Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Arizona's Governor appealed the district court's declaratory judgment interpreting the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910. The district court declared that even after a 1999 amendment, the Enabling Act continues to require congressional consent to any changes to the state constitution affecting the investment or distribution of assets in Arizona's land trust for public schools.The Ninth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this judgment. The panel held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge either past or future changes to the distribution formula. In this case, plaintiff stipulated that the only injury particular to him is his individual belief that the state is not obeying federal law, but such an injury is not concrete for Article III standing. The panel also held that, even if this case had initially presented a justiciable controversy, that controversy ended when Congress consented to the distribution formula in Proposition 123. View "Pierce v. Ducey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and of state law arising from the suspension and termination of his employment. In this case, plaintiff was terminated from his position as an economics professor after the university concluded that plaintiff had sexually harassed his former student.The panel held that SCU, as a private university, does not become a state actor merely by virtue of being required by generally applicable civil rights laws to ameliorate sex (or any other form of) discrimination in educational activities as a condition of receiving state funding. Furthermore, the receipt of federal and state funds conditioned on compliance with anti-discrimination laws is insufficient to convert private conduct into state action. View "Heineke v. Santa Clara University" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's judgment in favor of the United States, the FBI, and federal officials in a putative class action alleging that an FBI investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.Plaintiffs, three Muslim residents of California, filed a putative class action against Government Defendants and Agent Defendants, alleging that the FBI paid a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their religious identity. Plaintiffs argued that the investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination, in violation of eleven constitutional and statutory causes of action.The panel held that some of the claims dismissed on state secrets grounds should not have been dismissed outright. Rather, the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy protective procedure in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The panel held that the Fourth Amendment injunctive relief claim against the official-capacity defendants should not have been dismissed, because expungement relief was available under the Constitution to remedy the alleged constitutional violations. The panel declined to address whether plaintiffs' Bivens claim remained available after the Supreme Court's decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and thus remanded for the district court to determine whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate for any Fourth Amendment claim against the Agent Defendants. The panel held that some of plaintiffs' remaining allegations state a claim while others do not. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the substantively stated claims. View "Fazaga v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 does not authorize the Department of Defense (DoD) to make budgetary transfers from funds appropriated by Congress to it for other purposes in order to fund the construction of a wall on the southern border of the United States in California and New Mexico.The Ninth Circuit first held that California and New Mexico have Article III standing to pursue their claims because they have alleged that the actions of the Federal Defendants will cause particularized and concrete injuries in fact to the environment and wildlife of their respective states as well as to their sovereign interests in enforcing their environmental laws; California has alleged environmental and sovereign injuries "fairly traceable" to the Federal Defendants' conduct; and a ruling in California and New Mexico's favor would redress their harms. Furthermore, California and New Mexico easily fall within the zone of interests of Section 8005 of the Act and are suitable challengers to enforce its obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act.The panel held that the district court correctly determined that Section 8005 did not authorize DoD's budgetary transfer to fund construction of the El Paso and El Centro Sectors. The panel explained that the district court correctly determined that the border wall was not an unforeseen military requirement, that funding for the wall had been denied by Congress, and therefore, that the transfer authority granted by Section 8005 was not permissibly invoked. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment, declining to reverse the district court’s decision against imposing a permanent injunction, without prejudice to renewal. View "California v. Trump" on Justia Law

Section 8005 and Section 9002 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 does not authorize the Department of Defense's budgetary transfers to fund construction of the wall on the southern border of the United States in California, New Mexico, and Arizona.The Ninth Circuit first held that Sierra Club and SBCC have established that their members satisfy the demands of Article III standing to challenge the Federal Defendants' actions. In this case, Sierra Club's thousands of members live near and frequently visit these areas along the U.S.-Mexico border to do a variety of activities; the construction of a border wall and related infrastructure will acutely injure their interests because DHS is proceeding with border wall construction without ensuring compliance with any federal or state environmental regulations designed to protect these interests; and the interests of Sierra Club's members in this lawsuit are germane to the organization's purpose. Furthermore, SBCC has alleged facts that support that it has standing to sue on behalf of itself and its member organizations. Sierra Club and SBCC have also shown that their injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action of the Federal Defendants, and their injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.The panel held that neither Section 8005 nor any constitutional provision authorized DoD to transfer the funds at issue. The panel reaffirmed its holding in State of California, et al. v. Trump, et al., Nos. 19-16299 and 19-16336, slip op. at 37 (9th Cir. filed June 26, 2020), holding that Section 8005 did not authorize the transfer of funds at issue here because "the border wall was not an unforeseen military requirement," and "funding for the wall had been denied by Congress." The panel also held that Sierra Club was a proper party to challenge the Section 8005 transfers and that Sierra Club has both a constitutional and an ultra vires cause of action here. The panel explained that the Federal Defendants not only exceeded their delegated authority, but also violated an express constitutional prohibition designed to protect individual liberties. The panel considered the Federal Defendants' additional arguments, holding that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is not to be construed as an exclusive remedy, and the APA does not displace all constitutional and equitable causes of action, and Sierra Club falls within the Appropriations Clause's zone of interests. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Sierra Club a permanent injunction enjoining the federal defendants from spending the funds at issue. View "Sierra Club v. Trump" on Justia Law

For standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an injury. The temporary loss of use of one's money constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III.Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of LLR customers in Alaska who were improperly charged sales tax. The complaint alleged claims for conversion and misappropriation and for violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. In this case, plaintiff was refunded $531.25 for sales tax charges, but contends that she is owed at least $3.76 in interest on that sum to account for her lost use of the money. The district court granted LLR's motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding that $3.76 is "too little to support Article III standing." The panel held that plaintiff suffered a cognizable and concrete injury: the loss of a significant amount of money (over $500) for a substantial amount of time (months with respect to some purchases, over a year with respect to others). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Van v. LLR, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder. Petitioner moved for a new trial based on his discovery that a juror had made a false representation during voir dire.The panel applied review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), holding that it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), which permits a new trial where a juror's lies during voir dire hide a fact that would have permitted the juror to be stricken for cause, accommodates a prejudice analysis. Because the Supreme Court has not given explicit direction as to whether McDonough requires a criminal defendant to show prejudice to obtain a new trial, and because the state court's interpretation is consistent with many other courts' interpretations, the panel cannot hold that the state court's interpretation was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Scott v. Arnold" on Justia Law

IMDb filed suit challenging Assembly Bill 1687, which prohibits a specified category of websites from publishing the ages and dates of birth of entertainment industry professionals. The district court concluded that the statute violated IMDb's First Amendment speech rights and other constitutional and statutory provisions, and enjoined California's enforcement of the statute.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that, on its face, AB 1687 prohibits the publication of specific content, by specific speakers. Therefore, the panel held that it is a content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny. In this case, California and the Screen Actors Guild failed to demonstrate that AB 1687 is the least restrictive means and narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal of reducing incidents of age discrimination. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties’ discovery requests. View "IMDb.com, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

An order denying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70(a) motion to enforce a conditional writ of habeas corpus pertains to the district court's adjudication of the habeas petition, and 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) therefore requires a habeas petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court's order.The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner a COA and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal from the district court's order denying his motion under Rule 70(a) to enforce the district court's conditional writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and assault on a peace officer, and sentenced to 100 years in prison with 20 years suspended. In this case, petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that reasonable jurists would debate whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the State complied with the conditional writ and thus in denying petitioner's Rule 70(a) motion. Consequently, petitioner failed to make a substantial showing under section 2253(c)(2) to permit the issuance of a COA. View "Rose v. Guyer" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's conviction and capital sentence for murdering his parents. Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to present additional evidence of third-party culpability. Petitioner also alleged that a contract for indigent defense services between Los Angeles County and the Pomona Contract Lawyers Association (PCLA) violated his constitutional rights because it interfered with his ability to obtain second trial counsel.The panel held that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to present testimony that gang members appeared to claim credit for the murders, but that counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to find and call a gang expert to counter the testimony of the prosecution's gang expert. In this case, fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether the testimony of five witnesses regarding the gang members' boasting was reasonably likely to have changed the outcome of petitioner's trial. Therefore, there were reasonable grounds for the California Supreme Court to conclude that the omitted testimony would not have altered the outcome. The panel also held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial on the merits of the PCLA contract claims (claims 1, 2, 3, and 11) was not unreasonable, because there is no evidence in the record that trial counsel was appointed to represent petitioner under the contract, was a member of the PCLA at the time the initial contract was signed, or was a signatory to the original contract. View "Staten v. Davis" on Justia Law