Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The emergency military construction authority provided by 10 U.S.C. 2808 does not authorize eleven border wall construction projects on the southern border of the United States.The Organizational Plaintiffs and the State Plaintiffs filed separate actions challenging the Federal Defendants' anticipated diversion of federal funds to fund border wall construction pursuant to various statutory authorities, including Section 2808. The Federal Defendants timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and declaratory relief to Sierra Club and the States and the grant of a permanent injunction to Sierra Club. The States timely cross-appealed the denial of their request for a permanent injunction.The Ninth Circuit held that the States and Sierra Club both have Article III standing and a cause of action to challenge the Federal Defendants' border wall construction projects; Section 2808 did not authorize the challenged construction where the projects are neither necessary to support the use of the armed forces nor are they military construction projects; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in either granting a permanent injunction to Sierra Club or in denying a separate permanent injunction to the States. Although the panel recognized that in times of national emergency the panel generally owes great deference to the decisions of the Executive, the particular circumstances of this case require it to take seriously the limitations of the text of Section 2808 and to hold the Executive to them. The panel stated that where, as here, Congress has clung to this power with both hands—by withholding funding for border wall construction at great effort and cost and by attempting to terminate the existence of a national emergency on the southern border on two separate occasions, with a majority vote by both houses—the panel can neither pry it from Congress's grasp. View "Sierra Club v. Trump" on Justia Law

This case arose after the death of George Floyd and the resulting nationwide protests in support of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The events at issue here stem from the BLM protests in Portland, Oregon where the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Marshals Service deployed federal law enforcement agents to the city.Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged that the Federal Defendants "intentionally targeted and used physical force and other forms of intimidation against journalists and authorized legal observers for the purpose of preventing or deterring them from observing and reporting on unreasonably aggressive treatment of lawful protestors." The district court entered a TRO against the Federal Defendants on July 23, 2020. On August 10, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the Federal Defendants, and the district court entered a preliminary injunction with terms largely identical to the terms of the July 23 TRO. On August 25, the district court denied the Federal Defendants' motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On appeal, a divided three-judge motions panel issued an order on August 27 granting the Federal Defendants' motion for an administrative stay of the injunction pending resolution of their emergency motion for a stay pending appeal.The Ninth Circuit denied the Federal Defendants' emergency motion for stay pending appeal and lifted the administrative stay entered August 27, 2020. The panel held that the Federal Defendants have not made a strong showing that their standing argument is likely to succeed. The panel also held that the Federal Defendants have not made a strong showing required by Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-434 (2009), that they are likely to succeed on the merits of plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim and First Amendment right-of-access claim. The panel further held that the Federal Defendants have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury as a result of the district court's preliminary injunction. Finally, the panel held that a stay of the district court's injunction would substantially injure both the City and the plaintiffs. View "Index Newspapers LLC v. United States Marshals Service" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action against CVS based on Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) preemption of California state law claims. Plaintiff alleged that the supplement he purchased, and five additional CVS glucosamine-based supplements, did not provide the advertised benefits. The FDCA distinguishes between "disease claims" and "structure/function claims" that manufacturers make about their products, applying different regulatory standards to each.The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that the FDCA preempts plaintiff's state law causes of action simply because CVS's glucosamine-based supplements present only structure/function claims. The panel explained that Dachauer v. NBTY, Inc., 913 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2019), was distinguishable from this case and the district court erred by applying it. Furthermore, the district court erred by greatly expanding the present state of federal preemption jurisprudence under the FDCA, contrary to public policy. The panel also held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint without granting plaintiff leave to amend to add allegations regarding an implied disease claim. In this case, plaintiff may have been able to "bolster" his complaint with allegations of extra-label evidence showing that CVS's glucosamine-based supplements present implied disease claims. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions for a stay pending appeal of the district court's injunction enjoining Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. On September 10, 2020, less than two months before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the law and ordered Arizona to create and to institute a new procedure that would grant voters who failed to sign their ballots up to five days after voting has ended to correct the error.The panel held that the Nken factors weigh in favor of a stay. In this case, the State has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits where Arizona's Election Day signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. Under the Anderson-Burdick framework for evaluating ballot-access laws, the panel concluded that the State has made a strong showing that its ballot-signature deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests. Even though plaintiffs contend that the changes to Arizona's law will likely affect only a small number of voters and create a relatively low administrative burden on the State, the panel explained that the State's probability of success on the merits is high. Furthermore, the public interest is well served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws and plaintiffs stand to face only a minimal burden. