Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Idaho's abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code §18-623, which criminalizes procuring an abortion or obtaining an abortion-inducing drug for an unemancipated minor by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the minor with the intent to conceal the abortion from the minor’s parents or guardian. Plaintiffs, including an Idaho attorney and two advocacy organizations, sought to counsel pregnant minors and provide material support for accessing legal abortions in other states. They challenged the statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the statute, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and void-for-vagueness claims. The district court also partially granted and denied Idaho’s motion to dismiss, dismissing only the claim regarding the right to intrastate travel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims that the statute was void for vagueness or that it infringed on their rights to expressive association. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the statute’s “recruiting” prong unconstitutionally infringed on their protected speech. The court determined that the “recruiting” provision was overbroad and could be severed from the rest of the statute. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against enforcing the “recruiting” prong but reversed the district court’s decision regarding the other claims and remanded for modification of the preliminary injunction. View "Matsumoto v. Labrador" on Justia Law

Sterling Atkins, the petitioner, was convicted by a Nevada jury of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault, and was sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed all counts except for the sexual assault conviction, which it reversed. Atkins then sought state postconviction relief, which was denied, and subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.In the federal district court, Atkins raised several claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence, and for inadequately preparing a psychological expert. The district court denied these claims, finding that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial was reasonable under AEDPA standards. The court also found that Atkins's claim regarding the psychological expert was procedurally defaulted and that he could not meet the Martinez v. Ryan standard to excuse the default.Atkins also challenged a jury instruction regarding the possibility of parole, arguing it was misleading and that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to speculate about parole. The district court found this claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Atkins failed to show cause to excuse the default.Atkins sought to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase for failing to investigate his psychological background and a claim that trial counsel had a financial conflict of interest. The court denied these requests, finding that the claims were either procedurally defaulted or lacked merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Atkins's habeas petition and denied his request to expand the certificate of appealability. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably denied Atkins's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Atkins failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural defaults of his other claims. View "ATKINS V. BEAN" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

Charles Porter, a Yosemite National Park employee, was charged with various sexual assault offenses after attempting to anally rape T.D., another male park employee, in April 2020. T.D. testified that Porter, heavily intoxicated, forced himself on T.D. in his cabin. Neighbors corroborated T.D.'s account. Porter claimed T.D. was the aggressor. The district court allowed testimony from Porter’s ex-girlfriend, A.H., under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits evidence of prior sexual assaults. A.H. testified that Porter had previously engaged in nonconsensual sex with her.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California admitted A.H.'s testimony after evaluating its probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. The jury found Porter guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 148 months in prison. Porter appealed, arguing that Rule 413 violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by allowing propensity evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule 413 is constitutional, referencing its decision in United States v. Lemay, which upheld the analogous Rule 414 for child molestation cases. The court emphasized that Rule 413, like Rule 414, is subject to Rule 403, which allows district courts to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. The court found that the district court had properly applied Rule 403 and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding A.H.'s testimony.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Porter’s conviction, concluding that the admission of A.H.'s testimony under Rule 413 did not violate due process. View "U.S. v. Porter" on Justia Law

An Arizona state inmate, Michael Ray Fuqua, who identifies as a Christian-Israelite, requested a religious dietary accommodation to observe Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread. The prison chaplain, Jeffrey Lind, denied this request, arguing that Fuqua did not substantiate his request with appropriate documentation and that his beliefs were theologically inconsistent. Fuqua claimed that this denial forced him to either starve or spend significant money on commissary food, causing him physical and financial hardship.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of Lind on Fuqua’s First Amendment Free Exercise, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claims. The court found that Fuqua failed to show a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that Lind had legitimate reasons for denying the request. The court also held that RLUIPA only authorizes equitable relief, which was moot in Fuqua’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on Fuqua’s First Amendment and Equal Protection claims, finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Lind’s denial was based on his own theological assessment rather than a neutral procedural rule. This could constitute a substantial burden on Fuqua’s religious exercise and intentional discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wood v. Yordy, which precludes suits seeking monetary damages under RLUIPA against state officers, and Fuqua’s equitable claims were moot. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "FUQUA V. RAAK" on Justia Law

The United States government initiated a civil forfeiture action to recover funds from Younes Nasri, a Canadian citizen residing in Dubai, alleging that the funds were ill-gotten gains from criminal activities. Nasri, who was indicted on racketeering and drug conspiracy charges, claimed innocent ownership of the assets held in foreign bank accounts. He argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the assets because neither he nor the assets had any ties to the United States.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted the government's motion to strike Nasri's claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the assets. The court also determined that the fugitive disentitlement statute did not violate due process and that Nasri qualified as a fugitive under the statute. Nasri appealed the decision, challenging the court's jurisdiction and the application of the fugitive disentitlement statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that due process requires a court to have control or constructive control over the property in a forfeiture action to establish in rem jurisdiction. The court found that the district court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over the foreign assets, without sufficient control or possession, violated due process principles. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the lower court to assess whether it had control or constructive control over the assets to satisfy due process requirements when asserting in rem jurisdiction. View "USA V. NASRI" on Justia Law

Dilesh Sharma pleaded guilty to attempted enticement of a minor for sexual purposes, distribution of child pornography, and receipt of child pornography. The district court calculated Sharma’s guideline sentence by starting with the base offense level for each crime and then applied enhancements, including a two-level enhancement for using a computer and a three-level enhancement for possessing at least 150 images. Sharma was sentenced to 288 months’ imprisonment for the enticement count and 240 months for each child pornography count, to run concurrently, along with a life term of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected Sharma’s objections to the computer-usage and image-number enhancements, which he argued were arbitrary and violated the Due Process Clause. The court found that the enhancements were rationally related to legitimate interests and upheld their application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Sharma’s facial due-process challenges to the enhancements. The court held that the computer-usage enhancement was rational when enacted and remains rational today, as it punishes the faster transmission of child pornography via electronic means. Similarly, the image-number enhancement was found to be rationally related to the legitimate interest of punishing offenders with larger collections of child pornography. The court concluded that Sharma did not meet his burden to show that the enhancements were irrational due to changed circumstances. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that neither enhancement violates the Due Process Clause. View "U.S. v. Sharma" on Justia Law

Orthodox Jewish families and schools challenged California's requirement that private schools be nonsectarian to provide special education under the IDEA. The families argued this requirement violated their Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements for their children with disabilities. The schools claimed the requirement barred them from certification solely due to their religious affiliation.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the case, ruling the schools and one family lacked standing and denying the families' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found the schools did not demonstrate they were "able and ready" to apply for certification and that the nonsectarian requirement did not affect the educational placement of one family's child. However, it held that another family had standing to challenge the requirement.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the schools' and one family's claims for lack of standing but reversed the dismissal of the other families' claims. The court held that the nonsectarian requirement burdened the families' free exercise rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements. It found the requirement was not neutral to religion and applied strict scrutiny, concluding the State failed to show the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The court vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further consideration of the injunction factors. View "LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law