Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied an application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition in federal district court based on a Brady v. Maryland claim. The panel held that petitioner failed to show that he exercised due diligence in failing to discover the evidence at issue before he filed his habeas petition. Therefore, the application was denied under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). The panel also held that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty had the new evidence been known at trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). View "Solorio, Jr. v. Muniz" on Justia Law

The proper standard for determining which employees have the power to establish an entity's "official policy" under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 34 U.S.C. 12601 is the standard that governs under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in an action brought to halt racially discriminatory policing policies concerning traffic stops instituted by Joseph Arpaio, the former Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona. The panel held that Arpaio acted as a final policymaker for the County; the County was liable for violations of Title VI and section 12601 stemming from its own official policies; and Arpaio adopted the racially discriminatory traffic-stop policies at issue, he acted as a final policymaker for the County, and the district court correctly held the County liable for the violations of Title VI and section 12601 caused by those policies. The panel also held that the district court properly applied issue preclusion to bar the County from relitigating the lawfulness of Arpaio's traffic-stop policies in light of prior adverse findings in Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012). View "United States v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining California Department of Public Health officials from enforcing the California Medical Waste Management Act (MWMA). The preliminary injunction enjoined Department officials from enforcing the Act on Daniels for the manner in which it disposed of medical waste at facilities outside of the State of California. The panel held that Daniels will likely succeed on the merits of its dormant Commerce Clause claim. Furthermore, the panel held that Department officials were entitled to qualified immunity because Daniels' constitutional rights under the dormant Commerce Clause were not clearly established at the time of the violation. Therefore, the panel reversed the denial of Department officials' motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. View "Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging the warrantless seizure of 18 pigeons, a crow, and a seagull. All 18 pigeons were subsequently euthanized. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the officers and dismissal of the state law claims; vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim challenging the seizure of the birds because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff's healthy-looking birds posed any meaningful risk to the other birds or humans at the time they were seized; instructed the district court to consider in the first instance whether the officers were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because any constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time it was committed; and vacated summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the city and instructed the district court to consider in the first instance whether plaintiff should be allowed to add a new theory of Monell liability at this stage in the proceedings. View "Recchia v. Los Angeles Department of Animal Services" on Justia Law

After a pretrial detainee passed away, his successor-in-interest filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of the decedent's right to adequate medical care under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit held that, given developments in Section 1983 jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), and the panel's en banc decision in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016), the proper standard of review for such claims was one of objective indifference, not subjective indifference. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gordon v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The 90-day period referenced in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) begins when the aggrieved person is given notice of the right to sue by the EEOC. Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, GME, ultimately alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's Title VII claims may be based on alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge only to the extent such acts are part of a single unlawful employment practice. In this case plaintiff's claims based on her first administrative charge were timely, but claims based on a second administrative charge were untimely. The panel explained that plaintiff could base her Title VII claims on GME's alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge to the extent she could show such acts were part of a single hostile work environment claim. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment only as to claims based on discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring after plaintiff filed her first administrative charge. The panel otherwise reversed and remanded. View "Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by the owner of a mobile home park alleging that the City engaged in an unconstitutional taking. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated the Fifth Amendment when it approved a lower rent increase than he had requested. The panel applied the factors in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and held that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to create a triable question of fact as to the economic impact caused by the City's denial of larger rent increases; plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence supporting its investment-backed expectations claim; and the character of the City's action could not be characterized as a physical invasion by the government. Based on the evidence, the panel held that no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the denials of plaintiff's requested rent increases were the functional equivalent of a direct appropriation of the property. View "Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County and two deputy sheriffs after plaintiff was shot during the deputies' response to a 911 call. When the deputies arrived at plaintiff's apartment, plaintiff answered the door holding a large knife. Although the jury's verdict that Deputy Rose violated plaintiff's right to be free from excessive force was sufficient to deny him qualified immunity under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the panel held that plaintiff failed to identify any sufficiently analogous cases showing that under similar circumstances a clearly established Fourth Amendment right against the use of deadly force existed at the time of the shooting. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's ruling that Deputy Rose was entitled to qualified immunity. The panel held that the district court erroneously concluded that the California Bane Act required a separate showing of coercion beyond that inherent in the use of force. The panel held that the Bane Act required a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right and that no reasonable jury in this case could find that the deputy had a specific intent to violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded this claim for a new trial. Finally, the panel addressed claims in defendants' cross-appeal. View "Reese v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Honolulu police obtained a warrant to open a suspicious package, intercepted at the UPS facility; it contained 500 packets labeled “bath salts” and “Spike Max.” Initial testing indicated but did not confirm that they contained methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), which was illegal in Hawaii. Six days later, the police made a controlled delivery to Smith’s home. After taking the delivery, Smith was arrested without a warrant. Hours later, the police effected controlled buys of MDPV at stores Smith owned. They seized evidence from the house and the stores. Later that day, an officer completed a sworn application; a state judicial determination of probable cause for extended restraint was signed on the second day following the arrest. The police received a lab report that confirmed that the substances were MDPV and informed Smith of his rights. Smith did not provide a statement and was released. Smith was never prosecuted. Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. During jury deliberations, the court received an emergency phone call indicating that the foreperson had physically threatened another juror. After individual interviews, both attorneys stipulated to the dismissal of one juror. The jury then deliberated for four hours with six, instead of seven, jurors, returning a verdict that rejected Smith's claim of unreasonable detention. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s arguments that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and that misconduct by defense counsel and witnesses painted Smith as a “bad guy.” View "Smith v. City & County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of California Revenue and Tax Code 19195, which establishes a public list of the top 500 delinquent state taxpayers, and California Business and Professions Code 494.5, which provides for suspension of the driver's license of anyone on the top 500 list. The panel held that taxpayer was not deprived of procedural due process and rejected taxpayer's claim that he had an inadequate opportunity to be heard prior to license revocation; taxpayer was not deprived of substantive due process and the panel rejected his claims that the statutory scheme impermissibly burdened his right to choose a profession and that the scheme was retroactive; taxpayer's equal protection claim failed because there was a rational basis for state action against a citizen for failing to pay two years' worth of past-due taxes; and the panel rejected taxpayer's claim that the combined effect of the challenged statutes was to single out the largest 500 tax debtors for legislative punishment, amounting to a bill of attainder View "Franceschi v. Yee" on Justia Law