Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Children’s Health Defense (CHD), a nonprofit organization, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta) censored its Facebook posts about vaccine safety and efficacy. CHD claimed that Meta’s actions were directed by the federal government, violating the First and Fifth Amendments. CHD also asserted violations of the Lanham Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, the Poynter Institute, and Science Feedback were named as defendants.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed CHD’s complaint. The court found that CHD failed to establish that Meta’s actions constituted state action, a necessary element for First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed the Lanham Act claim, ruling that Meta’s fact-checking labels did not constitute commercial advertising. Additionally, the court rejected the RICO claim, stating that CHD did not adequately allege a fraudulent scheme to obtain money or property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that CHD did not meet the requirements to treat Meta as a state actor. The court found that Meta’s content moderation policies were independently developed and not compelled by federal law. CHD’s allegations of government coercion and joint action were deemed insufficient. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, concluding that Meta’s fact-checking labels were not commercial speech. The RICO claim was dismissed due to a lack of proximate cause between the alleged fraud and CHD’s injury.Judge Collins partially dissented, arguing that CHD could plausibly allege a First Amendment claim for injunctive relief against Meta. However, he agreed with the dismissal of the other claims. The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Meta. View "Children's Health Defense v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, Rosendo Valdivias-Soto, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States after being previously removed. During his removal proceedings, Valdivias, who only speaks Spanish and has cognitive impairments, was misinformed about his right to counsel due to translation errors. The interpreter repeatedly used the Spanish word for "hire," suggesting that Valdivias could only have an attorney if he could pay for one, which led him to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Additionally, the immigration judge (IJ) incorrectly advised him that he was ineligible for any relief due to his aggravated felony conviction, which affected his waiver of the right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, finding that the removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The court held that Valdivias did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel or his right to appeal because of the translation errors and the IJ's incorrect advice. The court also found that Valdivias was prejudiced by these errors, as he could have plausibly obtained a U-visa and avoided deportation if he had been properly informed and represented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Valdivias's removal proceedings were fundamentally unfair due to the due process violations stemming from the translation errors and the IJ's misstatements. The court also held that Valdivias satisfied the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies because the erroneous advice and translation errors rendered administrative review unavailable. Finally, the court concluded that Valdivias was improperly deprived of the opportunity for judicial review due to the invalid waiver of his right to appeal. Therefore, the dismissal of the indictment was affirmed. View "United States v. Valdivias-Soto" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on nonimmigrant work visas and their children, sought to adjust their status to permanent residents. They challenged policies by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) that determine the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries, claiming these policies violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend their complaint. Instead of amending, the plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Patel v. Garland, which held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review factual findings in discretionary-relief proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The government argued that this ruling meant the courts also lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs' claims because they were not ripe. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not strip federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear collateral challenges to generally applicable policies and procedures. However, the claims were not ripe because the plaintiffs had not applied for adjustment of status, and USCIS had not denied their applications based on the challenged policies. For the one plaintiff who did apply and was denied, the court held that her claims must be channeled through a petition for review from a final order of removal, as per §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (D). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation aligns with other circuits, maintaining that general policy challenges are not precluded by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). View "NAGENDRA NAKKA V. USCIS" on Justia Law

Roy Scott, who was unarmed and in mental distress, called the police for help. Officers Kyle Smith and Theodore Huntsman from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department responded. Despite Scott complying with their orders and not being suspected of a crime, the officers used force to restrain him. Scott lost consciousness shortly after and was later pronounced dead. Scott’s daughter Rochelle and a representative of Scott’s estate sued the Department and the two officers, alleging violations of Scott’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and Rochelle’s Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The officers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the officers violated Scott’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court found that Scott was mentally ill, not suspected of a crime, and did not present a risk to officers or others, making the use of severe or deadly force constitutionally excessive. The court also held that Scott’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, referencing Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim.However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Rochelle’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court held that while the officers violated Rochelle’s right to familial association, that right was not clearly established at the time of the officers’ conduct, entitling the officers to qualified immunity on this claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "SCOTT V. SMITH" on Justia Law

