Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The California State Water Resources Control Board signed a Management Agency Agreement (“MAA”) with the U.S. Forest Service to formally recognize it as the management agency on Forest Service lands to implement water management plans. The U.S. Forest Service issued grazing permits in three allotments-- the Bell Meadow, Eagle Meadow, and Herring Creek Allotments (the “BEH Allotments”). Plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service’s allowance of livestock grazing in the BEH Allotments led to fecal matter runoff. The only claim at issue here alleged that the government violated Section 313 of the Clean Water Act by failing to comply with requirements of California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing under the associational standing doctrine because at least one member of each plaintiff organization averred that they regularly hike in all three Allotments. rest Service would instead implement the agreed-upon Best Management Practices (“BMP”s) and the provisions of the MAA. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the MAA was superseded by the State Board’s adoption of the 2004 “Policy for Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Program” (“2004 NPS Policy”). The panel held that this argument was refuted by the text of that document. The panel concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that government violated the reporting and permitting requirements of the relevant Cal. Water Code. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ claims based on asserted violations of the basis plan’s water quality objectives. View "CENT. SIERRA ENVTL. RES. CTR. V. STANISLAUS NAT'L FOREST" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbing the same bank two times. The first robbery occurred in October 2016. In December 2016, officers found the defendant passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle that was stopped in traffic. Officers found a firearm during a search of the vehicle. It was subsequently determined that the firearm in the defendant’s vehicle was the firearm used in the October 2016 robbery. The defendant was charged with robbery and the gun was confiscated. In January 2017, the bank was robbed a second time, by seemingly the same person. This time, the robber used a silver firearm. The defendant was ultimately charged with the second robbery of the bank.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that officers did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop. Even if there was an unreasonable delay, the district court’s application of the inevitable-discovery rule was not erroneous.The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that robbery was not a crime of violence and, therefore, he could not be charged with using a firearm during a crime of violence. Under binding circuit court precedent, robbery is a crime of violence.Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant committed both robberies. View "USA V. ANTHONY HYLTON, JR." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, Sergeant Dan Ponder, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Ponder used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. After determining that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that Ponder did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the panel concluded that Ponder's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and his use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, nothing in the record suggested that Najera was threatening bystanders or advancing toward them when he was killed. Furthermore, Najera presented no threat at all to the officer in that moment. The panel also concluded that ponder was on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful at the time. View "Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

In 1981, Balla, incarcerated at ISCI, brought a class action suit alleging unconstitutional prison conditions. In 1984, the district court granted injunctive relief related mostly to medical care and physical safety. Since then, the district court has ordered many forms of prospective relief. The district court ultimately held a hearing, found that ISCI had complied with agreed-upon standards and was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of patients, and terminated all prospective relief, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b).The Ninth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an assertion that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of ISCI's failure to adequately treat the Hepatitis C virus. That evidence did not necessarily answer whether there was an ongoing constitutional violation related to the general provision of healthcare that was required by prior orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding no evidence that ISCI medical staff made choices in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiffs’ health; the conditions at the Medical Annex did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because there was no deliberate indifference. There was no evidence there were ongoing problems of the sort that motivated previous population caps and security staffing orders. View "Balla v. Idaho" on Justia Law

New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought against tobacco companies, alleging that the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) preempts the County of Los Angeles's ban on the sale of all flavored tobacco products. The panel explained that the TCA's unique tripartite preemption structure governs its analysis of these issues. The TCA's text, framework, and historical context reveal that it carefully balances federal and local power by carving out the federal government's sole authority to establish the standards for tobacco products, while preserving state, local, and tribal authority to regulate or ban altogether sales of some or all tobacco products.The panel held that the TCA does not expressly preempt the County's sales ban. In this case, the preemption clause does not cover the County's sales ban, and in the alternative, the savings clause saves the County's sales ban from preemption. Furthermore, given that Congress explicitly preserved local authority to enact the very type of sales ban at issue here, the panel concluded that the TCA does not impliedly preempt the sales ban. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Riley’s Farm provides historical reenactments and hosts apple picking. In 2001-2017, schools within the District took field trips to Riley’s. In 2018, Riley used his personal Twitter account to comment on controversial topics. Parents complained; a local newspaper published an article about Riley and his postings. The District severed the business relationship. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging retaliation for protected speech, the district court granted the District defendants summary judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed as to injunctive relief but affirmed as to damages. Riley made a prima facie case of retaliation; he engaged in expressive conduct, some of the District defendants took an adverse action that caused Riley to lose a valuable government benefit, and those defendants were motivated by Riley’s expressive conduct. There was sufficient evidence that Board members had the requisite mental state to be liable for damages. The defendants failed to establish that the District’s asserted interests in preventing disruption to their operations and curricular design because of parental complaints outweighed Riley’s free speech interests. Even assuming that the selection of a field trip venue was protected government speech, the pedagogical concerns underlying the government-speech doctrine did not apply because Riley was not speaking for the District. Nonetheless, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the damages claim. There was no case directly on point that would have clearly established that the defendants’ reaction to parental complaints and media attention was unconstitutional. View "Riley’s American Heritage Farms v. Elsasser" on Justia Law

The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law

CalChamber filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, to “vindicate its members’ First Amendment rights to not be compelled to place false and misleading acrylamide warnings on their food products.” The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Attorney General and related entities, including private enforcers from pursuing new lawsuits to enforce Proposition 65's requirement that “[n]o person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer . . . without first giving clear and reasonable warning.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed. CalChamber was likely to succeed on the merits of its compelled speech claim. Given the robust disagreement by reputable scientific sources over whether acrylamide in food causes cancer in humans, the warning was controversial and misleading. Proposition 65’s enforcement regime created a heavy litigation burden on manufacturers who use alternative warnings rather than the regulatory safe harbor warning. The serious constitutional issue provided sufficient reason to enjoin Proposition 65 acrylamide litigation until the case was finally decided; the injunction was not an impermissible prior restraint. CalChambers established irreparable harm, and the scope of the injunction was not impermissible; and the balance of hardships weighed in CalChamber’s favor. The injunction was in the public interest. View "California Chamber of Commerce v. Council for Education and Research on Toxics" on Justia Law