Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves X Corp., the owner of a large social media platform, challenging California Assembly Bill AB 587. This law requires large social media companies to post their terms of service and submit semiannual reports to the California Attorney General detailing their content-moderation policies and practices, including how they define and address categories like hate speech, extremism, and misinformation. X Corp. sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of AB 587, arguing that it violates free speech and is federally preempted.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied X Corp.'s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that X Corp. was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claim, applying the Zauderer standard for compelled commercial speech. The court concluded that the law's requirements were purely factual and uncontroversial, and reasonably related to the state's interest in transparency. The court also rejected X Corp.'s preemption argument, stating that AB 587 does not impose liability for content moderation activities but only for failing to make required disclosures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the Content Category Report provisions of AB 587 likely compel non-commercial speech and are subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-based. The court found that these provisions are not narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in transparency and therefore likely fail strict scrutiny. The court also determined that the remaining factors for a preliminary injunction weighed in favor of X Corp. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to enter a preliminary injunction consistent with its opinion and to determine whether the Content Category Report provisions are severable from the rest of AB 587. View "X CORP. V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Jesus Ramiro Gomez was sentenced to 188 months in prison for distributing methamphetamine. The district court applied a career offender enhancement, which significantly increased his sentence. This enhancement was based on Gomez's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the district court classified as a "crime of violence."The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially reviewed the case. The court found that Gomez's prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence, thus applying the career offender enhancement. This decision was based on previous rulings that had classified California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) as a crime of violence. Gomez did not object to this classification at the time of sentencing but raised the issue on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Gomez's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The court reasoned that the statute includes reckless uses of force, which do not meet the elements clause of the career offender guideline requiring a mens rea more culpable than recklessness. The court also rejected the government's argument that the conviction could be classified as aggravated assault under the enumerated offenses clause, as this too requires a mens rea greater than extreme recklessness. Consequently, the district court's application of the career offender enhancement was deemed improper. View "USA V. GOMEZ" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2020, Derrick Sanderlin attended a protest in San Jose, California, where he was struck in the groin by a 40mm foam baton round fired by Officer Michael Panighetti. Sanderlin alleged that Panighetti's use of force was retaliatory and excessive, violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Sanderlin claimed he was peacefully protesting and did not hear any warnings before being shot. Panighetti argued that Sanderlin was obstructing officers from targeting other individuals who posed a threat.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Panighetti's motion for summary judgment, concluding that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Panighetti's actions were retaliatory and whether the force used was excessive. The court found that a jury could determine that Sanderlin was engaged in protected First Amendment activity and that Panighetti's actions were motivated by retaliatory animus. Additionally, the court held that a reasonable jury could find that Sanderlin was seized under the Fourth Amendment and that the force used was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Panighetti. The Ninth Circuit held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sanderlin, genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether Panighetti's use of force was retaliatory and excessive. The court concluded that it was clearly established that police officers may not use their authority to retaliate against individuals for protected speech and that the use of a 40mm foam baton round against a non-threatening individual constituted excessive force. The court also determined that subsequent legal developments did not alter the clearly established law at the time of the incident. View "SANDERLIN V. DWYER" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including Vicente Topasna Borja, challenged the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) and Hawaii’s Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act (UMOVA). Borja, a former Hawaii resident now living in Guam, argued that these laws violate equal protection by allowing former Hawaii residents who move abroad or to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to vote absentee in Hawaii’s federal elections, while those who move to other U.S. Territories cannot.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the enforcement of UOCAVA but granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiffs did not have a fundamental right to vote in Hawaii’s federal elections and that those who move from a state to a territory are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Therefore, the court applied rational basis review and concluded that UOCAVA and UMOVA satisfied this standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that rational basis review, not strict scrutiny, applies to UOCAVA and UMOVA’s overseas voting provisions. The court reasoned that these laws do not deprive residents within a geographically defined governmental unit from voting in a unit-wide election nor dilute the voting power of qualified voters within Hawaii. The court found that the differential treatment of former Hawaii residents who move to other U.S. Territories versus those who move abroad or to the CNMI is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. The court also rejected the argument that individuals who move from Hawaii to other U.S. Territories constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit concluded that UOCAVA and UMOVA’s classifications satisfy rational basis review and affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants. View "BORJA V. NAGO" on Justia Law

