Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is one of the principal shareholders of Riley’s American Heritage Farms (“Riley’s Farm”) Schools within the Claremont Unified School District booked and attended field trips to Riley’s Farm. In 2018, Plaintiff used his personal Twitter account to comment on a range of controversial social and political topics. After some parents complained and a local newspaper published an article about Defendant and his Twitter postings, the School District severed its business relationship with Riley’s Farm. Plaintiff brought suit against the School District, individual members of the school board, and three school administrators (the “School defendants”), alleging retaliation for protected speech.   The Ninth Circuit (1) amended its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment for public school defendants in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging First Amendment violations, (2) denied a petition for rehearing, (3) denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and (4) ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.   The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights had been violated and the individual School defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the damages claims because the right at issue was not clearly established when the conduct took place. The court further held that Defendant failed to establish that the School District’s asserted interests in preventing disruption to their operations and curricular design because of parental complaints were so substantial that they outweighed Defendant’s free speech interests. View "RILEY'S AMERICAN HERITAGE FARM V. JAMES ELSASSER" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested returning from the Philippines, where he engaged in sex tourism involving minors. He was convicted and sentenced on one count of attempted sexual of a child and one count of possession of sexually explicit images of children. Defendant arranged these activities through online messaging services provided by electronic service providers ("ESPs") Yahoo and Facebook. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence seized from his electronic devices should have been suppressed because, among other reasons, Yahoo and Facebook were government actors and violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they investigated his accounts without a warrant and reported the evidence. He further argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the required mental state for his sexual exploitation charge and miscalculated the sentence on his possession charge.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court rejected Defendant’s arguments and held that the government’s requests that Yahoo preserve records related to Defendant’s private communications did not amount to an unreasonable seizure. Further, Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the limited digital data sought in the government’s subpoenas. The court also held that the affidavit established a fair probability that child pornography would be found on the defendant’s electronic devices. Finally, the court held that there was no impermissible double counting in this case, as the enhancements were premised on separate exploitative acts. View "USA V. CARSTEN ROSENOW" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the life sentence that an Arizona court imposed on Petitioner for a crime he committed when he was 17-years-old. The state post-conviction court rejected Petitioner’s Miller claim, finding that unlike the individuals sentenced in Miller, Petitioner received an individualized sentencing hearing. The district judge held that the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an unreasonable application of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment granting habeas corpus relief to Petitioner. The court held that the state court’s application of Miller was reasonable. Here, the sentencing judge considered Petitioner’s youth and characteristics and concluded that Petitioner warranted a life sentence without the possibility of release. Petitioner argued that there was no practical difference between a sentence of life with the possibility of release and a sentence of natural life. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that despite the practical result, Miller does not mandate resentencing. View "MICHAEL JESSUP V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that law enforcement officers used excessive force in apprehending him after he escaped from a County Jail highway work crew and lived on the lam for three weeks.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officials. The court held that the bodycam footage and audio did not blatantly contradict all of Plaintiff’s testimony. The court viewed the facts blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage in the light depicted by the videotape and its audio to conclude that Plaintiff did not attempt to surrender to the officers. However, the court viewed all other facts, including Plaintiff’s allegation of the post-handcuff beating, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff on summary judgment.   The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged post-handcuff beating and dog-biting were proportional to the threat the officer reasonably perceived by Plaintiff while handcuffed. The court also found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity under Sec. 1983 as to the claimed post-handcuff beating and dog-biting because it was clearly established law that beating a handcuffed convict violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court found that the excessive force claims based on failure to intervene and failure to intercede against the other defendants failed. View "COREY HUGHES V. MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Oregon minority-party state senator alleged that majority party members retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech when Defendants ordered him not to enter the state capitol without giving them 12 hours advance notice.     The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s complaint raised a plausible inference that he was engaged in protected speech. However, in considering Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s speech was unprotected fighting words, the court held that at the motion to dismiss stage, it could not say that Plaintiff’s statements created a likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response.   The court explained that an elected official raising a First Amendment retaliation claim has the initial burden of pleading and proving that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant official to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action complained of.   Here, Plaintiff satisfied the second prong of the prima facie test and his complaint plausibly alleged that his speech played a part in the retaliation. Thus, Defendants’ affirmative defense was not grounds for dismissal at the pleading stage. View "BRIAN BOQUIST V. PETER COURTNEY" on Justia Law

