Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
USA V. DEFRANCE
Michael Blake DeFrance was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend in 2013 under Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-206(1)(a), a misdemeanor. In 2018, he was found in possession of three firearms, leading to a federal indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied DeFrance's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the Montana statute could be violated without the use of physical force. DeFrance was subsequently convicted and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under Montana's PFMA statute qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court concluded that because the Montana statute can be violated by inflicting emotional distress rather than physical injury, it does not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court held that DeFrance's conviction under the Montana statute does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The Ninth Circuit reversed DeFrance's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing or other proceedings consistent with their opinion. View "USA V. DEFRANCE" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT
Residents of Humboldt County filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the County’s system of administrative penalties and fees for cannabis abatement violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The County Code imposes daily fines of $6,000 to $10,000 for illegal cannabis cultivation. Plaintiffs claimed that the County charges landowners based on imprecise data or previous owners' conduct, causing emotional distress and financial burdens due to ongoing penalties and abatement costs.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing as they had not paid any fines, rendering the Eighth Amendment claim unripe. The court also found both facial and as-applied challenges untimely, reasoning that the statute of limitations began when the ordinance was enacted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that plaintiffs’ claim under the Excessive Fines Clause was constitutionally ripe and that they had standing due to the imposition of penalties causing concrete injuries, including emotional distress and financial expenses. The court also found that prudential ripeness considerations supported allowing the litigation to proceed. The court determined that the statute of limitations for facial challenges begins when plaintiffs know of the actual injury, not when the ordinance is enacted. Thus, some plaintiffs’ facial challenges were timely. The court also found that several plaintiffs had timely as-applied challenges, except for Cyro Glad, whose claim was untimely.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause, as the penalties and demolition orders were punitive and potentially excessive. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the dismissal only for Cyro Glad’s as-applied claim. View "THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT" on Justia Law
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION
A nonprofit corporation, Moving Oxnard Forward (MOF), challenged campaign finance limitations in the Oxnard City Code, alleging they violated the First Amendment. The limitations, adopted by the City of Oxnard, California, primarily affected Aaron Starr, MOF's President, who had a history of receiving large contributions and challenging the City Council's policies. Starr had previously led recall efforts against the City Council and ran for Mayor, relying on larger-dollar contributions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the City, upholding the campaign finance limitations. MOF appealed the decision, arguing that the limitations were designed to target and suppress Starr's political activities rather than to prevent corruption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found significant "danger signs" of invidious discrimination against Starr. The court noted that the legislative record and the practical impact of the limitations disproportionately affected Starr, who had been a vocal critic of the City Council. The court also found that the City's justification for the limitations, based on a 2010 corruption scandal, was tenuous and unrelated to campaign contributions.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the contribution limits were not narrowly tailored to the City's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. Instead, the limits appeared to be more closely drawn to suppress Starr's political activities. As a result, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of MOF, holding that the per-candidate aggregate contribution limitations in the Oxnard City Code violated the First Amendment. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION" on Justia Law
PUENTE V. CITY OF PHOENIX
In this case, two organizations and four individuals brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Phoenix and several police officers, alleging violations of their constitutional rights during a protest outside a rally held by then-President Trump at the Phoenix Convention Center on August 22, 2017. The plaintiffs claimed that the police used excessive force and violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by dispersing the protesters with tear gas, chemical irritants, and flash-bang grenades.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona certified two classes and granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims except for the individual Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims asserted by three plaintiffs against certain officers. The court found that there was no "seizure" of the class members under the Fourth Amendment and evaluated the excessive-force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's "shocks-the-conscience" test. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the First Amendment claims, finding no evidence of retaliatory intent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the class claims. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the use of airborne and auditory irritants did not constitute a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and that the Fourteenth Amendment's "purpose to harm" standard applied. The court found no evidence of an improper purpose to harm by the officers.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the individual defendants on the excessive-force claims asserted by the three plaintiffs, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances or did not violate clearly established law. The court also affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claims, finding that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to disperse the crowd due to a clear and present danger.Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for Police Chief Williams and the City of Phoenix, concluding that there was no evidence that Williams caused or ratified the use of excessive force or that the City was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "PUENTE V. CITY OF PHOENIX" on Justia Law
Maverick Gaming LLC V. United States
