Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for police officers on the basis of qualified immunity in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his constitutional rights, including his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In this case, the officers tripped plaintiff so that he fell to the ground, pinned him down, and handcuffed him. Plaintiff fell on his face, sustained long-term physical injuries, and sustained emotional distress as a result of the encounter.The panel rejected the officers' contention that the Notice of Appeal failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c). The panel also concluded that, although there are material facts in dispute, when the facts are taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff engaged in passive resistance and that the officers' take-down of plaintiff involved unconstitutionally excessive force. Furthermore, because the right to be free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance was clearly established at the time, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Rice v. Morehouse" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to a police officer in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the officer used excessive force when he deployed his police dog in effecting plaintiff's arrest for driving under the influence and resisting arrest.The panel concluded that no clearly established law governed the reasonableness of using a canine to subdue a noncompliant suspect who resisted other types of force and refused to surrender. In this case, following a brief police chase, plaintiff fled to his home where he activated the remote-controlled garage door opener, remained in control of his car inside the garage for eight minutes, refused multiple commands to get out of the car, and resisted lesser force employed by officers without effect while he continued resisting. The officer released his police dog to force compliance and, even after the dog bit him, plaintiff continued to resist. The panel explained that the initial deployment of the canine and the duration of the bite did not violate clearly established law. View "Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Oregon State Bar, alleging First Amendment violations arising from the Oregon State Bar's (OSB) requirement that lawyers must join and pay annual membership fees in order to practice in Oregon. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that (1) the two statements from the April 2018 Bulletin are not germane; (2) compelling them to join and maintain membership in OSB violates their right to freedom of association; and (3) compelling plaintiffs to pay—without their prior, affirmative consent—annual membership fees to OSB violates their right to freedom of speech. Furthermore, the Crowe Plaintiffs alone contend that the Bar's constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards for objecting members are deficient, and the Gruber Plaintiffs alone continue to argue on appeal that OSB is not entitled to sovereign immunity from suit. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that precedent forecloses the free speech claim, but neither the Supreme Court nor this court has resolved the free association claim now before the panel. Even assuming both statements at issue were nongermane, the panel concluded that plaintiffs' free speech claim failed. As alleged, the panel also concluded that the OSB's refund process is sufficient to minimize potential infringement on its members' constitutional rights. However, the panel explained that plaintiffs may have stated a viable claim that Oregon's compulsory Bar membership requirement violates their First Amendment right of free association. On remand, the panel noted that there are a number of complicated issues that the district court will need to address. First, the district court will need to determine whether Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2477, 2481 (2018), supplies the appropriate standard for plaintiffs' free association claim and, if so, whether OSB can satisfy its "exacting scrutiny standard." Given that the panel has never addressed such a broad free association claim, the district court will also likely need to determine whether Keller v. State Bar of California's, 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990), instructions with regards to germaneness and procedurally adequate safeguards are even relevant to the free association inquiry. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court erred by determining that OSB was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court with instructions. View "Crowe v. Oregon State Bar" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting a partial stay under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), of three state law claims, in an action brought by the United States alleging that the California State Water Resources Board violated various provisions of the California Environmental Quality Control Act.The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a partial Colorado River stay. The panel explained that partial stays pursuant to Colorado River are permissible only in very limited circumstances, namely when there is strong evidence of forum shopping. In this case, there is little evidence of forum shopping. The panel also concluded that it could not affirm the district court on the basis of Pullman abstention where the Board, which did not cross-appeal, cannot ask the court to affirm on Pullman grounds. The panel reasoned that it would necessarily have to stay the intergovernmental immunity claim, which the district court allowed to proceed. On remand, the panel instructed the district court to allow the United States' claims to proceed, subject to regular issues of justiciability. View "United States v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

