Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they forced their way into his home without a warrant, threw him to the ground and then tasered and arrested him. In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search was unreasonable as to a defendant who was physically present and expressly refused consent to entry. The panel held that Randolph closely paralleled this case, and the warrantless entry into plaintiff's home violated the Fourth Amendment because none of the lawful exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bonivert v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a pretrial release officer improperly procured a warrant for plaintiff's arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. The panel held that the officer was not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity for a defective arrest warrant where, given the similarities between his role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, his action in submitting the bare unsigned warrant should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge. View "Patterson v. Van Arsdel" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion affirming the district court's judgment denying a habeas corpus petition where petitioner sought a custody redetermination as he awaited the outcome of administrative proceedings to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of returning to his native country of El Salvador. The panel held that reinstated removal orders were administratively final for detention purposes, and that the detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders was governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), rather than section 1226(a). Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing. View "Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action challenging plaintiffs' exclusion from an enforcement zone set up around a Border Patrol checkpoint area near their homes in rural Arizona. In this case, the district court entered summary judgment before any discovery had occurred. The panel held that the limited record before the district court did not permit the panel to conclude, as a matter of law, that the enforcement zone was a nonpublic forum or, if it was, that the government satisfied the requirements for excluding plaintiffs from that nonpublic forum. On remand, and after appropriate discovery, the panel noted that the district court will need to determine if there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether, and what part of, the enforcement zone was a public forum, and whether the government's exclusion policy was permissible under the principles of forum analysis. View "Jacobson v. USDHS" on Justia Law

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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did not require the district court to abstain from hearing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of pretrial detention in state court. The Ninth Circuit held that the State has acted in good faith throughout this litigation with respect to the substantive merits of petitioner's claim; petitioner's case fell within the irreparable harm exception to Younger where he has been incarcerated for over six months without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing; and petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies as to his bail hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, providing that the writ issue unless the California Superior Court conducts a new constitutionally compliant bail hearing within fourteen days after the issuance of the district court's order conditionally granting the petition. View "Arevalo v. Hennessy" on Justia Law

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The administrative exhaustion requirement justifies tolling the statute of limitations, but it does not justify creating a new accrual rule. The potential unfairness of limitations running during exhaustion is better addressed by equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging excessive force and sexual assault claims against ten Arizona Department of Corrections officers. The panel held that plaintiff's claims accrued when the alleged assault occurred in 2010 because he knew of his injuries at that time; equitable tolling was not applicable in this case where neither his 2014 complaint allegations, his sworn affidavits, nor the letters and grievances he wrote from 2010 to 2014, provide competent summary judgment evidence that he took any steps to inquire into the delay in hearing from the Criminal Investigation Unit for nearly four years; and thus plaintiff's claims were time-barred. View "Soto v. Sweetman" on Justia Law