Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A 16-year-old high school student and her parents filed an emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, seeking to enjoin the school district from requiring compliance with a student vaccination mandate. The Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs' motion in part. The court ordered that an injunction shall be in effect only while a "per se" deferral of vaccination is available to pregnant students under the school district's student vaccination mandate, and that the injunction shall terminate upon removal of the per se deferral option for pregnant students. Defendants then filed a letter and supporting declaration explaining that the deferral option for pregnant students has been removed from the mandate. Given the removal of the per se deferral option for pregnant students, the injunction issued in the November 28, 2021 order has terminated under its own terms.The Ninth Circuit issued an order providing its reasoning for why an injunction pending appeal is not warranted as to the now-modified student vaccination mandate. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success in showing that the district court erred in applying rational basis review, as opposed to strict scrutiny, to the student vaccination mandate. The court explained that plaintiffs' emergency motion fails to raise a serious question as to whether the vaccination mandate is not neutral and generally applicable; plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success in showing that the district court erred by applying rational basis review; and plaintiffs do not argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their free exercise claim if rational basis review applies. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that they will suffer irreparable harm if this court does not issue an injunction, or that the public interest weighs in their favor. View "Doe v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

Erick and his tenth-grade classmates attended an end-of-year party at a park. Erick told school aide Lopez that he was going to the park’s swimming pool, which was monitored by three lifeguards. Lopez did not enter the pool area but watched Erick from a designated observation area, as required by pool rules. Lopez allegedly knew that Erick had asthma and could not swim. Lopez saw Erick leave the pool and enter the locker area. He left the observation deck to wait for Erick at the locker room exit. Unbeknownst to Lopez, Erick returned to the pool. Five minutes later, Lopez began searching for Erick. He found lifeguards trying unsuccessfully to resuscitate Erick, who had drowned.Erick’s parents sued Lopez, the school district, and others for negligence and wrongful death, with a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for deprivation of familial relationship. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The Due Process Clause generally does not provide an affirmative right to government aid, but a state’s failure to protect may give rise to a section 1983 claim under the state-created danger exception, which applies when the state places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. The court applied a subjective standard; because the aide was unaware that Erick was in the pool area when he drowned, the defendants cannot be liable. View "Herrera v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that California Government Code 32310, which bans possession of large-capacity magazines that hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition, violated the Second Amendment.On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed. The court assumed, without deciding, that California’s law implicates the Second Amendment and applied intermediate scrutiny because the ban imposed only a minimal burden on the core Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Section 32310 is a reasonable fit for the important government interest in reducing gun violence. The statute outlaws no weapon, but only limits the size of the magazine that may be used. That limitation interferes only minimally with the core right of self-defense; there is no evidence that anyone ever has been unable to defend his home and family due to the lack of a large-capacity magazine. The limitation saves lives; in the past half-century, large-capacity magazines have been used in about three-quarters of gun massacres with 10 or more deaths and in 100 percent of gun massacres with 20 or more deaths. Section 32310 does not, on its face, result in a taking. The government acquires nothing by virtue of the limitation. Owners may modify or sell their nonconforming magazines; the law does not deprive owners of all economic use. View "Duncan v. Bonta" on Justia Law

In 2017, Langley pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to time served and 10 years of supervised release. As required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), the conditions of Langley’s supervised release included that he “not commit [a] federal, state or local crime,” “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” In 2017, Langley unsuccessfully sought amendment of the conditions of supervised release to permit him to use medical marijuana as allowed by California state law, to alleviate pain stemming from the amputation of his lower leg. Langley renewed the motion in 2020. Langley, who submitted a physician's opinion that marijuana was the best medical solution for his pain issues, argued that he has a fundamental Due Process Clause right to use medical marijuana.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Langley’s renewed motion. The court held that it is bound by precedent that rejected the identical substantive due process claim. Even if state laws decriminalizing marijuana could constitute additional evidence under the test for determining whether a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, the court concluded that it is bound by its 2007 decision until it is overturned by a higher authority. View "United States v. Langley." on Justia Law

