Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dentist, his professional corporation, and a teledentistry company (collectively "Plaintiffs") alleged that the Dental Board of California conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations. Plaintiffs alleged that the harassment arose after they developed an online service model for patients.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Article III standing because they alleged an injury that was traceable to Defendants’ challenged conduct. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action. The court rejected the proposition that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy.   Further, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants subjected them to disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court explained that a class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator. Here, Plaintiffs did not meet this standard because instead of claiming they stood the same as others, they touted their differences.   The court did not review the lower court’s denial of state-action immunity. View "JEFFREY SULITZER V. JOSEPH TIPPINS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to medical providers at Orange County Jail in 1983 claims alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff, a detainee who died from a ruptured aortic dissection.The court stated to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable official would have understood that their actions presented an unconstitutional substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Defendant, the on-call physician at the time, could not have reasonably believed that he could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with Plaintiff’s symptoms. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to this Defendant.The court further held that the first nurse to see Plaintiff had access to facts from which an inference could be drawn that Plaintiff was at serious risk. The court held that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to Defendant.The court also held that the second nurse to see Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. Reasoning that a jury could not reasonably conclude that this Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Finally, the court held that the third nurse to see Plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have inferred that Plaintiff was at serious risk if not hospitalized. View "PATRICK RUSSELL V. JOCELYN LUMITAP" on Justia Law

After Defendant sold fentanyl to an undercover officer, federal agents executed a search warrant at his home, leading to the discovery of fentanyl, oxycodone and a loaded firearm. Defendant was indicted on conspiracy to distribute a substance containing fentanyl, possession with intent to deliver fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.At trial, Defendant contested only the conspiracy and firearms charges. As to the firearm offense, Defendant presented a witness who testified that he sold the gun to Defendant. The witness claimed that he was moving out of the state and did not have any place to store the gun. The witness also testified that the gun had nothing to do with any drug transaction. Defendant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to 120 months incarceration on the drug offenses and 60 months on the firearm offense.Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's supplemental instruction to the jury that allowed the jury to convict him by finding that the drug had a connection to the drug trafficking charges. The Ninth Circuit agreed, reversing Defendant's firearm conviction. Applying a plain error standard, the panel determined that the district court erred in instructing the jury "in furtherance of" meant that “there must be a connection between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense. The district court's definition failed to explain to the jury that it needed to find the firearm somehow facilitated the drug trafficking offenses to convict Defendant. View "USA V. RHETT IRONS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleged that a corrections officer unlawfully tampered with his mail. The plaintiff moved pro se to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but the district court denied his motion upon finding he was barred under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury, an exception that allows prisoners to proceed IFP notwithstanding the three-strikes rule.At issues on appeal are (1) whether the district court properly attributed three strikes to the plaintiff; and (2) must an allegation of imminent danger relate to a prisoner’s underlying claim to get around the PLRA’s three-strikes rule?The Ninth Circuit held a prior lawsuit constitutes a strike when it “was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court found that the district court properly assessed three strikes based on the plaintiff's prior cases.Next, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff is not entitled IFP status regardless of whether a nexus exists, finding that Section 1915(g) contains a nexus requirement. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling because the plaintiff both accumulated three strikes and failed to establish a sufficient nexus. View "EDWARD RAY, JR. V. E. LARA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Arizona voters and three organizations, including the Democratic National Committee, brought this action against the Arizona Secretary of State alleging that the Ballot Order Statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it gives candidates the benefit of appearing first on the ballot, not on the basis of some politically neutral ordering (such as alphabetically or by lot), but on the basis of political affiliation.The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lack standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question. The circuit court panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the suit on these grounds. The panel held that: (1) the DNC satisfied the injury in fact requirement on the basis of its competitive standing; (2) the challenged law was traceable to the Secretary; and (3) having shown that an injunction against the Secretary would significantly increase the likelihood of relief, plaintiffs met their burden as to redressability. The court reasoned that adjudicating a challenge to a ballot order statute did not present the sort of intractable issues that arise in partisan gerrymandering cases. Further, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the district court’s dismissal could be affirmed on the alternative ground that she was not the proper defendant under Article III or the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "BRIAN MECINAS V. KATIE HOBBS" on Justia Law

The California State Water Resources Control Board signed a Management Agency Agreement (“MAA”) with the U.S. Forest Service to formally recognize it as the management agency on Forest Service lands to implement water management plans. The U.S. Forest Service issued grazing permits in three allotments-- the Bell Meadow, Eagle Meadow, and Herring Creek Allotments (the “BEH Allotments”). Plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service’s allowance of livestock grazing in the BEH Allotments led to fecal matter runoff. The only claim at issue here alleged that the government violated Section 313 of the Clean Water Act by failing to comply with requirements of California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing under the associational standing doctrine because at least one member of each plaintiff organization averred that they regularly hike in all three Allotments. rest Service would instead implement the agreed-upon Best Management Practices (“BMP”s) and the provisions of the MAA. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the MAA was superseded by the State Board’s adoption of the 2004 “Policy for Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Program” (“2004 NPS Policy”). The panel held that this argument was refuted by the text of that document. The panel concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that government violated the reporting and permitting requirements of the relevant Cal. Water Code. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ claims based on asserted violations of the basis plan’s water quality objectives. View "CENT. SIERRA ENVTL. RES. CTR. V. STANISLAUS NAT'L FOREST" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbing the same bank two times. The first robbery occurred in October 2016. In December 2016, officers found the defendant passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle that was stopped in traffic. Officers found a firearm during a search of the vehicle. It was subsequently determined that the firearm in the defendant’s vehicle was the firearm used in the October 2016 robbery. The defendant was charged with robbery and the gun was confiscated. In January 2017, the bank was robbed a second time, by seemingly the same person. This time, the robber used a silver firearm. The defendant was ultimately charged with the second robbery of the bank.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that officers did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop. Even if there was an unreasonable delay, the district court’s application of the inevitable-discovery rule was not erroneous.The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that robbery was not a crime of violence and, therefore, he could not be charged with using a firearm during a crime of violence. Under binding circuit court precedent, robbery is a crime of violence.Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant committed both robberies. View "USA V. ANTHONY HYLTON, JR." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, Sergeant Dan Ponder, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Ponder used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. After determining that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that Ponder did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the panel concluded that Ponder's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and his use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, nothing in the record suggested that Najera was threatening bystanders or advancing toward them when he was killed. Furthermore, Najera presented no threat at all to the officer in that moment. The panel also concluded that ponder was on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful at the time. View "Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

In 1981, Balla, incarcerated at ISCI, brought a class action suit alleging unconstitutional prison conditions. In 1984, the district court granted injunctive relief related mostly to medical care and physical safety. Since then, the district court has ordered many forms of prospective relief. The district court ultimately held a hearing, found that ISCI had complied with agreed-upon standards and was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of patients, and terminated all prospective relief, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b).The Ninth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an assertion that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of ISCI's failure to adequately treat the Hepatitis C virus. That evidence did not necessarily answer whether there was an ongoing constitutional violation related to the general provision of healthcare that was required by prior orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding no evidence that ISCI medical staff made choices in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiffs’ health; the conditions at the Medical Annex did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because there was no deliberate indifference. There was no evidence there were ongoing problems of the sort that motivated previous population caps and security staffing orders. View "Balla v. Idaho" on Justia Law