Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Nevada law against individual law enforcement officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from their arrest for chalking anti-police messages on sidewalks. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Detective Tucker.The panel affirmed the district court's holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The panel reversed the district court's holding that Detective Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of plaintiffs' arrests that an arrest supported by probable cause but made in retaliation for protected speech violates the First Amendment. The panel stated that plaintiffs have shown differential treatment of similarly situated individuals, satisfying the Nieves exception. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the anti-police content of plaintiffs' chalkings was a substantial or motivating factor for Detective Tucker's declarations of arrest. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Furthermore, a reasonable officer in Detective Tucker's position had fair notice that the First Amendment prohibited arresting plaintiffs for the content of their speech, notwithstanding probable cause. View "Ballentine v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition where the district concluded that the petition was timely but denied petitioner's claim on the merits. Relying on Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2011), petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal's silence on timeliness triggers an exception to the general "look through" rule under which the California Court of Appeal's one-line denial of his petition would presumptively be considered a tacit affirmation of the superior court's finding of untimeliness.The panel declined to extend Trigueros to new contexts, concluding that there are at least two materially important distinctions between this case and Trigueros. First, Trigueros centers around a ruling from the California Supreme Court, while the case at hand centers around a ruling from the California Court of Appeal. Second, the California Supreme Court in Trigueros ordered "an informal response on the merits," Trigueros, while the California Court of Appeal here merely requested a general "opposition to the petition." Therefore, the panel declined to apply Trigueros in this context and concluded that the government's failure to present certain additional arguments does not prevent it from addressing these matters in this appeal. View "Flemming v. Matteson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, dismissing on ripeness grounds, an action brought by Twitter against the Attorney General of Texas, in his official capacity, alleging First Amendment retaliation. Specifically, Twitter alleged that the service of a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) by the OAG to Twitter after the company banned President Donald Trump for life following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, was government retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Twitter asked the district court to enjoin the AG from enforcing the CID and from continuing his investigation, and to declare the investigation unconstitutional.The panel held that the case was not prudentially ripe because the issues were not yet fit for judicial decision where the OAG has not yet made an allegation against Twitter; where facts were not yet developed; and where Twitter need not comply with the CID, could challenge its enforcement, and could challenge the CID in state court. The panel stated that, while Twitter could suffer hardship from withholding consideration, adjudicating this case now would require determining whether Twitter has violated Texas's unfair trade practices law before OAG has a chance to complete its investigation. Furthermore, any hardship to Twitter from the alleged chill of its First Amendment rights was insufficient to overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the case in its current posture. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, a federal prisoner, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that a correctional officer labeled him a snitch to other prisoners, offered them a bounty to assault plaintiff, and failed to protect him from the predictable assault by another prisoner.The panel construed the pro se complaint liberally and held that plaintiff's complaint alleged conduct beyond deliberate indifference. The panel applied Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), explaining that if the Supreme Court allowed a guard who is aware of and deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer medical harm from an asthma attack to be sued under Bivens, it was but a modest extension to allow a suit against a guard who creates the substantial risk of harm and then allows it to occur. The panel stated that, although this case represents a modest extension of Bivens, no special factors caution against extending the remedy to encompass this well-established claim, brought against a single rogue officer under the same constitutional provision applied in a well-recognized Supreme Court Bivens case. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Hoffman v. Preston" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to companionship and familial association when they shot and killed Sergio Ochoa.Reviewing the district court's decision de novo and viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel concluded that the district court selected the correct legal test to assess whether the conduct here shocks the conscience, and it correctly concluded that it does not. In this case, the officers did not have time to deliberate before firing and the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm test in order to determine if the officers' conduct shocked the conscience. The panel explained that Ochoa had engaged in a domestic dispute that allegedly involved a gun while possibly under the influence of drugs, he had entered a stranger's home stating that he was armed with knives, he failed to yield to a police car, and drove erratically. Furthermore, Ochoa ignored repeated commands from the officers, refused to drop two kitchen knives, and then took a large step. Therefore, under the purpose-to-harm test, defendants did not violate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rather, the officers' actions reflected their attempts to satisfy legitimate law enforcement objectives: apprehension of an armed, dangerous suspect and protection of the safety of the officers, the home’s inhabitants, and the public. View "Ochoa v. City of Mesa" on Justia Law