In 2016, the FRA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing a national minimum requirement of two crew members for trains. In 2019, the FRA issued an order purporting to adopt a nationwide maximum one-person crew rule and to preempt "any state laws concerning that subject matter." Two Unions and three states petitioned for review of the Order under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).As a preliminary matter, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Unions' petition because venue was not proper under 28 U.S.C. 2343. The panel explained that the Unions' principal officers were not in the Ninth Circuit. The panel concluded that it had jurisdiction over the States' petitions because they were sufficiently aggrieved to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2344. On the merits, the panel held that the FRA's Order does not implicitly preempt state safety rules, that the FRA failed to comply with the APA's notice-and-comment provisions in issuing the Order, and that the order is arbitrary and capricious. The panel explained that the Order's basis for its action did not withstand scrutiny, and the FRA's contemporaneous explanation was lacking. In this case, the States met their burden of showing that the issuance of the Order violated the APA. Accordingly, the panel dismissed the petition for review but granted the States' petitions, vacating the Order. View "Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff and his family under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). Plaintiff and his family sought to extend their tenancy in defendants' property based on plaintiff's medical condition.The panel agreed with the district court that, under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B), making "accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services" was not necessary to afford plaintiff and his family "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The panel held that, absent an accommodation, the plaintiff's disability must cause the plaintiffs to lose an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. In this case, defendants offered plaintiff and his family, who were on a month-to-month tenancy, terminable at will, a new lease for one year at an increased rent. However, plaintiff and his family turned down the new lease, and never credibly argued that they turned down the lease for any reason related to plaintiff's disability. Upon termination of the lease, plaintiff and his family were in the same position as a family with no disability that had had its lease terminated. The panel explained that it could not find a connection between plaintiff's disability and his request to remain in the home until January 22, 2018. Therefore, defendants were under no obligation to extend the tenancy-termination date. Finally, the panel agreed with the Third and Sixth Circuits and held that there is no standalone liability under the FHAA for a landlord’s failure to engage in an interactive process. View "Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After a police officer fatally shot her son, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law against the officer. The officer shot plaintiff's son seven times in front of a convenient store after the two were involved in a physical altercation.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's state law negligence claim. The panel explained that the district court erroneously conflated the legal standards under the Fourth Amendment and California negligence law. The panel held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the officer's shooting of her son could be found negligent by a reasonable juror under the broader formulation of reasonableness in California law. In this case, the district court inaccurately concluded that plaintiff did not point to any evidence probative of the fact that her son exhibited symptoms of mental illness that would have been apparent to the officer; did not consider that a jury could find the officer's pre-shooting conduct unreasonable under California law, given the son's potential mental illness; and misinterpreted the Ninth Circuit precedent set forth in Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), in assessing the reasonableness of the officer's conduct at the time of the shooting. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on failure to state a claim, of plaintiff's action seeking to remedy defendants' failure to count his vote in the 2016 November General Election. At issue is whether Arizona residents who registered to vote on October 11, 2016, registered to vote in time to be eligible to vote in the 2016 November General Election. The Arizona law in effect in 2016 set the voter registration deadline for the 2016 November Election on Monday, October 10, 2016. However, because Monday, October 10, 2016 was also Columbus Day, a state and federal holiday, certain methods of voter registration were not available on that day. In this case, plaintiff and roughly 2,000 others registered to vote on Tuesday, October 11, 2016.The panel held that, under Arizona law in effect in 2016, an Arizona resident who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 did not register in time to be eligible to vote in the 2016 November Election. The panel also held that the October 10, 2016 voter registration deadline did not violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Accordingly, the panel need not reach the remaining two questions regarding the enforceability of the NVRA under section 1983 and the factual predicate necessary to state a cognizable money damages claim for deprivation of an individual's right to vote. Finally, the panel noted that this rigid result is not likely to reoccur under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-120, as amended. View "Isabel v. Reagan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of individual employees of the Clark County DFS and the County in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants wrongfully removed plaintiffs' infant daughter, M.M., from plaintiffs' home, wrongfully removed M.M. from her foster mother's home, and then placed her in a neglectful foster home that caused her death.The panel held that plaintiffs waived several appellate arguments where these arguments were either not raised before the district court, are inconsistent with positions employed there, or are presented without argument. The panel also held that each of plaintiffs' asserted factual disputes are either resolved by the record or are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on its claims. In this case, plaintiffs' third claim of failure to train has been waived whereas its fifth claim of state-law negligence was effectively dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to present a genuine dispute that M.M. was wrongfully removed from their home or that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly decided the question of causation for the state negligence claim as a matter of law rather than a matter of fact, and that plaintiffs waived their wrongful death claim. View "Momox-Caselis v. Donohue" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law