reflected legislative intent to preempt the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.   Plaintiff contended that preemption was unnecessary because the two statutes could be harmonized, and preemption was foreclosed by explicit language in the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPEA”). The panel declined to address the issue of whether the WPEA made the Rehabilitation Act generally applicable to security screeners because this issue was not raised in the district court. View "ANNA GALAZA V. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

Appointees to a university committee created to satisfy federal legal requirements sought to enjoin the university from releasing the letters appointing them to the official committee. The appointees claimed that the disclosure of such letters, which contain their personal identifying information, would violate their First Amendment right of expressive association. The district court held that there was a serious question on the merits of that argument and preliminarily enjoined the disclosure.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting the University of Washington from releasing, in response to a public records request, letters appointing Plaintiffs to the University’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. The panel determined that here, the letters of appointment existed (and were part of the University’s public records) only because the committee members were appointed by the University according to statutory and regulatory criteria to ensure diverse representation. Their group association as committee members was not intended to enhance effective advocacy of their views or to pursue their lawful private interests but rather to fulfill federal requirements. Because, in performing their work on the committee, the members were not engaged in an association deemed to be “expressive” under Supreme Court or this Circuit’s precedent, the First Amendment right of expressive association did not protect them from the University’s disclosure of personal identifying information contained in their letters of appointment. Further, because the committee members’ work was unprotected by the First Amendment on an individual basis, their collective work on the committee was likewise unprotected. View "JANE SULLIVAN, ET AL V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Although the Board entertained the government’s challenge to a portion of the immigration judge’s decision in Petitioner’s case, it declined to consider Petitioner’s challenges to that decision because Petitioner had not filed a cross-appeal. Petitioner argued that the Board erred when it concluded that he was required to file a separate cross-appeal to challenge the immigration judge’s alternative order on the merits of his claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel observed that section 1003.3 does not expressly address cross-appeals. However, the panel wrote that the cross-appeal rule is an “unwritten but longstanding rule” under which “an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.” The panel explained that the Supreme Court has described this rule as “firmly entrenched,” and it has noted that “in more than two centuries of repeatedly endorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of our holdings has ever recognized an exception to the rule.” The panel noted that it was not suggesting that the Board was required to follow the traditional rule governing cross-appeals. Rather, the Board has authority to prescribe its own rules of procedure so long as the Board acts within the broad limits imposed by the Due Process Clause. The panel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s arguments for a waiver of the cross-appeal rule because he failed to exhaust that claim before the Board. View "JORGE LOPEZ HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pled “no contest” or “nolo contendere” to willfully resisting, obstructing, and delaying a peace officer in violation of section 148(a)(1) of the California Penal Code. Although Plaintiff entered the equivalent of a guilty plea, the state court never entered an order finding him guilty of the charge to which he pleaded. Instead, the court ordered that its acceptance of Plaintiff’s plea would be “held in abeyance,” pending his completion of ten hours of community service and obedience of all laws. After the six months of abeyance elapsed, the charges against Plaintiff were “dismissed” in the “interest of justice” on the prosecutor’s motion. Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court held that Plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest and municipal liability claims, as well as the district court’s adverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the Heck bar does not apply in a situation where criminal charges are dismissed after entry of a plea that was held in abeyance pending the defendant’s compliance with certain conditions. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Stockton and Stockton Police Department. Longstanding precedent establishes that both California municipalities and police departments are “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983. View "FRANCISCO DUARTE, ET AL V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff protested outside the federal courthouse in Portland, Oregon. He alleged that federal officers unlawfully arrested protesters and used excessive force, including by indiscriminately using tear gas against peaceful protesters. Together with other protesters, he brought this action against Defendant, then the Director of the Federal Protective Service’s Northwest Region, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.   The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that no Bivens cause of action is available in this case. Applying the two-step analysis set forth in Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), the panel held that a Bivens remedy could not be extended to this case because it presented a new context, and at least two independent factors indicated that the court was less equipped than Congress to determine whether the damages action should proceed.   The court wrote this case differed from Bivens because (1) Defendant, a high-level supervisor, was of a different rank than the agents in Bivens; (2) Defendant’s alleged actions, which consisted of ordering or acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct, took place at a higher level of generality than the actions of the agents in Bivens; and (3) the legal mandate under which Defendant acted differed from that of the agents in Bivens in that Defendant was directing a multi-agency operation to protect federal property and was carrying out an executive order. Allowing a Bivens action to proceed in this case could expose sensitive communications between Defendant and other high-level executive officers. View "MARK PETTIBONE, ET AL V. GABRIEL RUSSELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

One week after an armed robbery of a Sprint store in Los Angeles, Defendant was stopped and frisked by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). A handgun was recovered from the car and later introduced at Defendant’s trial as the weapon used in the Sprint store robbery. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and brandishing a firearm.   At issue on appeal is whether officers violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by exceeding the scope of their patdown search and seizing the car key, and, if a constitutional violation occurred, whether the handgun evidence was nevertheless admissible because Defendant’s flight from officers attenuated the discovery of the handgun.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1, reversed his conviction for brandishing a firearm, and remanded for a reduction of sentence or retrial on the Section 924(c) count. The court concluded that the handgun evidence was illegally obtained and should have been excluded at trial and that this error prejudiced Defendant as to the brandishing conviction but was harmless as to the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that Defendant did not objectively demonstrate his intent to abandon the car key. The panel wrote that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the handgun evidence at Defendant’s trial unless an exception to the rule applies. View "USA V. TERRANCE BAKER" on Justia Law

This case involved a Washington licensing scheme that disciplines healthcare providers for practicing conversion therapy on minors. The 9th Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.Judge O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Ikuta, Nelson and Vandyke, issued a statement respecting from the court's decision to deny rehearing en banc because the decision correctly applied existing precedent. However, Judge Scannlain noted that the court should have used this case as an opportunity to resolve a circuit split and to "clarify that regulation of the medical profession is not a First-Amendment-free zone."Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Bumatay wrote that because the speech underpinning conversion therapy is overwhelmingly—if not exclusively— religious, the court should have granted Plaintiff's petition for en banc review to evaluate his Free Speech claim under a more exacting standard. View "BRIAN TINGLEY V. ROBERT FERGUSON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving a sentence of supervised release for a prior federal conviction from Nevada when he was arrested and indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud. Soon after Defendant’s arrest, the government obtained an order permitting it to seize the funds in his inmate trust account and apply them to a restitution obligation for a prior federal conviction from Washington. Defendant pleaded guilty in the conspiracy case, admitted a violation of his supervised release in his Nevada case, and was sentenced in both cases. Defendant urges that the seizure of his inmate funds violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his Fifth Amendment due process right. He also contends that the district court’s imposition of an undisputedly illegal sentence for his supervised release violation is reversible error.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part, vacated the sentence imposed for the violation of supervised release, and remanded for re-sentencing on the supervised release violation. The panel concluded that the government’s seizure of Defendant’s inmate funds did not violate his right to either counsel of choice or due process. The court also concluded that the district court’s imposition of an illegally excessive sentence for Defendant’s supervised release violation was plain error that requires vacatur of that sentence and remand for re-sentencing. View "USA V. LONNIE LILLARD" on Justia Law