Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Heryford, Trinity County, California's District Attorney, sued American Bankers and others, on behalf of the people under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging they had “engaged in deceptive marketing and sales practices.” Private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL; only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties. The complaint listed private law firms as “Special Assistant District Attorneys.” An agreement required the Firms to “provide all legal services that are reasonably necessary,” and to “conduct negotiations and provide representations at all hearings, depositions, trials, appeals, and other appearances” with authority to control the performance of their work “under the direction of the District Attorney,” stating that Heryford’s office did “not relinquish its constitutional or statutory authority or responsibility” and retained “sole and final authority to initiate and settle.” Heryford retained the Firms on a contingency-fee basis. American Bankers challenged the contingency-fee agreement as a violation of its federal due process rights that gave the Firms “a direct and substantial financial stake in the imposition of civil penalties and restitution,” which “compromise[d] the integrity and fairness of the prosecutorial motive and the public’s faith in the judicial process.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Heryford’s retention of private counsel to pursue civil penalties cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a private relator’s pursuit of civil penalties under the qui tam provisions of the False Claim Act, an arrangement that does not violate due process. View "American Bankers Management Co. v. Heryford" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement as a civil detainee while awaiting the adjudication of an involuntary petition under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act violated substantive due process. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's confinement triggered both presumptions under Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931–35 (9th Cir. 2004), that the conditions of his civil detention amounted to punishment. In this case, sexually violent predator detainees in the Twin Towers Correctional Facility were subject to essentially the same conditions of confinement as their criminal counterparts, and conditions in the sexually violent predator unit in the facility were more restrictive than conditions at Coalinga State Hospital. The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages against the County and against the sheriff in his official capacity; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for damages against the sheriff in his individual capacity; and noted that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was moot because he died during the pendency of this appeal. View "King v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs filed suit against online retailer Zappos.com, alleging that they were harmed by hacking of their accounts. The panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs also alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit identity fraud or identity theft. The panel explained that it assessed standing at the time the complaints were filed, not as of the present. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the risk of future harm was fairly traceable to the conduct being challenged and that their identity theft injury was redressable. The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs filed suit against online retailer Zappos.com, alleging that they were harmed by hacking of their accounts. The panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs also alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit identity fraud or identity theft. The panel explained that it assessed standing at the time the complaints were filed, not as of the present. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the risk of future harm was fairly traceable to the conduct being challenged and that their identity theft injury was redressable. The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law