Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

As a condition of getting a permit, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Plaintiff, an e-scooter user, filed a complaint alleging that the location disclosure requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur.   Next, the court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court reasoned that Plaintiff could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy because Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily disclosed location data to the e-scooter operators.   Further, the court determined that the nature of MDS location data indicated a diminished expectation of privacy. The data only discloses the location of an e-scooter owned by the operator and typically re-rented to a new user after each individual trip. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

Congress passed ARPA, American Rescue Plan Act, to help state, local, and tribal governments mitigate the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The statute contains a provision (the “Offset Provision”) – challenged in this appeal – prohibiting a State from using ARPA funds to subsidize a tax cut or otherwise a reduction in state net tax revenue. Specifically, Arizona contended that it was coerced into accepting the Offset Provision because of the size of the funds offered under ARPA and the financial situation brought on by the pandemic. Arizona sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the federal defendants from recouping funds or otherwise enforcing the Offset Provision, and declaratory relief that the Offset Provision violated the Constitution. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that Arizona had standing to challenge ARPA both because there was a realistic danger of ARPA’s enforcement, and because there was a justiciable challenge to the sovereignty of the State, which alleges infringement on its authority to set tax policy and its interest in being free from coercion impacting its tax policy. The court reasoned that standing is measured at the time of the complaint, and when the complaint was filed, there was not a required compliance scheme. The court declined to consider the merits of Arizona’s constitutional claims. The court remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Arizona’s Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment claims. View "STATE OF ARIZONA V. JANET YELLEN" on Justia Law

In July 2020, during the heart of the COVID pandemic, Defendant was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Defendant's case went to trial no long after his arrest, when the district court's COVID procedures were still in effect. More specifically, the Northern District of California imposed a restriction stating only "persons who have been authorized by a judge or the Clerk of Court may enter courthouse property." However, the district court judge overseeing Defendant's motion to suppress and trial imposed additional restrictions, disallowing any member of the public from entering the courtroom and instead streamed live audio over the internet. Defendant objected, citing a violation of his right to a public trial. The district court rejected Defendant's challenge, and a jury convicted him.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction and reversed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the district court’s COVID protocols violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court found that the government presented an overriding interest in limiting the transmission of COVID while holding a criminal trial; however, the court's restriction on video access was not narrowly tailored. The Ninth Circuit noted that other courts around the county were able to allow for video access during the pandemic. View "USA V. JAMES ALLEN, II" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this action are minors who resided in San Diego County. Plaintiffs sued the County and County social workers for allegedly violating their Fourth Amendment rights by interviewing them without a court order or parental consent during the course of a child-abuse investigation. During that investigation, the County created and maintained files related to the alleged child abuse. Attorneys defending the County reviewed the child-abuse investigation file without first obtaining a court order. Plaintiffs then brought an action, alleging that the attorneys who accessed the file violated their right to privacy.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The court held that, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012) does not stand for the proposition that a right to privacy necessarily attaches to the type of records at issue here. Further, even if Plaintiffs were entitled to informational privacy, the balancing test recognized in Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2010), showed the County’s interest in defending this litigation outweighed Plaintiffs’ asserted privacy interest. Even assuming that the social workers’ records comprised sensitive medical and psychological records, there was no constitutional violation because the County’s need to access the records was high. Plaintiffs initiated that need, and the professional obligations that lawyers owe their clients minimized the risk of misuse, harassment, or embarrassment. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. View "A.C. V. ERICA CORTEZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the bans on long guns and semiautomatic centerfire rifles under the Second Amendment. The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enjoin the requirement that young adults obtain a hunting license to purchase a long gun. However, the court found that the district court erred in not enjoining an almost total ban on semiautomatic centerfire rifles. The court found that the Second Amendment protects the right of young adults to keep and bear arms, which includes the right to purchase them.   The court held that the district court’s reasoning that the laws did not burden Second Amendment rights was a legal error. The court further held that the district court properly applied intermediate scrutiny to the long-gun hunting license regulation and did not abuse its discretion in finding it likely to survive. However, the district court erred by applying intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to the semiautomatic centerfire rifle ban. And even under intermediate scrutiny, this ban likely violates the Second Amendment because it fails the “reasonable fit” test. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs would not likely be irreparably harmed. View "MATTHEW JONES V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant was convicted of murder in Arizona and sentenced to death. He is scheduled to be executed on May 11, 2022. On May 9, 2022, Petitioner filed a Sec. 2254 petition challenging the Arizona state court's determination that he was competent to be executed. He also sought a stay of execution. The district court denied relief on May 10, 2022, and Petitioner now appeals.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition and denying his request for a stay of execution. Petitioner failed to establish that the Arizona state court's determination of his competency was unreasonable under the applicable case law, as required under AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit also determined that the state court's decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "CLARENCE DIXON V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

