Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a 67-year-old native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in 1985 without admission or parole. In removal proceedings, he conceded removability but sought several forms of relief, including asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and relief pursuant to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal order in 2018. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen proceedings, which the BIA denied in 2019.The BIA upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that the petitioner had withdrawn his asylum application, was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, and did not merit NACARA relief. The BIA also found no sufficient indicia of incompetency to mandate remand for a competency evaluation. The petitioner then sought review of both the 2018 and 2019 BIA decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court clarified its jurisdictional rules in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, concluding that it has jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law, including fact-intensive mixed questions of law. The court lacks jurisdiction over purely factual findings and discretionary determinations.The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by not remanding the case to the IJ for a competency determination, given the extensive evidence of the petitioner's potential incompetence. The court also found that the BIA erred in its assessment of the petitioner's fear of harm due to his mental illness, concluding that the petitioner established a reasonable likelihood of future harm if institutionalized in Guatemala. The court denied the petitioner's other claims and dismissed parts of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "LEMUS-ESCOBAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

Two yoga teachers, Steven Hubbard and Amy Baack, challenged the City of San Diego's ordinance prohibiting teaching yoga to four or more persons at the City’s shoreline parks or beaches. They argued that this prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The ordinance defined teaching yoga as a non-expressive activity and prohibited it without the City’s permission, even if offered for free. Hubbard and Baack, who offered free yoga classes in these parks, were stopped by City park rangers and issued infraction tickets for violating the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that teaching yoga was not protected speech under the First Amendment and that the City’s prohibition was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court also concluded that issuing an injunction was not in the public interest, as the City had not banned yoga entirely but had restricted it to non-shoreline parks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that teaching yoga is protected speech under the First Amendment because it involves communicating and disseminating information about yoga’s philosophy and practice. The court found that the City’s ordinance was content-based, as it specifically targeted yoga, and thus failed strict scrutiny. The City did not demonstrate a compelling interest or narrow tailoring to justify the prohibition. The court concluded that Hubbard and Baack were likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied First Amendment claim, would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Hubbard and Baack. View "HUBBARD V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Two Korean spas, collectively referred to as "the Spa," had a policy of granting entry only to biological women, excluding men and preoperative transgender women. The Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated an enforcement action against the Spa, alleging that this policy violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), which prohibits discrimination in public facilities based on sexual orientation, including gender expression or identity. The Spa did not challenge the statute's definition or argue that their conduct did not fit within it but claimed that enforcing WLAD against their policy violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the Spa's complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Spa's conduct discriminated based on gender identity, thus falling within WLAD's scope. It also found that the HRC's enforcement did not impermissibly burden the Spa's First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, or free association.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the Spa's entrance policy discriminated based on gender identity, which is included in WLAD's definition of sexual orientation. The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the Spa's free speech claim, concluding that WLAD imposed an incidental restriction on speech no greater than necessary to eliminate discriminatory conduct. The court also applied rational basis review to the Spa's free exercise claim, finding that WLAD was neutral and generally applicable, and that eliminating discrimination based on sex and transgender status is a legitimate government purpose. Finally, the court rejected the Spa's free association claim, determining that the Spa was neither an intimate nor an expressive association. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Olympus Spa v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Tyler Jay Watson was investigated by a police task force in Nampa, Idaho, for drug distribution based on information from a confidential informant. Watson, who was on parole, had his vehicle and residence searched by law enforcement and probation officers. Methamphetamine was found in his vehicle, and during a subsequent search of his residence, Watson was detained in a patrol car. After being read his Miranda rights, Watson admitted to having more drugs at his grandmother's home. Officers obtained consent to search the grandmother's garage, where they found fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cash.Watson was charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. He filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements and the evidence found, arguing that his parole conditions compelled him to cooperate with law enforcement under threat of parole revocation, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied the motion, finding the searches constitutional and Watson's statements not involuntarily compelled. Watson conditionally pled guilty and was sentenced to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Watson's statements were not involuntarily compelled because his parole conditions required cooperation only with his parole officer, not all law enforcement officers. Additionally, Watson was properly Mirandized before making the incriminating statements, and there was no indication that he was told refusal to cooperate would result in parole revocation. Thus, the court concluded that Watson was not subject to a penalty situation under these circumstances. View "USA V. WATSON" on Justia Law

Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law

Theresa Brooke, a woman with disabilities who uses a wheelchair, visited the Ramada by Wyndham Burbank Airport hotel in August 2023. She alleged that architectural barriers at the hotel deterred her from entering. Brooke sued the hotel's owner, Tsay JBR, LLC, for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. She sought injunctive relief under the ADA and statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brooke, finding that Tsay JBR had violated the ADA due to the lack of an access aisle in the hotel's passenger loading zone. This ADA violation also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act. However, the court found that there was a factual issue regarding whether Brooke personally encountered the violation or was deterred by it, which is necessary for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The district court scheduled a bench trial, concluding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply to claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Tsay JBR's petition for a writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on claims for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act. The court determined that Brooke's claim was legal in nature, both in terms of its historical analog to 18th-century English public accommodations law and the punitive and deterrent nature of the statutory damages sought. The court directed the district court to set the matter for a jury trial. View "TSAY JBR LLC V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Three criminal defendants in San Francisco, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenged the constitutionality of the San Francisco Sheriff's Office (SFSO) Pre-Trial Electronic Monitoring program (PTEM). They specifically contested Rule 5, which requires enrollees to submit to warrantless searches, and Rule 11, which allows SFSO to share participants’ location data with other law enforcement agencies without a warrant and to retain the data. The plaintiffs were divided into two subclasses: those enrolled in the program before May 2023 ("original rules subclass") and those enrolled after May 2023 ("revised rules subclass").The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Program Rules likely violated their rights under the United States and California constitutions. The court enjoined the enforcement of the challenged Program Rules for both subclasses. The Sheriff appealed the injunction, particularly the prohibition on enforcing the location sharing provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeals and that abstention was not warranted. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial challenges to Rule 11’s location sharing requirement for the revised rules subclass. The court determined that the Superior Court exercises a core judicial power in imposing PTEM and that the Sheriff’s program does not create separation-of-powers issues. The court also found that the location sharing provision was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution when ordered by the Superior Court following an individualized determination. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as to the revised rules subclass but affirmed it for the original rules subclass due to the lack of a clear record that location sharing was a condition of PTEM enrollment. The court also granted the Sheriff’s motion to stay the district court’s subsequent order enforcing the preliminary injunction. View "SIMON V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

A sheriff's deputy in San Bernardino County, California, pursued a suspect who fled from a traffic stop. The suspect, Richard Delacruz, ran towards the backyard of Michael Newman's home. The deputy, Todd Underhill, lost sight of Delacruz but believed he might have entered the house. Underhill and other deputies entered the home without a warrant, found Newman, and eventually located and arrested Delacruz inside the house.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement applied. The court found that the deputies had probable cause to believe Delacruz was inside the house and that the pursuit was immediate and continuous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the deputies had probable cause to enter the home, as a reasonable person would believe there was a fair probability that Delacruz was inside. The court also determined that the pursuit was immediate and continuous, despite a nine-minute delay between losing sight of Delacruz and entering the home. The court concluded that the hot-pursuit exception justified the warrantless entry, as the deputies were in immediate and continuous pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed a felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "NEWMAN V. UNDERHILL" on Justia Law

A mother, Aurora Regino, filed a complaint against the Chico Unified School District after the district began using her child's new preferred name and pronouns without informing her. Regino claimed that the district's policy, which allows students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns without parental notification, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. She argued that the policy deprived her of her fundamental rights as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Regino's complaint, reasoning that she failed to allege the existence of a fundamental right that was clearly established in existing precedent. The court applied a standard similar to that used in qualified immunity cases, requiring that the right be clearly established in existing law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that the district court applied erroneous legal standards to the substantive and procedural due process claims. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process claim does not need to show that existing precedent clearly establishes the asserted fundamental right. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the asserted fundamental right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct the proper analysis, including a careful formulation of the asserted fundamental right and an examination of whether it is deeply rooted in history and tradition.The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court erred in its analysis of Regino's procedural due process claim by requiring her to identify a fundamental right. Procedural due process protects all liberty interests derived from state law or the Due Process Clause itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. View "REGINO V. STALEY" on Justia Law