Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff and his family under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). Plaintiff and his family sought to extend their tenancy in defendants' property based on plaintiff's medical condition.The panel agreed with the district court that, under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B), making "accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services" was not necessary to afford plaintiff and his family "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The panel held that, absent an accommodation, the plaintiff's disability must cause the plaintiffs to lose an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. In this case, defendants offered plaintiff and his family, who were on a month-to-month tenancy, terminable at will, a new lease for one year at an increased rent. However, plaintiff and his family turned down the new lease, and never credibly argued that they turned down the lease for any reason related to plaintiff's disability. Upon termination of the lease, plaintiff and his family were in the same position as a family with no disability that had had its lease terminated. The panel explained that it could not find a connection between plaintiff's disability and his request to remain in the home until January 22, 2018. Therefore, defendants were under no obligation to extend the tenancy-termination date. Finally, the panel agreed with the Third and Sixth Circuits and held that there is no standalone liability under the FHAA for a landlord’s failure to engage in an interactive process. View "Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After a police officer fatally shot her son, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law against the officer. The officer shot plaintiff's son seven times in front of a convenient store after the two were involved in a physical altercation.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's state law negligence claim. The panel explained that the district court erroneously conflated the legal standards under the Fourth Amendment and California negligence law. The panel held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the officer's shooting of her son could be found negligent by a reasonable juror under the broader formulation of reasonableness in California law. In this case, the district court inaccurately concluded that plaintiff did not point to any evidence probative of the fact that her son exhibited symptoms of mental illness that would have been apparent to the officer; did not consider that a jury could find the officer's pre-shooting conduct unreasonable under California law, given the son's potential mental illness; and misinterpreted the Ninth Circuit precedent set forth in Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), in assessing the reasonableness of the officer's conduct at the time of the shooting. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on failure to state a claim, of plaintiff's action seeking to remedy defendants' failure to count his vote in the 2016 November General Election. At issue is whether Arizona residents who registered to vote on October 11, 2016, registered to vote in time to be eligible to vote in the 2016 November General Election. The Arizona law in effect in 2016 set the voter registration deadline for the 2016 November Election on Monday, October 10, 2016. However, because Monday, October 10, 2016 was also Columbus Day, a state and federal holiday, certain methods of voter registration were not available on that day. In this case, plaintiff and roughly 2,000 others registered to vote on Tuesday, October 11, 2016.The panel held that, under Arizona law in effect in 2016, an Arizona resident who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 did not register in time to be eligible to vote in the 2016 November Election. The panel also held that the October 10, 2016 voter registration deadline did not violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Accordingly, the panel need not reach the remaining two questions regarding the enforceability of the NVRA under section 1983 and the factual predicate necessary to state a cognizable money damages claim for deprivation of an individual's right to vote. Finally, the panel noted that this rigid result is not likely to reoccur under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-120, as amended. View "Isabel v. Reagan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of individual employees of the Clark County DFS and the County in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants wrongfully removed plaintiffs' infant daughter, M.M., from plaintiffs' home, wrongfully removed M.M. from her foster mother's home, and then placed her in a neglectful foster home that caused her death.The panel held that plaintiffs waived several appellate arguments where these arguments were either not raised before the district court, are inconsistent with positions employed there, or are presented without argument. The panel also held that each of plaintiffs' asserted factual disputes are either resolved by the record or are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on its claims. In this case, plaintiffs' third claim of failure to train has been waived whereas its fifth claim of state-law negligence was effectively dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to present a genuine dispute that M.M. was wrongfully removed from their home or that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly decided the question of causation for the state negligence claim as a matter of law rather than a matter of fact, and that plaintiffs waived their wrongful death claim. View "Momox-Caselis v. Donohue" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they shot and killed Pedro Villanueva and wounded Francisco Orozco, a passenger in Villanueva’s vehicle.The panel concluded, under Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989), Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007), and Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2012), that because Orozco's freedom of movement was terminated when the officers intentionally shot at the Silverado in which he was a passenger to stop its movement, Orozco was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The panel noted that it matters not whether the officers intended to shoot Orozco or whether they even knew he was present as a passenger. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel also concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers used excessive force, because they "lacked an objectively reasonable basis to fear for [their] own safety, as [they] could simply have stepped back [or to the side] to avoid being injured." The panel concluded that the use of deadly force was clearly established as unreasonable as of 1996 by Acosta v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 83 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1996). View "Villanueva v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Oregon Supreme Court: Is a private contractor providing healthcare services at a county jail a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of Oregon Revised Statutes 659A.400 and subject to liability under section 659A.142? View "Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its certification order, in an appeal raising issues pertaining to Nevada state water law. The panel certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following questions: 1) Does the public trust doctrine apply to rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, if so, to what extent? 2) If the public trust doctrine applies and allows for reallocation of rights settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, does the abrogation of such adjudicated or vested rights constitute a “taking” under the Nevada Constitution requiring payment of just compensation? View "Mineral Country v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Republican Club's civil rights complaint against the City and its lessee, the Western Justice Center (WJC). The Republican Club alleged First Amendment violations arising from the Center's rescission, on the basis of political and religious viewpoint, of an agreement to rent out a space for the Republican Club's speaking event. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), the Supreme Court held that, in certain circumstances, a private actor who leases government property must comply with the constitutional restraints as though they were binding covenants written into the lease agreement itself.The panel held that neither the circumstances under which WJC rehabilitated the building and acquired the lease, nor the terms of the lease itself, convert WJC into a state actor. To apply the ruling in Burton, the panel stated that a private party's conduct of which the plaintiff complains must be inextricably intertwined with that of the government. In this case, the Club failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) where WJC and its agents were not state actors and where the Club did not allege that the City or some other state actor participated in the alleged conspiracy to deprive the Club of its constitutional rights. Furthermore, the government does not, without more, become vicariously liable for the discretionary decisions of its lessee. Here, the undisputed facts show that the City did not delegate any final policy-making authority that caused the Club's alleged constitutional injury. View "Pasadena Republican Club v. Western Justice Center" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who is challenging his 2012 court-martial conviction for one count of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of wrongful sexual conduct. In United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F.2016), which was decided after petitioner's conviction became final, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held unconstitutional a pattern jury instruction on Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 413 under which jurors may consider evidence of any one charged sexual offense as showing the defendant's propensity to have committed any of the other charged sexual offenses.Although Hills announced a new rule which held that the use of charged sexual offenses to show propensity to commit other charged sexual offenses violated the presumption of innocence and right to have all findings made clearly beyond a reasonable doubt, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the panel held that the rule does not fall under either exception for nonretroactivity because it is neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Therefore, Hills does not apply retroactively in petitioner's case. View "Lewis v. United States" on Justia Law