Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was on parole when she was evicted from her apartment. She sent a letter to the parole office about her eviction and provided updated contact information, but the parole office was unable to contact her with the information provided. The parole office then suspended Plaintiff’s parole and issued a “retake warrant.” Plaintiff was arrested seven years later. At the revocation hearing, the parole office decided not to revoke Plaintiff’s parole, retroactively rescinded her parole suspension, restored her parole end date to March 2015, and released her from custody. During the two months she was detained, Plaintiff lost her home, business, and pets.   The Ninth Circuit held that the parole officer permissibly suspended plaintiff’s parole. Plaintiff’s arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the parole office had a reasonable belief that she violated her parole. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not require notice to a parolee before a parole suspension hearing, and because plaintiff was largely responsible for the seven-year delay in her arrest, her arrest did not violate due process. Plaintiff’s state law claims failed because the defendants had no waived immunity for false imprisonment or false arrest, and she could not establish the elements of her negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. View "ELIZABETH CORNEL V. STATE OF HAWAII" on Justia Law

The California Insurance Commissioner filed an ex parte conservation application to place the California Insurance Company (“CIC I”) in a conservatorship after CIC I’s president attempted to consummate a purchase transaction with Berkshire Hathaway without the Commissioner’s approval, and then attempted to bypass the California insurance regulatory scheme by merging CIC I with the California Insurance Company (“CIC II”), a New Mexico-domesticated shell company formed by the president. The Superior Court granted the Commissioner’s conservatorship application and appointed the Commissioner as Conservator of CIC I. Applied Underwriters, of which the president is the Chief Executive Officer, and CIC II filed separate actions in federal court asserting causes of actions under Section 1983.   The district court dismissed both actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that because important considerations of federalism were at stake, the district court’s reliance on Younger abstention as a ground for dismissal was in error. The court held that an insurance conservatorship is not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution to bring it within the purview of what constitutes a similar, Younger-eligible “civil enforcement proceeding.”   The court held that dismissal of Appellants’ claims was warranted on account of the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. Further, Appellants’ interests were well represented in the conservatorship action; they had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges; they failed to sufficiently allege that the conservatorship action was brought in bad faith; they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury arising from extraordinary circumstances which might justify an exception to the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. View "APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. V. RICARDO LARA" on Justia Law

Denying Petitioner’s motion to recall a mandate, the Ninth Circuit wrote (1) motions that assert a judgment is void because of a jurisdictional defect generally must show that the court lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction, (2) Petitioner has not met that standard in arguing that the statutory “in-custody” requirement was satisfied, and (3) the additional details provided in the motion and accompanying exhibits do not demonstrate the Ninth Circuit’s holding on mootness lacked an arguable basis. View "STEPHEN MAY V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought suit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and Arizona state law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in an action brought by Petitioner, a Muslim inmate who alleged that he is unable to pray five times a day, as the Qur’an requires because he is housed with people who harass him as he prays; and who had asked the prison to accommodate his religious practice by housing him exclusively with other prisoners based on their religious beliefs and practices.   The court held that Petitioner’s RLUIPA claim failed because denying his request to be housed only with Muslims was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. The court held that Defendants did not violate Petitioner’s First Amendment free exercise rights because denying Petitioner’s request was also reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest—avoiding the potential legal liability of housing inmates based on their religious beliefs and practices. Denying the request was rationally related to avoiding liability because by denying Petitioner’s requested accommodation, the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry completely eliminated its risk of litigation from other prisoners based on that claim. View "SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL SAUD V. PANNAN DAYS" on Justia Law

Taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Subpart F’s ability to permit taxation of a CFC’s income after 1986 through the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (“MRT”). The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, denied taxpayers’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and taxpayers appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the MRT is consistent with the Apportionment Clause and it does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That clause requires that a direct tax must be apportioned so that each state pays in proportion to its population. The court acknowledged that the Sixteenth Amendment exempts from the apportionment requirement the category of “incomes, from whatever source derived.” The court observed that courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of taxes similar to the MRT notwithstanding any difficulty in defining income, that the realization of income does not determine the tax’s constitutionality, and that there is no constitutional ban on Congress disregarding the corporate form to facilitate taxation of shareholders’ income.   The court explained that the MRT serves the legitimate purpose of preventing CFC shareholders who have not yet received distributions from obtaining a windfall by never having to pay taxes on their offshore earnings that have not yet been distributed. The MRT accomplished this legitimate purpose by rational means: by accelerating the effective repatriation date of undistributed CFC earnings to a date following passage of the TCJA. View "CHARLES MOORE V. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued various Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (“ADCRR”) officials and the Arizona Attorney General (collectively “Defendants”) challenging Defendants’ proposed protocol for his execution. Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until such time as Defendants can assure the district court that his execution would comply with various federal statutes and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and Plaintiff appealed and filed two motions to stay his execution.   The Ninth Circuit denied the motions because: (1) it deferred to the district court’s finding that Defendants’ accommodations for Plaintiff’s degenerative spinal disease preclude a finding that their lethal injection protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain; (2) even assuming without deciding that Defendants’ Execution Protocol may give rise to a liberty interest, there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated; and (3) given that Defendants shall execute Plaintiff by lethal injection, he lacks standing to challenge Defendants’ protocol for execution by lethal gas. View "FRANK ATWOOD V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s original life sentence in 1998. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (holding that Miller’s rule applied retroactively on collateral review), Defendant was resentenced to LWOP in 2016. Defendant argued relying on the now-vacated en banc decision, Briones I, that the resentencing record does not reflect that the district court meaningfully engaged in Miller’s central inquiry, namely, identifying those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. The Ninth Circuit wrote that Jones made altogether clear that—irrespective of any seemingly contrary language in Miller or Montgomery— permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for juvenile LWOP. The court held that Defendant waived his argument that a requirement of meaningful engagement with Miller’s central inquiry comes from this court’s cases interpreting the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 3553, as to which Jones is irrelevant. The court rejected Defendant’s argument that Briones II vacated his LWOP sentence for a second, independent reason—namely, that the district court may not have understood it was allowed to meaningfully consider evidence of his post-conviction rehabilitation. The court held that Defendant waived his as-applied challenge to the substantive proportionality of his sentence, and wrote that all relevant factors militate against exercising discretion to consider the merits of Defendant’s otherwise waived substantive disproportionality arguments. View "USA V. RILEY BRIONES, JR." on Justia Law

Petitioner was found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree felony murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that his 1975 California conviction could not be used as an aggravating circumstance under section 13–703(F)(1) of the later-revised Arizona Revised Statutes. He also argued that the use of section 13–703(F)(1) violated his Eighth Amendment rights (this is referred to as the “Eighth Amendment claim”). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected these claims and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s March 2012 opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the district court allowed Petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of its prior dismissal of his ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim as procedurally barred. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion to seek leave to file a second or successive habeas motion. The court held that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed petition meets the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(B). The court reasoned that because Sawyer provides no equitable exception to Section 2244(b)(2)(B)’s requirements, and because Petitioner does not assert that his first claim otherwise meets those requirements, Petitioner’s first claim does not make a prima facie showing that it meets the requirements for an exception to the bar on second or successive petitions. Finally, Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing in support of his freestanding actual innocence claim. View "FRANK ATWOOD V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his lawsuit alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing and maintaining him in the Terrorist Screening Database and on its constituent No Fly List. After the government removed Plaintiff from the No-Fly List and submitted a declaration stating that he would “not be placed on the No-Fly List in the future” based on “currently available information,” the district court dismissed as moot Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to his inclusion on the No-Fly List and inclusion in the broader Terrorist Screening Database.   The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred by dismissing as moot Plaintiff’s No Fly List claims because the government failed to follow the instructions given by the Ninth Circuit the last time Plaintiff’s case was before the court. The court further held that 49 U.S.C. Section 46110(a) did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s No Fly List claims. Section 46110 concerns judicial review of orders issued by the TSA Administrator. The court held that Plaintiff was not challenging the TSA Administrator’s decision refusing to remove him from the No-Fly List, he was challenging the Screening Center’s decision to place him on the No-Fly List in the first place. The court held that that both Plaintiff’s substantive due process and non-stigma-related procedural due process claims pertaining to his placement by the Screening Center on the No-Fly List, and his alleged placement in the Database, will be before the district court on remand. View "YONAS FIKRE V. FBI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the detectives and the City of Henderson (collectively, Defendants) under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case arose following an incident where Defendants believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a series of armed robberies and forcibly tackled him as he was leaving a Nevada state courthouse.   The detectives moved for summary judgment arguing that they are protected by qualified immunity, and the City moved for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. The district court denied the detectives’ motion and denied the City’s motion except as to Plaintiff’s ratification theory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of force was substantial. Although Plaintiff was suspected of a serious crime, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the courthouse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the degree of force used against Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and the detectives were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether they committed a constitutional violation.   The court held that Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) clearly established, that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a relatively calm, non-resisting suspect who posed little threat of safety without any prior warning and without attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest. View "DANIEL ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON" on Justia Law