Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Applying Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986), the Ninth Circuit held that the press has a qualified right of timely access to newly filed civil nonconfidential complaints that attaches when the complaint is filed. However, the panel held that this right does not entitle the press to immediate access to those complaints. Furthermore, some reasonable restrictions resembling time, place, and manner regulations that result in incidental delays in access are constitutionally permitted where they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored and necessary to preserve the court's important interest in the fair and orderly administration of justice.In this case, CNS filed suit seeking immediate access to newly filed civil complaints from Ventura County Superior Court. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the no-access-before-process policy, but reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the scanning policy. The panel vacated the district court's injunction and award of fees, remanding for further consideration. View "Courthouse News Service v. Planet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Montana State Prison (MPS), filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prison staff members, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was sexually assaulted during the course of a pat-down search. The district court dismissed all defendants except Sergeant Larry Pasha, the prison guard who conducted the pat down, and a jury subsequently returned a verdict in Pasha's favor. Plaintiff appealed.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue plaintiff's trial sua sponte. The panel recognized that there was no model jury instruction for Eighth Amendment sexual assault, and took this opportunity to address this circuit's law governing this type of claim.The panel held that a prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner. In this case the model instructions plainly misstated the law applicable to plaintiff's cause. The panel reversed and remanded for a new trial because it was impossible to determine whether the jury would have reached the same result had it been properly instructed. View "Bearchild v. Cobban" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood filed suit against HHS, alleging that the agency's 2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) for funding programs to combat teen pregnancy were contrary to the law as required in their appropriation, the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP), which is the relevant part of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that Planned Parenthood had standing under the competitor standing doctrine and that the case is not moot because it satisfies the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness. The panel explained that Planned Parenthood could reasonably expect to be subject to the same injury again, and the injury was inherently shorter than the normal life of litigation.The panel exercised its discretion to reach two issues in the first instance. First, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA was contrary to law, because the 2018 Tier 1 FOA's direction that grant applicants address and replicate each of the elements of the TAC or the SMARTool, contradicts the TPPP's direction that Tier 1 grants go only to applicants whose programs are proven effective. Second, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was not contrary to the TPPP on its face. The panel remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington and North Idaho v. United States Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CFS and two of its employees fired him from his position as a social services practitioner in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities, in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5 and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The County's Civil Service Commission upheld the termination and denied plaintiff's appeal, and the district court dismissed the action.The Ninth Circuit held that the Commission's order did not preclude plaintiff's section 1102.5 claim for retaliation in light of Taswell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 643 (Ct. App. 2018). In Taswell, the California Court of Appeal applied a legislative-intent exception and held that administrative findings by a state agency do not preclude claims for retaliation brought under section 1102.5. However, the panel's conclusion regarding legislative intent did not extend to plaintiff's claim under section 1983, which was precluded by the Commission's order. In this case, plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the propriety of his termination before the administrative agency, as evidenced by the comprehensive evidentiary record and the availability of judicial review. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bahra v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

In appeal No. 13-99003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Central District and denied petitioner's motion to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) as to all claims except claim 6, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The panel held that the conclusion that an irreconcilable conflict did not exist based on the disagreement between petitioner and counsel was reasonable; even if petitioner were successfully able to demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication or prove that an irreconcilable conflict existed under the Moore factors, his irreconcilable-conflict claim would still fail, because the Supreme Court has never held that an irreconcilable conflict with one's attorney constitutes a per se denial of the right to effective counsel; and thus the state court's decision did not unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law as pronounced by the Supreme Court. The panel also held that the state court reasonably determined that counsel did not perform deficiently by refusing to let petitioner testify, and even if counsel was deficient in doing so, petitioner was not prejudiced.In appeal No. 13-99007, the panel affirmed the judgment of the Southern District and denied petitioner's motion to expand the COA. The panel held that petitioner was not deprived of constitutionally adequate representation during the penalty phase and petitioner was not deprived of his right to the competent assistance of a psychiatric expert. View "Carter v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a claim for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 brought by public sector employees against their union after the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). Janus held that the compulsory collection of agency fees by unions violates the First Amendment.The panel joined the Seventh Circuit and held that private parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law. The panel also held that the good faith affirmative defense applies as a matter of law, and the district court was right to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief. View "Danielson v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to a police officer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims that the officer used excessive force. The officer placed defendant in a chokehold during an encounter following a concert, and the chokehold rendered plaintiff unconscious.The panel held that its decision in Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2013), squarely addressed the constitutionality of the use of a chokehold on a non-resisting person. Barnard held that any reasonable person should have known that squeezing the breath from a compliant, prone, and handcuffed individual despite his pleas for air involves a degree of force that is greater than reasonable. In this case, plaintiff was not resisting arrest when the officer placed him in a chokehold, and there was little chance he could initiate resistance with five other officers fully restraining him and pinning him to the ground. Therefore, it was clearly established that the use of a chokehold on a non-resisting, restrained person violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on the use of excessive force. Furthermore, the same version of the facts precluded summary judgment on the state law claims. View "Tuuamalemalo v. Greene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims arising from Defendant Stringer's fatal shooting of plaintiff's son, Michael Dozer. The district court entered judgment for defendants after the jury returned a special verdict finding that Stringer did not use excessive force or act negligently.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff's proposed testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. In this case, the district court excluded as irrelevant plaintiff's testimony about her percipient observations of Dozer's past behavior, which she offered to prove that Stringer should have recognized that Dozer was exhibiting signs of mental illness at the time of their encounter and therefore that the shooting was unreasonable. The panel also rejected defendants' alternative argument that plaintiff's proposed testimony was an improper lay opinion under Rule 701. Finally, the panel held that the district court's evidentiary error was not harmless and a new trial was warranted. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

The en banc court affirmed the district court's grant of sentencing relief based on petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that petitioner received constitutionally adequate representation at the penalty phase of his trial.The en banc court held that the only reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the facts of this case lead to the following conclusions: (1) that counsel failed in their duty to undertake a reasonable investigation at the penalty phase of petitioner's trial; (2) that counsel's choices cannot be rationalized as "strategic" or "tactical;" and (3) that any reasonably competent attorney would have discovered and introduced the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence that existed. The en banc court held that no fair-minded jurist would conclude otherwise. The en banc court also held that the California Supreme Court's conclusion that petitioner suffered no prejudice was objectively unreasonable. Without having heard the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence, the en banc court held that the jury could not fairly gauge petitioner's moral culpability at sentencing. View "Andrews v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the city and police department officials in an action brought by plaintiff, who was 74 years old at the time, challenging the issuance and execution of a search warrant on her home, as well as her detention incident to the search. In this case, officers acted pursuant to a search warrant to investigate an illegal marijuana operation.The panel held that there was probable cause to search plaintiff's mobile home based on the informant's reliability and the probability that probative evidence or contraband would be found in the residences on the property, including the mobile home. Therefore, the search warrant's breadth was co-extensive with the scope of the probable cause and was not overbroad. The panel also held that the officers acted reasonably when they continued to search plaintiff's mobile home because the probable cause to search the mobile home did not depend on the suspect living there. Rather, the panel held that the officers had probable cause to continue the search because they could still reasonably believe that the entire property was suspect and that the property was still under the suspect's common control. Furthermore, the panel held that the duration of the detention, about an hour, was reasonable. Finally, none of plaintiff's alleged omissions amounted to judicial deception. View "Blight v. City of Manteca" on Justia Law