A dentist, his professional corporation, and a teledentistry company (collectively "Plaintiffs") alleged that the Dental Board of California conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations. Plaintiffs alleged that the harassment arose after they developed an online service model for patients.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Article III standing because they alleged an injury that was traceable to Defendants’ challenged conduct. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action. The court rejected the proposition that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy.   Further, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants subjected them to disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court explained that a class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator. Here, Plaintiffs did not meet this standard because instead of claiming they stood the same as others, they touted their differences.   The court did not review the lower court’s denial of state-action immunity. View "JEFFREY SULITZER V. JOSEPH TIPPINS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to medical providers at Orange County Jail in 1983 claims alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff, a detainee who died from a ruptured aortic dissection.The court stated to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable official would have understood that their actions presented an unconstitutional substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Defendant, the on-call physician at the time, could not have reasonably believed that he could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with Plaintiff’s symptoms. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to this Defendant.The court further held that the first nurse to see Plaintiff had access to facts from which an inference could be drawn that Plaintiff was at serious risk. The court held that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to Defendant.The court also held that the second nurse to see Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. Reasoning that a jury could not reasonably conclude that this Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Finally, the court held that the third nurse to see Plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have inferred that Plaintiff was at serious risk if not hospitalized. View "PATRICK RUSSELL V. JOCELYN LUMITAP" on Justia Law

After Defendant sold fentanyl to an undercover officer, federal agents executed a search warrant at his home, leading to the discovery of fentanyl, oxycodone and a loaded firearm. Defendant was indicted on conspiracy to distribute a substance containing fentanyl, possession with intent to deliver fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.At trial, Defendant contested only the conspiracy and firearms charges. As to the firearm offense, Defendant presented a witness who testified that he sold the gun to Defendant. The witness claimed that he was moving out of the state and did not have any place to store the gun. The witness also testified that the gun had nothing to do with any drug transaction. Defendant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to 120 months incarceration on the drug offenses and 60 months on the firearm offense.Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's supplemental instruction to the jury that allowed the jury to convict him by finding that the drug had a connection to the drug trafficking charges. The Ninth Circuit agreed, reversing Defendant's firearm conviction. Applying a plain error standard, the panel determined that the district court erred in instructing the jury "in furtherance of" meant that “there must be a connection between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense. The district court's definition failed to explain to the jury that it needed to find the firearm somehow facilitated the drug trafficking offenses to convict Defendant. View "USA V. RHETT IRONS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleged that a corrections officer unlawfully tampered with his mail. The plaintiff moved pro se to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but the district court denied his motion upon finding he was barred under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury, an exception that allows prisoners to proceed IFP notwithstanding the three-strikes rule.At issues on appeal are (1) whether the district court properly attributed three strikes to the plaintiff; and (2) must an allegation of imminent danger relate to a prisoner’s underlying claim to get around the PLRA’s three-strikes rule?The Ninth Circuit held a prior lawsuit constitutes a strike when it “was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court found that the district court properly assessed three strikes based on the plaintiff's prior cases.Next, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff is not entitled IFP status regardless of whether a nexus exists, finding that Section 1915(g) contains a nexus requirement. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling because the plaintiff both accumulated three strikes and failed to establish a sufficient nexus. View "EDWARD RAY, JR. V. E. LARA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Arizona voters and three organizations, including the Democratic National Committee, brought this action against the Arizona Secretary of State alleging that the Ballot Order Statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it gives candidates the benefit of appearing first on the ballot, not on the basis of some politically neutral ordering (such as alphabetically or by lot), but on the basis of political affiliation.The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lack standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question. The circuit court panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the suit on these grounds. The panel held that: (1) the DNC satisfied the injury in fact requirement on the basis of its competitive standing; (2) the challenged law was traceable to the Secretary; and (3) having shown that an injunction against the Secretary would significantly increase the likelihood of relief, plaintiffs met their burden as to redressability. The court reasoned that adjudicating a challenge to a ballot order statute did not present the sort of intractable issues that arise in partisan gerrymandering cases. Further, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the district court’s dismissal could be affirmed on the alternative ground that she was not the proper defendant under Article III or the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "BRIAN MECINAS V. KATIE HOBBS" on Justia Law