Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff who self-identifies as “an openly transgender female,” sued the Miss United States of America pageant, alleging that the Pageant’s “natural born female” eligibility requirement violates the Oregon Public Accommodations Act (“OPAA”). The district court granted the Pageant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the First Amendment protects the Pageant’s expressive association rights to exclude a person who would impact the group’s ability to express its views.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Miss United States of America, LLC. The panel held that the First Amendment, which ensures that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” extends its protections to theatrical productions. Beauty pageants fall comfortably within this ambit. The panel noted that it is commonly understood that beauty pageants are generally designed to express the “ideal vision of American womanhood.” The panel held that the Pageant’s message cannot be divorced from the Pageant’s selection and evaluation of contestants. The Pageant would not be able to communicate “the celebration of biological women” if it were forced to allow Plaintiff to participate. The First Amendment affords the Pageant the ability to voice this message and to enforce its “natural born female” rule. The panel concluded that forcing the Pageant to accept Plaintiff as a participant would fundamentally alter the Pageant’s expressive message in direct violation of the First Amendment. Further, the panel held that application of the OPAA would force the Pageant to include Plaintiff and therefore alter its speech. View "ANITA GREEN V. MISS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that Schwab Charitable, its board of directors, and its Investment Oversight Committee breached their fiduciary duties under California law by partnering with Schwab & Co.—a legally separate but closely related company—for brokerage, custodial, and administrative services. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. After Defendants moved to dismiss, the district court held that Plaintiff lacked standing under Article III and statutory standing under California law. The district court allowed Plaintiff to amend his complaint, but he notified the district court that he did not intend to do so, and instead wished to appeal. The district court then entered judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Plaintiff did not have Article III standing to sue Schwab Charitable Fund for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties by, among other things, deducting excessive fees from Plaintiff’s donor-advised fund. The panel held that it need not decide whether Plaintiff’s arguments, regarding his purported need to contribute more to the DAF and related impact on his reputation and expressive rights, were cognizable in general because Plaintiff did not allege that he had experienced or will experience any of these purported injuries. The panel concluded that Plaintiff had not adequately alleged standing based on these theories of injury. View "PHILIP PINKERT V. SCHWAB CHARITABLE FUND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Before her retirement, Plaintiff was employed by the Oregon Health Authority, and SEIU was the exclusive representative for her bargaining unit. Plaintiff never joined SEIU, but the State deducted union dues from her salary and remitted the dues to SEIU. Plaintiff alleged that SEIU forged her signature on a union membership agreement. Plaintiff demanded that the State and SEIU stop the dues deductions and return the withheld payments. After she retired, Plaintiff filed this action against State defendants and SEIU, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief against all defendants for lack of jurisdiction and her claims for retrospective relief against Service Employees International Union Local 503 (“SEIU”) for failure to allege state action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the panel first considered whether it could entertain Plaintiff’s claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants. As to Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief for violation of her First Amendment rights, the panel concluded that her fear of future harm was based on a series of interferences that were too speculative to establish a “case or controversy” for the prospective relief she sought.   Plaintiff’s theory that potential future unauthorized dues deductions chilled the exercise of her First Amendment rights was also too speculative to establish standing. The panel concluded that she lacked any concrete interest in her future wages or her right to be free from compelled union speech that were threatened by the alleged lack of procedural safeguards. View "JODEE WRIGHT V. SEIU LOCAL 503, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an individual provider (“IP”) of in-home care for her disabled son. Under Washington law, IPs are considered public employees for the purpose of collective bargaining, and they are represented by Service Employees International Union 775 (“SEIU”). Plaintiff did not join the union, but on two occasions the State withheld dues from her paycheck.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims against Public Partnerships LLC (“PPL”) and Public Consulting Group, Inc. (“PCG”) (collectively “private defendants”), and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Washington Governor Inslee and Secretary Strange of the Department of Social and Health Services (collectively “state defendants”), in Plaintiff’s action alleging that Defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and engaged in the willful withholding of her wages in violation of state law.   The panel held that Plaintiff did not have standing to bring any claims for prospective relief. The panel further held that, although the district court erred in holding that PPL and PCG were not state actors, Plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim or a claim for violation of state law. Plaintiff alleged that PPL and PCG violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights because they deprived her of her liberty interest under the First Amendment without adequate procedural safeguards. The panel held that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish that PPL and PCG can be considered state actors for the purpose of her 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. Plaintiff met both parts of the two-prong test for determining whether state action exists. View "CINDY OCHOA V. PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