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the County's motion to dismiss a claim brought by plaintiff under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Plaintiff alleges that the County's failure to hire, train, and supervise its Sheriff's deputies resulted in two deputies severely beating plaintiff during his arrest. Plaintiff contends that the County tolerated and ignored the proliferation of racially motivated "cliques" or "gangs" within the Sherriff's Department which led to the excessive force used.The panel held that California Government Code 945.3 tolled plaintiff's claim while his criminal charges were pending even if he filed his complaint outside the two year statute of limitations. Section 945.3 provides that a person charged with a criminal offense may not bring a civil action against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace officer "based upon" conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged while the charges against the accused are pending before a superior court. The panel explained that, because there can be no Monell claim based on excessive force without an underlying constitutional violation by the officers, the peace officer's conduct in violation of the Constitution here becomes the "necessary logical condition" to formulate a Monell claim. Therefore, section 945.3's "based upon" language applies to plaintiff's Monell claim, and his claim was properly tolled until the dismissal of his criminal charges. View "Lockett v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied Karen Denise Chades's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). Chades was convicted of first degree murder in California state court. In her application, Chades claimed that she was denied effective assistance of counsel in her federal habeas proceedings because her habeas counsel did not adequately press her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim against her trial counsel.The panel held that it has no authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to authorize Chades to file a second or successive application. In this case, Chades concedes that her application does not meet the statutory exceptions under which a second or successive claim can be reviewed. The panel declined to accept Chades' invitation to hold that the panel nevertheless has jurisdiction to entertain her request directly under the Constitution, because doing so would necessarily require the panel to find that the provisions in section 2244 that bar Chades's application are unconstitutional as applied to her. The panel concluded that the statute does not impermissibly preclude judicial review of an inmate's constitutional challenges, but rather acts as a mere regulation of repetitious requests for relief.The panel raised sua sponte the question of whether a single member of the panel could construe Chades's request as a habeas corpus application and transfer it to a district court for further proceedings. Regardless of whether a transfer is properly done by a panel or by an individual judge, the panel each declined to transfer here. Finally, the panel noted that Chades is not left entirely without a forum for airing her due process claim while seeking habeas relief. View "Chades v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's first-degree murder conviction and remanded with instructions to conditionally grant the writ. In this case, the prosecutor told the jury at the end of his closing-argument rebuttal that the presumption of innocence no longer applied.The panel applied petitioner's claim pursuant to Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), de novo, holding that the prosecutor's repeated statements, endorsed by the trial judge, that the presumption of innocence no longer applied violated due process under Darden. The panel stated that a holding of a due process violation under Darden necessarily entails a conclusion that the prosecutor's misstatements of the law were prejudicial. The panel also held that the Court of Appeal unreasonably concluded under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), that the prosecutor’s misstatements of the law were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Ford v. Peery" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated when she was, among other things, subjected to a strip search upon arriving at a prison to visit her boyfriend.The panel held that the defendant who performed the strip search violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment where defendant subjected plaintiff to the search without giving her the option of leaving the prison rather than being subjected to the search. However, the panel held that defendant is protected by qualified immunity because there has been no controlling precedent in this circuit, or a sufficiently robust consensus of persuasive authority in other circuits, holding that prior to a strip search a prison visitor—even a visitor as to whom there is reasonable suspicion—must be given an opportunity to leave the prison rather than be subjected to the strip search. Furthermore, because there is little to no likelihood that plaintiff might again be subjected to a strip search under comparable circumstances, prospective declaratory and injunctive relief are unavailable. Finally, plaintiff's other alleged causes of action all fail. View "Cates v. Stroud" on Justia Law

After Sonny Lam was shot and killed inside his home by a police officer, Sonny's father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging that the officer used excessive deadly force. In this case, a jury specifically found that Sonny had stabbed the officer in the forearm with a pair of scissors prior to the first shot, that the officer had retreated after firing the first shot, and that Sonny did not approach the officer with scissors before the officer fired the fatal second shot.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and held that the district court properly denied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim where the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting that an officer could not constitutionally kill a person who did not pose an immediate threat. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established at the time of the incident that firing a second shot at a person who had previously been aggressive, but posed no threat to the officer at the time of the second shot, would violate the victim's rights. Therefore, the facts as found by the jury adequately supported the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.The panel reversed the district court's denial of the officer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourteenth Amendment claim of loss of a familial relationship with Sonny, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that defendant acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not commit plain error in its evidentiary rulings. View "Lam v. City of Los Banos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former high school student, filed suit alleging disability discrimination by school officials in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.The panel applied Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), and held that the crux of plaintiff's complaint seeks relief for the disability-based discrimination and harassment she faced at school, and not for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Therefore, plaintiff need not exhaust the administrative remedies under the IDEA, and the panel reversed the district court's order dismissing her complaint for failure to exhaust. The panel also vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint as alternatively barred by the statute of limitations and remanded. On remand, the district court should reconsider whether any of plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations in light of the panel's conclusion that plaintiff does not seek relief for the denial of a FAPE under the IDEA. View "McIntyre v. Eugene School District 4J" on Justia Law