After the Spokane County prosecutor filed charges against Plaintiffs pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 77.15.265, Plaintiffs entered into a Stipulation to Police Reports and Order of Continuance (“SOC”), which provided that the charges would be dismissed if Plaintiffs complied with certain terms. Under Washington’s wildlife forfeiture statute, the entry of a SOC also resulted in the forfeiture of the wildlife and animal parts at issue. Plaintiffs successfully completed their SOCs, and the charges against them were dismissed. They brought suit alleging that the forfeiture and transfer of their property to Canada, without notice or a hearing, functionally destroyed their property interests, thus depriving them of due process.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the due process claim as moot and affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment with respect to the constitutionality of Washington State’s forfeiture statute. The court held that because Plaintiffs signed the SOCs, which triggered the automatic forfeiture, their suit for recovery of the forfeited property was moot. To the extent Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims hinged on their argument that the seized property was not contraband, these claims were also mooted by the Plaintiffs’ agreement to forfeiture. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had a property interest in the seized wildlife parts protected by the Fourteenth Amendment at the time the parts were transferred, they gave up that interest by agreeing to the ultimate forfeiture of the items to the state; Plaintiffs therefore could not maintain a concrete injury as a result of the transfer to British Columbia. View "CHAD BOCK V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution or torture in Nigeria based on his status as a gay man and the harm he suffered after being discovered having sex with his boyfriend in a hotel. The immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Petitioner was not credible because he “misrepresented” the name of the hotel where he and his boyfriend were discovered. The IJ found that Petitioner failed to establish that he is gay or that he was ever harmed in Nigeria for being gay. The IJ also found that Petitioner’s asylum application was frivolous, concluding that the misrepresentation of the hotel was a material element of his application.   Petitioner appealed arguing that the agency (1) erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim; (2) violated due process in its CAT determination; and (3) erred in concluding that he had filed a frivolous asylum application.   The Ninth Circuit, granted in part, and denied in part, Petitioner’s petition for review. The court concluded that the Board erred by failing to consider potentially dispositive evidence concerning his CAT claim, thus the agency’s denial of CAT relief could not stand. The court did not reach, and therefore denied, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment violation claims. Further, the court held that the Board erred in concluding that Petitioner had filed a frivolous asylum application, because any fabrication concerning the name of the hotel where Petitioner was discovered was not material to his claim. View "PETER UDO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegal reentry after removal in a case in which a Marine Corps surveillance unit spotted him immediately after he unlawfully entered the United States, and notified Customs and Border Patrol agents who soon detained him. Defendant argued that the Marine Corps surveillance violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which codified the longstanding prohibition against military enforcement of civilian law.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for illegal reentry after removal. The court reasoned that the military may still assist civilian law enforcement agencies if Congress expressly authorized it, and here, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense to offer military assistance to Border Patrol in hopes of securing the southern land border. The court concluded that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant's suppression motion based on the alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Further, the court also denied Defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecution’s striking two Asian jurors from the venire, concluding that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for doing so. View "USA V. CLEMENTE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that Defendants, prison officials, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, when despite his numerous complaints over a period of years and a visibly deteriorating condition, they ignored his enlarged prostate. After the district court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, he was left with two claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The remaining officials claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court disagreed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order denying qualified immunity to prison officials. The Ninth Circuit determined that only examination of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis was necessary—whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation—because doing so would not hamper the development of precedent and both parties expressly acknowledged that this case turned on the second prong. The court reasoned it was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s treatment that prison officials violated the constitution when they choose a medically unacceptable course of treatment for the circumstances and a reasonable jury could find that the prison officials did just that. View "LEWIS STEWART V. ROMEO ARANAS" on Justia Law