A group of LGBTQ+ students sued the U.S. Department of Education, alleging that they experienced discrimination at religious colleges and universities that receive federal funding. They challenged the religious exemption to Title IX, which allows religious institutions to discriminate based on gender if it conflicts with their religious tenets. The plaintiffs claimed this exemption violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. They also argued that the Department's 2020 amendment to Title IX regulations, which clarified that institutions do not need to submit a written statement to claim the exemption, was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. It ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the religious exemption violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment under the APA. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, concluding that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Title IX religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical practices and understanding test set forth in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. The court found that the exemption is consistent with a long history of religious accommodations in U.S. law. The court also held that the exemption does not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, as it is substantially related to the important governmental objective of accommodating religious exercise. Finally, the court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment, as they did not show that the rule caused them harm. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "HUNTER V. USEDU" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California corporation, owns and operates a railroad line known as the "Skunk Train" between Fort Bragg and Willits, California. The City of Fort Bragg and the California Coastal Commission sought to regulate the use and maintenance of the Railway's properties within the City, which the Railway resisted, claiming federal preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The City filed a state court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Railway to comply with local regulations. The Railway argued that federal law preempted these local regulations. Subsequently, the Railway filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaration that the City's and Commission's regulatory actions were preempted by federal law and an injunction to prevent interference with its operations.The Mendocino County Superior Court overruled the Railway's demurrer, which argued that federal law preempted all local regulations. The Railway's subsequent petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court were unsuccessful. The Railway then filed an answer in the state court, asserting federal preemption as an affirmative defense. Meanwhile, the Commission intervened in the state court action, seeking a declaration that the Coastal Act and local coastal program applied to the Railway's activities and were not preempted by federal law. The Railway also attempted to remove the state action to federal court, but the district court remanded it back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the Railway's federal lawsuit under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding that the state court proceedings were sufficiently parallel to the federal action and that considerations of avoiding piecemeal litigation, forum shopping, and the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction supported the dismissal. The court held that the state court could adequately protect the Railway's rights and that the federal preemption issue could be resolved in the state court proceedings. View "MENDOCINO RAILWAY V. AINSWORTH" on Justia Law

An attorney, Daniel Crowe, challenged the requirement to join the Oregon State Bar (OSB), arguing it infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of association. Crowe objected to statements published by OSB in its magazine, which he felt misrepresented his views. OSB refunded Crowe a portion of his dues used for the publication but did not satisfy his concerns, leading him to file a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially dismissed Crowe's claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed this decision, allowing the freedom of association claim to proceed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for OSB, holding that the bar's activities were germane to its regulatory purpose and did not violate Crowe's rights. Crowe appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that OSB is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, dismissing claims against OSB and for retrospective relief against its officers. However, the court found that Crowe demonstrated an infringement on his freedom of association because OSB's statements in its magazine could reasonably be imputed to its members, including Crowe, and were not related to the bar's regulatory purpose. The court concluded that this infringement did not survive exacting scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment regarding Crowe's freedom of association claim for prospective equitable relief against individual OSB officers and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Hawai‘i Court Records Rules, which mandate that all medical and health records filed in any court proceeding be filed under seal without further judicial order. The plaintiff, Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest, argued that this rule is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment, which grants the public a presumptive right to access court records.The United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Chief Court Administrators of the Hawai‘i state courts. The district court held that the public does not have a presumptive First Amendment right to access medical and health records, and even if such a right existed, requiring case-by-case litigation to unseal these records did not violate the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment grants the public a presumptive right to access a substantial portion of the records sealed under Hawai‘i’s mandatory sealing provision. The court found that the state’s interest in protecting individual privacy rights does not justify the categorical sealing of all medical and health records without any case-by-case consideration. The court concluded that the mandatory sealing rule is not the least restrictive means of protecting privacy interests and that case-by-case judicial review would better balance privacy concerns with the public’s right to access.The Ninth Circuit held that the Hawai‘i Court Records Rules are unconstitutionally overbroad because they encroach on the public’s right of access to court records. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CIVIL BEAT LAW CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC V. MAILE" on Justia Law

A resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States precludes the application of a federal cockfighting prohibition. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this prohibition. The federal cockfighting prohibition, codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and amended in 2018, made cockfighting illegal in all U.S. jurisdictions, including the CNMI.The U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the federal cockfighting prohibition applied to the CNMI under the Covenant. The district court determined that 7 U.S.C. § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as required by Covenant § 502, and thus also applicable to the CNMI. The court also found that Covenant § 105, which governs laws enacted after January 9, 1978, did not apply to amendments of laws that existed on that date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Covenant § 502 governs the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and its 2018 Amendment to the CNMI. The court found that § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978, and thus applicable to the CNMI. The court also held that even if Covenant § 105 were to govern, the federal cockfighting prohibition would still apply to the CNMI because it is applicable to the several states and does not impermissibly intrude upon the internal affairs of the CNMI. The court concluded that the federal interests in regulating interstate commerce, ensuring the humane treatment of animals, and preventing the spread of avian flu outweighed any intrusion into the CNMI’s internal affairs. The judgment was affirmed. View "SALAS V. USA" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, parents of Idaho school children, sought reimbursement for fees associated with educational and extracurricular activities within Idaho public school districts. They argued that these fees were improperly assessed because the Idaho Constitution mandates "free common schools," and that the payment of such fees constituted a taking of property without due process, violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho initially denied the school districts' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had a property interest in a free education under the Idaho Constitution. However, the case was later reassigned to a different district judge, who revisited the issue. The second district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, concluding that the plaintiffs did not possess a property right protected by the Takings Clause because the right to a free public education in Idaho does not constitute a vested private property interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the Idaho Constitution does not create a vested private property interest in specific educational benefits. It determined that public education in Idaho lacks the essential characteristics of private property, such as the right to possess, use, dispose of, or sell. Therefore, money paid to satisfy fees related to supplemental educational services is not subject to a Takings Clause claim. The court also clarified that a second district judge should not reconsider a prior judge's ruling unless specific conditions are met, but found any procedural error in this case to be harmless. View "Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District" on Justia Law