Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Arizona Department of Corrections issued Order 914, under which the Department may prohibit inmates from receiving mail containing “sexually explicit material.” The Department invoked the order to redact several issues of Prison Legal News, a monthly journal for prison inmates that covers developments in the criminal justice system. The publisher of Prison Legal News sued the Department under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that Order 914 violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied to Prison Legal News. The district court granted summary judgment to the publisher and entered a permanent injunction requiring the Department to amend its order and allow distribution of the issues that had been censored.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the permanent injunction in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that most of the order’s relevant prohibitions are facially constitutional under the First Amendment and that most of the as-applied challenges lack merit.   The court held that the penological interests in jail security and rehabilitation were legitimate and the order was neutral in the sense relevant to the analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The court determined, however, that one aspect of the order swept more broadly than could be explained by the Department’s penological objectives: section 1.2.17’s ban on content that “may” cause sexual arousal or be suggestive of sex. That provision was not rationally related to the Department’s interests. As to one portion of the May 2017 issue, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the Department. View "PRISON LEGAL NEWS V. CHARLES RYAN" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Used in conjunction with the operators’ smartphone applications, MDS automatically compiles real-time data on each e-scooter’s location by collecting the start and end points and times of each ride taken.   The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion affirming the district court’s order dismissing, for failure to state a claim, an action brought by an e-scooter user alleging that the City of Los Angeles’ e-scooter permitting program violates the Fourth Amendment and California law.   The court first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff as it was required to do at the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage, the proper reading of the complaint was that Plaintiff alleged that the collection of the MDS location data itself—without more—violated his constitutional rights.   The court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the oil and gas companies knew about climate change, understood the harms energy exploration and extraction inflicted on the environment, and concealed those harms from the public. Plaintiffs sued in Hawaii state court, asserting state-law public and private nuisance, failure to warn, and trespass claims. The complaints asserted that Defendants’ deception caused harm from climate change, like property damage from extreme weather and land encroachment because of rising sea levels.   The Ninth Circuit held that Defendants could not show federal jurisdiction. The court held that removal from state court was not proper under federal officer jurisdiction and that Plaintiffs’ injuries were for or relating to Defendants’ actions.   The court explained that Defendants did not act under federal officers when they produced oil and gas during the Korean War and in the 1970s under the Defense Production Act when they repaid offshore oil leases in kind and contracted with the government to operate the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, when they conducted offshore oil operations, or when they operated the Elk Hills oil reserve. The court further held that Defendants did not assert a colorable federal defense by citing the government-contractor defense, preemption, federal immunity, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, and the foreign affairs doctrine. The court concluded that most of these defenses failed to stem from official duties, and the government-contractor and immunity defenses were not colorable. The court held that Defendants did not establish federal enclave jurisdiction because they could not show that activities on federal enclaves directly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. View "CITY & COUNTY OF HONOLULU V. SUNOCO LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, one of whom is a former Montana State Senator, operate a website that tracks the voting records of Republican state legislators in Montana. Based on the travel expenses Plaintiffs incurred in giving presentations about the website, Montana’s Commissioner of Political Practices determined that Plaintiffs had formed a “political committee” under Montana law, subject to numerous reporting obligations.   Montana law broadly defines a “political committee,” in relevant part, as “a combination of two or more individuals . . . who receives a contribution or makes an expenditure” to “support or oppose” a candidate or a ballot issue. An expenditure of $250 or less does not create a political committee. Nor will expenditures that qualify as “de minimis acts,” which do not count towards the $250 threshold.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Montana state defendants and held that Montana Administrative Rule 44.11603, under which Plaintiffs were required by the Montana Commission of Political Practices to register as a political action committee, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs.   The court held that Montana’s administrative scheme did not give Plaintiffs fair notice that when they traveled around Big Sky Country without pay to give presentations, their purchases of fast food, fuel, and lodging at a roadside motel were not considered de minimis expenses associated with volunteer services. The court wrote that nothing in Montana law suggests that only those persons providing volunteer services or efforts within an organizational structure of a group are exempted from a political committee designation. View "ED BUTCHER V. AUSTIN KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