Officers stopped a Cadillac with an expired registration. Jenkins, a passenger, showed no signs of distress. When the officers discovered that Jenkins was subject to an arrest warrant, they handcuffed her and put her in a cruiser, where Jenkins vomited. Officers called for paramedics and asked Jenkins if she was detoxing. Jenkins responded: “No … I’m pregnant.” The call for paramedics was then canceled. During transport, Jenkins groaned and screamed for help. After fingerprinting Jenkins at the police station, officers returned her to the cruiser. Several minutes later they found her unconscious, called for paramedics, and began CPR. Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that was incorporated by reference into the amended complaint and did not assign the video too much weight. The complaint did not plausibly allege that any city policy or custom “was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations but suggested that that the moving force was the officers’ failure to heed their training. The complaint failed to establish either objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference by individual officers. The alleged violative nature of their conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to Jenkins’ serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "J. J. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002, Munoz digitally penetrated his daughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, acknowledging that “the Court will include as part of [his] sentence . . . lifetime supervision.” A Nevada state court sentenced Munoz to 48–144 months’ imprisonment, required him to register as a sex offender, and imposed a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Munoz filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lifetime supervision under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The lifetime supervision consists of a $30 monthly fee to defray the costs of his supervision; electronic monitoring; and a requirement that Munoz may reside only at a residence approved by his parole officer, and that he keep his parole officer informed of his current address.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The conditions, individually and collectively, do not severely and immediately restrain Munoz’s physical liberty, so Munoz is not challenging his “custody,” and his claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. On remand, the district court may determine whether to allow Munoz to file an amended habeas petition that could secure jurisdiction or consider whether it would be appropriate to construe Munoz’s habeas petition to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Mounoz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison, asserted that he was physically and sexually assaulted in March 2016 and filed a grievance in March 2016, which prison officials failed to process. He submitted a second grievance in May 2016 concerning subsequent events, but referring to the March assaults. The district court reasoned that because the March assaults were mentioned in the May grievance which was pending when the plaintiff filed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, an avenue of administrative relief remained open and the plaintiff could not be excused from exhausting the March grievance.The Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the suit. The prison’s failure to respond to the March grievance rendered the administrative appeals process “unavailable” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e. Where inmates take reasonably appropriate steps to exhaust but are precluded from doing so by a prison’s erroneous failure to process the grievance, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. A later-filed grievance that alleges new complaints but refers to a previous, already exhausted grievance for context does not render the first grievance unexhausted. Because the May grievance was still pending when the complaint was filed, the district court properly deemed that grievance unexhausted. View "Fordley v. Lizarraga" on Justia Law

In 2007-2011, the Department of Justice and the FBI issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his co-conspirators were charged. The press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the charges against him, and some limited employment history. The notices remain publicly available on the DOJ and FBI websitesThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s action alleging that the continued online public availability of the government’s press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action arises; while information may be repeatedly accessed after publication, the “single publication rule” provides that the limitations period runs only from the date of original dissemination. The court declined to apply equitable tolling. While individuals may have a constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive information, Appellant did not have such an interest in the information at issue. Rejecting an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the court held that the district court applied the correct test in determining whether the press releases were punitive in purpose or effect. View "Doe v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Montana political party shall hold a primary to nominate its candidates if, for any statewide office in one of the last two elections, it received votes totaling five percent or more of the total votes for the last successful gubernatorial candidate. A party may also qualify for a primary if it submits a petition, signed by a number of registered voters equal to five percent or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor at the last general election or 5,000 electors, whichever is less. The number must include the registered voters in at least one-third of Montana's 100 legislative districts equal to five percent or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor at the last general election in those districts or 150 electors in those districts, whichever is less.The Ninth Circuit first held that recent amendments that did not fundamentally change the law did not render the appeal moot. The court rejected First and Fourteenth Amendment claims of right of association and right to cast an effective vote; the plaintiffs had not shown that the burden imposed by Montana’s law was severe. The filing deadline and the geographic distribution requirement similarly imposed relatively minor burdens. The law served the interest of ensuring that only nonfrivolous parties appear on the ballot.The court held that the part of the distribution requirement indexed to five percent of the votes for the previous gubernatorial winner in each district violated the Equal Protection Clause “one person, one vote” principle, arbitrarily diluting the value of voters' signatures in districts with a large number of supporters of the most recent gubernatorial winner. The resulting variation from district to district was significant. View "Montana Green Party v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

Detained, separated from his family, speaking no English, and having diligently pursued representation, asylum applicant Usubakunov finally connected with a pro bono attorney at Catholic Charities who agreed to represent him. When that attorney was unavailable on the date of his merits hearing, Usubakunov requested his first continuance of that hearing. The IJ denied a continuance, leaving Usubakunov unassisted.The Ninth Circuit remanded. Under these circumstances, the IJ’s refusal to grant a continuance of Usubakunov’s merits hearing deprived him of his right to counsel and was an abuse of discretion because it was tantamount to a denial of counsel. The immigrant illustrated diligence, not bad faith, coupled with very difficult barriers. This was not a case of indefinite continuances, nor was it a case where Usubakunov was trying to game the system. View "Usubakunov v. Garland" on Justia Law