Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution or torture in Nigeria based on his status as a gay man and the harm he suffered after being discovered having sex with his boyfriend in a hotel. The immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Petitioner was not credible because he “misrepresented” the name of the hotel where he and his boyfriend were discovered. The IJ found that Petitioner failed to establish that he is gay or that he was ever harmed in Nigeria for being gay. The IJ also found that Petitioner’s asylum application was frivolous, concluding that the misrepresentation of the hotel was a material element of his application.   Petitioner appealed arguing that the agency (1) erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim; (2) violated due process in its CAT determination; and (3) erred in concluding that he had filed a frivolous asylum application.   The Ninth Circuit, granted in part, and denied in part, Petitioner’s petition for review. The court concluded that the Board erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim, thus the agency’s denial of CAT relief could not stand. The court did not reach, and therefore denied, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment violation claims. Further, the court held that the Board erred in concluding that Petitioner had filed a frivolous asylum application, because any fabrication concerning the name of the hotel where Petitioner was discovered was not material to his claim. View "PETER UDO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegal reentry after removal in a case in which a Marine Corps surveillance unit spotted him immediately after he unlawfully entered the United States, and notified Customs and Border Patrol agents who soon detained him. Defendant argued that the Marine Corps surveillance violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which codified the longstanding prohibition against military enforcement of civilian law.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for illegal reentry after removal. The court reasoned that the military may still assist civilian law enforcement agencies if Congress expressly authorized it, and here, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense to offer military assistance to Border Patrol in hopes of securing the southern land border. The court concluded that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant's suppression motion based on the alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Further, the court also denied Defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecution’s striking two Asian jurors from the venire, concluding that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for doing so. View "USA V. CLEMENTE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that Defendants, prison officials, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, when despite his numerous complaints over a period of years and a visibly deteriorating condition, they ignored his enlarged prostate. After the district court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, he was left with two claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The remaining officials claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court disagreed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order denying qualified immunity to prison officials. The Ninth Circuit determined that only examination of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis was necessary—whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation—because doing so would not hamper the development of precedent and both parties expressly acknowledged that this case turned on the second prong. The court reasoned it was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s treatment that prison officials violated the constitution when they choose a medically unacceptable course of treatment for the circumstances and a reasonable jury could find that the prison officials did just that. View "LEWIS STEWART V. ROMEO ARANAS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought his civil rights suit against the County of Ravalli and others. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. While its motion was still pending, the County made Plaintiff a Rule 68 offer of judgment for $50,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees. Before Rule 68’s fourteen-day window had closed, the district court granted the summary judgment motion. But the court did not enter final judgment. Rather, it said that judgment would be entered “in due course” after it issued a reasoned opinion. Within an hour of the entry of this order, Plaintiff accepted the County’s offer of judgment. The district court held that, under Rule 68, it was bound by the offer of judgment and entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $50,000 plus costs and fees.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff, entered in accordance with Defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment. The court held that under the plain text of Rule 68, the district court properly entered judgment according to the County’s offer of judgment. The court’s review of the rule showed that it was designed to function in a mechanical manner. The court reasoned that Rule 68 offer, once made, is non-negotiable; it is either accepted, in which case it is automatically entered by the clerk of court or rejected, in which case it stands as the marker by which the Plaintiff’s results are ultimately measured. View "ROBERT KUBIAK V. COUNTY OF RAVALLI" on Justia Law

Defendant’s ex-fiance discovered child pornography on his computer, which she then brought to the Sheriff’s Office. While the ex-fiance was there, the Detective asked her to show him only images that she had already viewed when she had accessed the laptop by herself. The ex-fiance complied with that request. Defendant moved to suppress on the ground that, because the Detective directed Defendant’s ex-fiance to access the computer without Defendant’s permission to show the Detective what she had already seen, the search of the computer at the sheriff’s office was an unlawful law-enforcement search.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The court held Defendant’s objections to the use of evidence obtained from his computer all failed. The court reasoned that because U.S. Attorney does not dispute Defendant’s assertion that his ex-fiance acted as a state agent when she accessed the computer at the sheriff’s office, the court assumed that this was a government search. However, the court applied United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and United States v. Bowman, 215 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2000), and held that the search was permissible because, when the ex-fiance accessed the child pornography on Defendant's computer at the sheriff’s office, she merely mimicked her earlier private search. View "USA V. DAREN PHILLIPS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is one of the principal shareholders of Riley’s American Heritage Farms (“Riley’s Farm”) Schools within the Claremont Unified School District booked and attended field trips to Riley’s Farm. In 2018, Plaintiff used his personal Twitter account to comment on a range of controversial social and political topics. After some parents complained and a local newspaper published an article about Defendant and his Twitter postings, the School District severed its business relationship with Riley’s Farm. Plaintiff brought suit against the School District, individual members of the school board, and three school administrators (the “School defendants”), alleging retaliation for protected speech.   