In 2011-2013, Fierro made six requests to be placed into protective custody, insisting that he was at risk of harm because he had received threats from the Border Brothers, a gang active throughout Arizona’s prisons. All six requests were denied. Fierro was physically assaulted in the prison yard by two other prisoners, at least one of whom was a suspected member of the Border Brothers. Fierro brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court instructed the jury to “give deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain internal security in a prison.”The Ninth Circuit vacated a verdict in favor of the prison officials. The evidence at trial reflected a genuine dispute whether the decisions to deny Fierro’s requests for protective custody were made pursuant to a security-based policy, and, if so, whether the decisions were an unnecessary, unjustified, or exaggerated response to security concerns, so the district court’s deference instruction was erroneous. View "Fierro v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Jemere Guillory was convicted in California state court of multiple offenses arising from an investigation into a shooting in San Diego. In Guillory’s direct appeal of his conviction, the state appellate court rejected his argument that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated by the alleged exclusion of his family members from the courtroom during jury selection. In subsequent state habeas proceedings, Guillory sought to re-raise this claim, but with new evidence consisting of declarations from two family members who had been excluded from the courtroom, as well as his own declaration. The state court of appeal denied his petition on the state law grounds that it was untimely and that his public trial claim had previously been raised and rejected on the merits. Guillory then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but the district court denied the petition. According to the district court, Guillory’s procedural default in his state habeas petition barred any federal review of his Sixth Amendment public trial claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the augmented version of Guillory’s public trial claim presented in his state habeas petition was procedurally defaulted, but the same could not be said of the properly exhausted public trial claim that Guillory presented on his direct appeal in state court. The Court therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guillory v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Amber Machowski was an individual with a disability who used a wheelchair for mobility. Defendant 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC, was the owner of a property in Fullerton, California, on which a business establishment known as City Market Liquor II was located. When Machowski attempted to patronize the store, she encountered architectural barriers that prevented her from making full use and enjoyment of the premises. Machowski sued Defendant, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The complaint sought injunctive relief, statutory damages under the Unruh Act, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. After Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, Machowski applied for the entry of default judgment, seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages. Machowski’s application for default judgment did not seek an award of attorney’s fees. Instead, it advised the district court that “plaintiff will separately file a motion for her attorney fees and costs once this application is granted and judgment has been entered.” The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Machowski’s Unruh Act claim, granted default judgment on her ADA claim, ordered injunctive relief, and sua sponte awarded Machowski $1000 in attorney’s fees under Central District of California Local Rule 55-3. Machowski timely appealed the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that where, as here, a prevailing party advises the district court that it is opting out of the fee schedule and will seek by motion, an award of reasonable attorney's fees, the district court abuses its discretion by disregarding the plaintiff's choice and sua sponte awarding fees under the fee schedule. Accordingly, the fee award was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Machowski v. 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant officer, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the officer used a roadblock to stop Plaintiff, who was suspected of committing a minor traffic violation, from fleeing on a bicycle. The district court construed Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and found that his claim was plausible.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity Defendant. The court held that the question of whether Defendant used excessive force against Plaintiff would be a question for a factfinder. The roadblock was a use of intermediate force that was capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious injury. Given the circumstances, a jury could conclude that Defendant should have taken additional steps to stop Plaintiff before using an intermediate level of force given Plaintiff’s minor offense and the lack of any safety risk to de Defendant or anyone else. However, even if Defendant did use excessive force, the law as it existed at the time of the incident did not clearly establish that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. View "PRESTON SEIDNER V. JONATHAN DE VRIES" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. (2022). View "KELLY ANN MCDOUGALL V. COUNTY OF VENTURA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor daughter, alleged that Defendant, an employee of the Kauai County Police Department, deceived the Hawaii family court when she assisted the non-custodial father of Plaintiff’s daughter in obtaining a temporary restraining order that prevented Plaintiff, the sole custodial parent, from having any contact with her daughter. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant conspired with the noncustodial father and state officials to extract the daughter from her school and place her in the father’s custody without Plaintiff’s knowledge or court order.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of qualified immunity, an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging violations of Plaintiff’s right to familial association.The court stated that although Defendant may ultimately prove that Plaintiff’s allegations were false, at the pleading stage, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. When the alleged events in this case occurred, the law clearly established that a parent and child’s constitutional right to familial association is violated when a state official interferes with a parent’s lawful custody through judicial deception. The law also clearly established that a state official cannot remove a child from a lawful custodial parent without consent or court order unless the official has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger and, even then, the scope and duration of the removal must be reasonable. Here, Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendant violated these rights by deliberately failing to inform the family court of a custody order. View "HANNAH DAVID V. GINA KAULUKUKUI" on Justia Law