Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prisoners moved to enforce a civil rights class action settlement agreement stemming from California's housing of the plaintiff prisoners in solitary confinement based only upon their gang affiliation. The prisoners contend that California breached the agreement when it transferred some prisoners from Security Housing to General Population but did not give those prisoners increased out-of-cell time. Furthermore, prisoners contend that California broke the settlement agreement when it limited another inmate group's direct physical contact during yard time.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that California violated the settlement agreement. The panel held that California has complied with Paragraph 25's requirements and agreed with California's contention that Paragraph 25 of the agreement requires inmate transfer from Security Housing to General Population but does not control General Population conditions. The panel also held that California has substantially complied with Paragraph 28's requirements for restricted custody inmates and, given the institution's safety concerns, the limitations are only minor deviations from Paragraph 28's requirements. The panel vacated the district court's remedial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ashker v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the University of Arizona violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), by discriminating against plaintiff on the basis of sex during the course of a sexual misconduct disciplinary case against him.The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's order and judgment dismissing the Title IX claim, holding that plaintiff stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. The panel held that plaintiff's allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. In this case, a professor's comments regarding plaintiff's disciplinary case reflects an atmosphere of bias against plaintiff during the course of the University's disciplinary case. Furthermore, plaintiff was not permitted to appeal the punishment and the University's underlying finding of responsibility; plaintiff was not permitted to file a harassment complaint against the complainant; and the investigation was one-sided. Considering the combination of plaintiff's allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, the panel stated that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University's handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against plaintiff. View "Schwake v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion to reopen proceedings on his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner sought to invalidate his plea of "guilty but mentally ill." Three years after Nevada eliminated the insanity defense, petitioner pleaded guilty but mentally ill to lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen.The panel held that petitioner's motion was timely under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than any of Rule 60(b)'s other grounds for relief. Furthermore, in Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016), the panel clarified that district courts can indeed stay and abey entirely unexhausted habeas petitions. The panel also held that petitioner presented extraordinary circumstances warranting re-opening the final judgment. In this case, the six Phelps factors supported reconsideration of the district court's 2009 judgment and the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. On remand, petitioner may request the district court to stay his petition while he returns to state court to exhaust his federal constitutional claims. View "Bynoe v. Baca" on Justia Law

Scafidi was charged with sexual assault. During the proceedings, state courts suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and determined that the police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Charges were dismissed on the state’s motion. Scafidi brought a federal civil rights claim against the Las Vegas Metro Police Department, officers, a crime scene investigator, and the nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the alleged victim. He contends that the officers staged an incriminating crime scene photo by moving his sleeping medications from the hotel bathroom drawer into a mint container by his clothes in the bedroom; falsely stated in a warrant application that the alleged victim’s sexual assault exam revealed sexual assault when it only revealed sexual intercourse; threatened him for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Scafidi was precluded from relitigating the state justice of the peace’s determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by concluding that the probable cause determination precluded Scafidi from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. His allegations that the defendants fabricated evidence or undertook other wrongful conduct in bad faith created a triable issue of material fact concerning probable cause, pursuant to Nevada and Ninth Circuit precedent. View "Scafidi v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging that police officers used unreasonable deadly force when they shot and killed Junef Monzon following a high-speed chase. The panel held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable in this dynamic and urgent situation, where officers were faced with the immediate threat of significant physical harm. The panel explained that the severity of Monzon's crime weighed in favor of the use of force; Monzon posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers when he ignored commands to stop the van and drove near, toward, and amongst the officers on foot; and Monzon's driving endangered the officers and left them with only seconds to consider less severe alternatives.The panel also held that a reasonable officer in the position of the individual defendant officers would have probable cause to believe that Monzon posed an immediate threat to the safety of one or more of the other officers or himself. Furthermore, even if the officers' use of deadly force was unreasonable, the officers did not violate a clearly established right. The panel rejected claims of failure to train and state law claims. View "Monzon v. City of Murrieta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging a Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Under the ordinance, a person who overstays a metered parking spot faces a fine of anywhere from $63 to $181, depending on her promptness of payment.The Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines. The panel extended the four-factor analysis in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998), to govern municipal fines. Applying the Bajakajian factors, the panel held that the City's initial parking fine of $63 is not grossly disproportional to the underlying offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue. However, the panel held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City to the late payment penalty of $63. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded for the district court to determine under Bajakajian whether the City's late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. View "Pimental v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Arizona's Governor appealed the district court's declaratory judgment interpreting the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910. The district court declared that even after a 1999 amendment, the Enabling Act continues to require congressional consent to any changes to the state constitution affecting the investment or distribution of assets in Arizona's land trust for public schools.The Ninth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this judgment. The panel held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge either past or future changes to the distribution formula. In this case, plaintiff stipulated that the only injury particular to him is his individual belief that the state is not obeying federal law, but such an injury is not concrete for Article III standing. The panel also held that, even if this case had initially presented a justiciable controversy, that controversy ended when Congress consented to the distribution formula in Proposition 123. View "Pierce v. Ducey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and of state law arising from the suspension and termination of his employment. In this case, plaintiff was terminated from his position as an economics professor after the university concluded that plaintiff had sexually harassed his former student.The panel held that SCU, as a private university, does not become a state actor merely by virtue of being required by generally applicable civil rights laws to ameliorate sex (or any other form of) discrimination in educational activities as a condition of receiving state funding. Furthermore, the receipt of federal and state funds conditioned on compliance with anti-discrimination laws is insufficient to convert private conduct into state action. View "Heineke v. Santa Clara University" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's judgment in favor of the United States, the FBI, and federal officials in a putative class action alleging that an FBI investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.Plaintiffs, three Muslim residents of California, filed a putative class action against Government Defendants and Agent Defendants, alleging that the FBI paid a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their religious identity. Plaintiffs argued that the investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination, in violation of eleven constitutional and statutory causes of action.The panel held that some of the claims dismissed on state secrets grounds should not have been dismissed outright. Rather, the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy protective procedure in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The panel held that the Fourth Amendment injunctive relief claim against the official-capacity defendants should not have been dismissed, because expungement relief was available under the Constitution to remedy the alleged constitutional violations. The panel declined to address whether plaintiffs' Bivens claim remained available after the Supreme Court's decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and thus remanded for the district court to determine whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate for any Fourth Amendment claim against the Agent Defendants. The panel held that some of plaintiffs' remaining allegations state a claim while others do not. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the substantively stated claims. View "Fazaga v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 does not authorize the Department of Defense (DoD) to make budgetary transfers from funds appropriated by Congress to it for other purposes in order to fund the construction of a wall on the southern border of the United States in California and New Mexico.The Ninth Circuit first held that California and New Mexico have Article III standing to pursue their claims because they have alleged that the actions of the Federal Defendants will cause particularized and concrete injuries in fact to the environment and wildlife of their respective states as well as to their sovereign interests in enforcing their environmental laws; California has alleged environmental and sovereign injuries "fairly traceable" to the Federal Defendants' conduct; and a ruling in California and New Mexico's favor would redress their harms. Furthermore, California and New Mexico easily fall within the zone of interests of Section 8005 of the Act and are suitable challengers to enforce its obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act.The panel held that the district court correctly determined that Section 8005 did not authorize DoD's budgetary transfer to fund construction of the El Paso and El Centro Sectors. The panel explained that the district court correctly determined that the border wall was not an unforeseen military requirement, that funding for the wall had been denied by Congress, and therefore, that the transfer authority granted by Section 8005 was not permissibly invoked. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment, declining to reverse the district court’s decision against imposing a permanent injunction, without prejudice to renewal. View "California v. Trump" on Justia Law