The Ninth Circuit (1) amended its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment for public school defendants in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging First Amendment violations, (2) denied a petition for rehearing, (3) denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and (4) ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.   The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights had been violated and the individual School defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the damages claims because the right at issue was not clearly established when the conduct took place. The court further held that Defendant failed to establish that the School District’s asserted interests in preventing disruption to their operations and curricular design because of parental complaints were so substantial that they outweighed Defendant’s free speech interests. View "RILEY'S AMERICAN HERITAGE FARM V. JAMES ELSASSER" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested returning from the Philippines, where he engaged in sex tourism involving minors. He was convicted and sentenced on one count of attempted sexual of a child and one count of possession of sexually explicit images of children. Defendant arranged these activities through online messaging services provided by electronic service providers ("ESPs") Yahoo and Facebook. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence seized from his electronic devices should have been suppressed because, among other reasons, Yahoo and Facebook were government actors and violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they investigated his accounts without a warrant and reported the evidence. He further argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the required mental state for his sexual exploitation charge and miscalculated the sentence on his possession charge.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court rejected Defendant’s arguments and held that the government’s requests that Yahoo preserve records related to Defendant’s private communications did not amount to an unreasonable seizure. Further, Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the limited digital data sought in the government’s subpoenas. The court also held that the affidavit established a fair probability that child pornography would be found on the defendant’s electronic devices. Finally, the court held that there was no impermissible double counting in this case, as the enhancements were premised on separate exploitative acts. View "USA V. CARSTEN ROSENOW" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the life sentence that an Arizona court imposed on Petitioner for a crime he committed when he was 17-years-old. The state post-conviction court rejected Petitioner’s Miller claim, finding that unlike the individuals sentenced in Miller, Petitioner received an individualized sentencing hearing. The district judge held that the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an unreasonable application of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment granting habeas corpus relief to Petitioner. The court held that the state court’s application of Miller was reasonable. Here, the sentencing judge considered Petitioner’s youth and characteristics and concluded that Petitioner warranted a life sentence without the possibility of release. Petitioner argued that there was no practical difference between a sentence of life with the possibility of release and a sentence of natural life. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that despite the practical result, Miller does not mandate resentencing. View "MICHAEL JESSUP V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that law enforcement officers used excessive force in apprehending him after he escaped from a County Jail highway work crew and lived on the lam for three weeks.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officials. The court held that the bodycam footage and audio did not blatantly contradict all of Plaintiff’s testimony. The court viewed the facts blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage in the light depicted by the videotape and its audio to conclude that Plaintiff did not attempt to surrender to the officers. However, the court viewed all other facts, including Plaintiff’s allegation of the post-handcuff beating, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff on summary judgment.   The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged post-handcuff beating and dog-biting were proportional to the threat the officer reasonably perceived by Plaintiff while handcuffed. The court also found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity under Sec. 1983 as to the claimed post-handcuff beating and dog-biting because it was clearly established law that beating a handcuffed convict violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court found that the excessive force claims based on failure to intervene and failure to intercede against the other defendants failed. View "COREY HUGHES V. MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Oregon minority-party state senator alleged that majority party members retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech when Defendants ordered him not to enter the state capitol without giving them 12 hours advance notice.     The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s complaint raised a plausible inference that he was engaged in protected speech. However, in considering Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s speech was unprotected fighting words, the court held that at the motion to dismiss stage, it could not say that Plaintiff’s statements created a likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response.   The court explained that an elected official raising a First Amendment retaliation claim has the initial burden of pleading and proving that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant official to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action complained of.   Here, Plaintiff satisfied the second prong of the prima facie test and his complaint plausibly alleged that his speech played a part in the retaliation. Thus, Defendants’ affirmative defense was not grounds for dismissal at the pleading stage. View "BRIAN BOQUIST V. PETER COURTNEY" on Justia Law