The case involves individual falconers and the American Falconry Conservancy challenging state and federal regulations that require them to consent to unannounced, warrantless inspections as a condition for obtaining a falconry license. The plaintiffs argue that these regulations impose unconstitutional conditions on their right to obtain a license and violate the Fourth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury in fact because they had not been subjected to a warrantless inspection under the challenged regulations and had not shown that future inspections were imminent. The district court also found that the American Falconry Conservancy lacked associational standing because it did not allege that its members faced immediate or threatened injury from unannounced inspections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs' unconstitutional-conditions claim against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they were forced to choose between retaining their Fourth Amendment rights and obtaining a falconry license. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims against CDFW and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), finding that the plaintiffs' claims against FWS were unripe and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future injury to support their Fourth Amendment claims. The court also concluded that the American Falconry Conservancy had standing for its unconstitutional-conditions claim but not for its unannounced-inspection claim.The Ninth Circuit's main holding was that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the unconstitutional conditions imposed by CDFW but lacked standing for their other claims. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PETER STAVRIANOUDAKIS V. USFWS" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Alexander Behrend, a Work Practice Apprentice (WPA) at the San Francisco Zen Center, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Behrend, who lived and worked at the Center, performed various tasks including meditation, cleaning, cooking, and maintenance. He argued that his role was not ministerial because it involved mostly menial work and did not include teaching or leading the faith.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center. The court found that Behrend's role fell within the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment laws in relation to their ministers. The court determined that Behrend’s duties, although menial, were integral to the Center’s religious mission and practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to Behrend’s role as a WPA. The court emphasized that the exception is broad and includes roles that are essential to carrying out a religious organization’s mission, even if they do not involve teaching or leadership. The court concluded that Behrend’s work was a vital part of Zen training and practice, thus fitting within the ministerial exception. The court rejected Behrend’s argument that only those with key roles in preaching and transmitting the faith qualify for the exception, noting that precedent supports a broader application. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the application of the ministerial exception. View "BEHREND V. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including Palestinian NGOs, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans, sought to enjoin the U.S. President and senior officials from providing military, diplomatic, and financial support to Israel in its operations in Gaza. They alleged that the U.S. violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by being complicit in genocide through its support of Israel. The plaintiffs requested wide-ranging injunctive and declaratory relief to stop U.S. assistance to Israel and to influence Israel to cease its military actions in Gaza.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions. The court found that the issues were fundamentally political and not suitable for judicial resolution, as they involved decisions constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions under the political question doctrine. The court emphasized that decisions regarding military and diplomatic support to foreign nations are constitutionally committed to the executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that framing their claims as violations of legal duties circumvented the political question doctrine. The court concluded that the judiciary does not have the authority to make decisions on national security and foreign policy matters, which are the prerogatives of the political branches. The request for declaratory relief was also found to be non-justiciable for the same reasons. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "DEFENSE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL-PALESTINE V. BIDEN" on Justia Law

The case involves Keith Atherton, who pleaded guilty to one count of using or attempting to use a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. His plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with certain exceptions. Atherton was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 30 years. He appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing by relying on false or unreliable information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that a due process challenge to sentencing, like Atherton’s, falls within the appeal waiver limitation set forth in United States v. Wells, for “a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution.” The court rejected the government’s contention that the Wells exception is limited to constitutional claims targeting the substantive terms of the sentence.Reviewing for plain error, the court held that Atherton’s due process rights were not violated. The court concluded that Atherton did not demonstrate that it is clear or obvious that the challenged information was patently false or unreliable or that the court relied upon the information in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Atherton" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelo Corey Stackhouse, who was convicted of kidnapping a minor and transporting a person across state lines with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. Stackhouse kidnapped a 10-year-old girl, using a cellphone during the crime, and transported a 19-year-old woman from Montana to Denver, where he sexually assaulted her.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Montana convicted Stackhouse on all seven charges. He appealed his convictions for kidnapping a person under the age of 18 using a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and for the transportation of a person across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Stackhouse’s convictions. The court held that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone—an instrumentality of interstate commerce—in furtherance of the offense. The court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence of Stackhouse’s intent to commit sexual assault when he transported the victim of his assault across state lines. The court concluded that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone in furtherance of the offense, and that Stackhouse’s actions leading up to and during the trip to Denver established that he had the intent to commit illegal sexual activity when he transported the victim interstate. View "USA V. STACKHOUSE" on Justia Law