In 1989, Oliver went to a Los Angeles church during evening service and shot three people, two of whom died. During a jury selection at Oliver’s trial on two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances and attempted murder, the defense made four unsuccessful “Batson” motions, alleging that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race. Oliver argued that the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking V.H.—that V.H. acquitted in a rape case in his only prior jury service—was pretextual, as evidenced by the disparate treatment of S.P., who was allegedly similar to V.H. except for her race.The district court granted habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. In substituting its own factual findings for those of the state court, the district court neglected to frame the relevant question as whether a fair-minded jurist could reach a different conclusion. The decision of the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable and did not "rubber-stamp” the prosecutor’s proffered explanations or otherwise misapply the law. No U.S. Supreme Court decision establishes that detailed factual findings are required before an appellate court may give deference to a trial court’s Batson ruling. If the trial court’s inquiry was deficient, it was cured by the California Supreme Court’s searching analysis, which included a de novo comparative juror analysis. The court remanded to allow the district court to assess the strikes of three other prospective jurors. View "Oliver v. Davis" on Justia Law

Four months after passing the bar exam, Shane was appointed as counsel for Rogers in a 1981 capital case involving a triple murder. She was the only attorney in a Nevada State Public Defender's satellite office. Shane recognized that a “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) argument was her client’s only meaningfully supported defense. Another inexperienced public defender became co-counsel shortly before trial. Counsel failed to prepare their mental health experts for trial and to rebut foreseeable evidence. They did not even consult the expert appointed to address Rogers’s legal sanity at the time of the offense. Rogers was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment conditionally granting Rogers’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The ineffective assistance claim was never adjudicated on the merits by the Supreme Court of Nevada. Rogers satisfied the “Strickland” test. Even applying the presumption of reasonableness, counsel’s investigation, preparation, and execution of the insanity defense fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel’s most significant error was failing to consult the expert appointed to assess Rogers’s competency for trial and sanity at the time of the offenses; this error was compounded by the inadequate preparation of counsel’s mental health experts. Counsel's failures to rebut the prosecution’s expert and to explain the NGRI defense to the jury in opening statements fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. There was a reasonable likelihood that Rogers’s NGRI defense would have succeeded if counsel had performed effectively. View "Rogers v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

In 1989, Stevens randomly shot at people on or near Interstate 580 in Oakland, leaving four people dead and six people injured. Stevens was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The court rejected Stevens’ “Batson” claim concerning the prosecutor’s decision to use seven peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors. The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking prospective jurors were supported by the record. As required by Batson, the court considered the claims on a strike-by-strike basis, in light of “all of the relevant facts and circumstances.” The Ninth Circuit noted that in reviewing a state court’s decision and the trial court’s findings of fact, its role is limited to guarding against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Finding no such malfunction the court declined to substitute its judgments for the factual credibility determinations made almost three decades ago by the state trial court. View "Stevens v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hansen operated AHA, which ran a program that purported to help undocumented immigrants become U.S. citizens through adult adoption. Hansen falsely told victims that many immigrants had become U.S. citizens through the Program. No one had achieved U.S. citizenship through the Program; it is not possible to become a U.S. citizen through adult adoption. At least 471 victims participated in the Program; each paid between $550 and $10,000. Hansen was convicted of 12 counts of mail fraud, three counts of wire fraud, and two counts of encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for private financial gain.The Ninth Circuit vacated Hansen's convictions for encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the U.S. for private financial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Subsection (iv) is overbroad and unconstitutional. Subsection (iv) prohibits someone from inspiring, helping, persuading, or influencing, through speech or conduct, one or more specified aliens to come to or reside in the United States in violation of civil or criminal law. The court rejected an argument that subsection (iv) is limited to speech integral to criminal conduct--solicitation and aiding and abetting. Subsection (iv) covers a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment, given that many commonplace statements and actions could be construed as encouraging or inducing an undocumented immigrant to come to or reside in the U.S. Subsection (iv)’s narrow legitimate sweep pales in comparison to the protected expression encompassed by the subsection. View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without leave to amend of a complaint brought by plaintiffs, a group of elected local government officials, asserting a pre-enforcement challenge to California Government Code section 3550, which states in part that a public employer shall not deter or discourage public employees from becoming or remaining members of an employee organization.The panel concluded that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish their standing to pursue their preenforcement challenge. The panel explained that section 3550 does not regulate plaintiffs' individual speech, and any restrictions the statute does impose on plaintiffs' ability to speak on behalf of their employers do not injure plaintiffs' constitutionally protected individual interests. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they have a well-founded fear that PERB will impute these statements to plaintiffs' public employers, particularly in light of concessions made by PERB in this litigation.However, dismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction must be entered without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction is powerless to reach the merits. In this case, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court to enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Barke v. Banks" on Justia Law