Maverick Gaming LLC, a casino gaming company, filed a lawsuit challenging the State of Washington's tribal-state compacts that allow sports betting on tribal land. Maverick argued that these compacts violate the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act (IGRA), the Equal Protection Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Maverick sought to invalidate the gaming compacts and amendments that permit sports betting on tribal lands, which would allow them to offer similar gaming activities at their cardrooms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Maverick's lawsuit. The court found that the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe, which intervened for the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss, was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). The court determined that the Tribe had a legally protected interest in the lawsuit that could be impaired or impeded in its absence. The court also concluded that the Tribe could not be feasibly joined in the litigation due to its sovereign immunity. Consequently, the court ruled that the litigation could not proceed in equity and good conscience without the Tribe and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Tribe was a required party with a substantial interest in the legality of its gaming compact and sports betting amendment. The court also found that the federal government could not adequately represent the Tribe's interests, as their interests diverged in meaningful ways. The court held that the Tribe's sovereign immunity prevented its joinder, and the litigation could not proceed without the Tribe. The court rejected Maverick's argument that the public rights exception should apply, as the suit threatened the Tribe's legal entitlements and sovereignty. View "Maverick Gaming LLC V. United States" on Justia Law
Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law. View "Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law
PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR
The case involves Planned Parenthood and two physicians challenging the Idaho Attorney General's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-622(1), which criminalizes performing or attempting to perform an abortion and imposes professional licensing penalties on healthcare providers who assist in performing or attempting to perform an abortion. The Attorney General issued an opinion letter stating that the statute prohibits medical providers from referring patients to out-of-state abortion providers. Plaintiffs argued that this interpretation violates their First Amendment rights by preventing them from providing information about abortion services in other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the Attorney General from enforcing his interpretation of the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe and not moot, and the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing, as they demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution under the Attorney General's interpretation. The case was deemed ripe and not moot despite the Attorney General's withdrawal of the opinion letter, as the withdrawal did not disavow the interpretation. The court also held that the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young due to his authority to assist in the enforcement of the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The request for reassignment to a different district judge was denied. View "PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Health Law
Matsumoto v. Labrador
The case involves Idaho's abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code §18-623, which criminalizes procuring an abortion or obtaining an abortion-inducing drug for an unemancipated minor by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the minor with the intent to conceal the abortion from the minor’s parents or guardian. Plaintiffs, including an Idaho attorney and two advocacy organizations, sought to counsel pregnant minors and provide material support for accessing legal abortions in other states. They challenged the statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the statute, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and void-for-vagueness claims. The district court also partially granted and denied Idaho’s motion to dismiss, dismissing only the claim regarding the right to intrastate travel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims that the statute was void for vagueness or that it infringed on their rights to expressive association. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the statute’s “recruiting” prong unconstitutionally infringed on their protected speech. The court determined that the “recruiting” provision was overbroad and could be severed from the rest of the statute. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against enforcing the “recruiting” prong but reversed the district court’s decision regarding the other claims and remanded for modification of the preliminary injunction. View "Matsumoto v. Labrador" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
ATKINS V. BEAN
Sterling Atkins, the petitioner, was convicted by a Nevada jury of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault, and was sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed all counts except for the sexual assault conviction, which it reversed. Atkins then sought state postconviction relief, which was denied, and subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.In the federal district court, Atkins raised several claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence, and for inadequately preparing a psychological expert. The district court denied these claims, finding that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial was reasonable under AEDPA standards. The court also found that Atkins's claim regarding the psychological expert was procedurally defaulted and that he could not meet the Martinez v. Ryan standard to excuse the default.Atkins also challenged a jury instruction regarding the possibility of parole, arguing it was misleading and that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to speculate about parole. The district court found this claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Atkins failed to show cause to excuse the default.Atkins sought to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase for failing to investigate his psychological background and a claim that trial counsel had a financial conflict of interest. The court denied these requests, finding that the claims were either procedurally defaulted or lacked merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Atkins's habeas petition and denied his request to expand the certificate of appealability. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably denied Atkins's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Atkins failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural defaults of his other claims. View "ATKINS V. BEAN" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
USA V. KING COUNTY
King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law