After the district court entered default against Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Act, it ordered Vo to show cause why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. After considering Vo’s response, the district court elected to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(4). The district court determined that there were exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons justifying this exercise of its discretion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s California Unruh Civil Rights Act claim against Defendant. The panel held that under Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021), in order to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint ADA and Unruh Act suit, the district court must properly articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional.   The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, there were exceptional circumstances regarding comity and fairness in allowing Plaintiff to evade California’s heightened procedural requirements for Unruh Act claims by bringing her claims in federal court. Second, unlike in Arroyo, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA claim, meaning that the Gibbs values could be effectuated. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s order was not sufficiently case-specific. View "THANH VO V. JOHN CHOI" on Justia Law

In an action brought by the Spirit of Aloha Temple (“Plaintiffs”) challenging the County of Maui Planning Commission’s denial of its application for a special use permit to hold religious services and other events on agriculturally zoned property, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Plaintiffs on their facial prior restraint challenge; held that the district court improperly dismissed the remaining claims on appeal under the doctrine of collateral estoppel; vacated the district court’s summary judgment on costs and the appealed religious liberties claims; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.   Plaintiffs facially challenged the zoning scheme as a prior restraint on their First Amendment rights. The panel held that Plaintiffs may bring a facial prior restraint challenge. Because the County’s special use permitting scheme was expressly “more onerous” on conduct protected by the First Amendment, the effect on religious expression was not merely “incidental” and thus had a sufficient nexus to expression for Plaintiffs to bring a facial challenge. The panel further held that the County’s permitting scheme granted permitting officials an impermissible degree of discretion, and therefore, failed to qualify as a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Thus, the challenged regulation violated the First Amendment.   The panel held that the district court erred in holding that the Commission’s findings on strict scrutiny collaterally estop Plaintiffs’ substantial-burden and nondiscrimination Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims, Free Exercise claims, and Equal Protection claims. View "SPIRIT OF ALOHA TEMPLE, ET AL V. COUNTY OF MAUI, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of the murder of an Oregon Department of Corrections Director. However, since trial, another man has confessed to the killing and nearly all the witnesses who directly implicated Petitioner have recanted their testimony. Petitioner sought federal habeas relief making various claims including constitutional violations based on the trial court’s exclusion of the other man's confession. The constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitoner failed to raise them in state court as required.The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner's procedural default is excused under the “actual innocence” exception set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The panel wrote that other man's detailed and compelling confessions, when considered with the recantations of nearly all the State’s key witnesses, are more than sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s standard, as it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of the new evidence.Reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding evidence of the confessor's guilt. View "FRANK GABLE V. MAX WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

After the U.S. Consulate in El Salvador denied the immigrant visa application of Plaintiff, he and his U.S.-citizen spouse (collectively "Plaintiffs") sought judicial review of the government’s visa decision. Relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the district court granted summary judgment to the government.   Vacating the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, and remanding, the panel held that (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates the constitutional rights of a citizen, due process requires that the government provide the citizen with timely and adequate notice of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice in this case, the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The panel explained that, as set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015), the doctrine of consular nonreviewability admits an exception in certain circumstances where the denial of a visa affects the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute ecstasy after Government officers discovered large quantities of illegal drugs in two packages falsely labeled as containing documents from a German law firm. Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the evidence in a pre-trial motion to suppress. The Ninth Circuit held that, even if the evidence was seized in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights, admission was justified under the independent source doctrine. The court also rejected Defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "USA V. TONY SAELEE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mobilize the Message provides political campaigns with doorknockers and signature gatherers, which it purports to hire as independent contractors. Plaintiff Moving Oxnard Forward is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making the government of Oxnard, California, more efficient and transparent and in the past have hired signature gatherers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs claimed that the California law violates the First Amendment because it discriminates against speech based on its content by classifying their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees or independent contractors under the ABC test while classifying direct sales salespersons, newspaper distributors, and newspaper carriers under Borello.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction which sought to restrain the California Attorney General from applying California’s “ABC test,” codified in California Labor Code Section 2775(b)(1) to classify Plaintiffs’ doorknockers and signature gatherers as either employees or independent contractors. The panel accepted that classification of their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees might impose greater costs on plaintiffs than if these individuals had been classified as independent contractors, and that as a result they might not retain as many doorknockers and signature gatherers. Such an indirect impact on speech, however, does not violate the First Amendment. Section 2783 does not target certain types of speech. Unless an occupational exemption exists, the ABC test applies across California’s economy. Thus, Plaintiffs were not unfairly burdened by application of the ABC test to their doorknockers and signature gatherers. View "MOBILIZE THE MESSAGE LLC, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law