Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit issued an order amending Judge N.R. Smith's separate opinion, denying a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordering that no petitions for panel rehearing or further petitions for rehearing en banc shall be entertained.In his amended separate opinion, Judge Smith explained that the court had neither jurisdiction nor authority to hear this case because plaintiffs failed to file their notice of appeal within thirty days of the judgment. The majority of the panel, however, believed that there was jurisdiction and authority to hear the case, and Judge Smith agreed with the per curiam opinion's resolution of the merits. View "Demaree v. Pederson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment for the Department and held that the Department did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause in adopting Medi-Cal policies related to reimbursement to out-of-state hospitals. The panel held that when a state was acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, its decisions were exempted from the dormant Commerce Clause. In this case, the Department sets rates of reimbursement to hospitals for those who were essentially insured as beneficiaries under Medi-Cal in a manner much like that of a private insurer participating in the market. Therefore, the Department was acting as a market participant, rather than a regulator and was exempt from dormant Commerce Clause requirements. View "Asante v. California Department of Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights by police officers during a traffic stop. The panel disagreed with the district court that plaintiff's allegation that the officers "beat the crap out of" him was too vague and conclusory to support a legally cognizable claim. The panel explained that plaintiff's use of a colloquial, shorthand phrase makes plain that plaintiff was alleging that the officers' use of force was unreasonably excessive. The panel also held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not bar plaintiff's other claims. View "Byrd v. Phoenix Police Department" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights by police officers during a traffic stop. The panel disagreed with the district court that plaintiff's allegation that the officers "beat the crap out of" him was too vague and conclusory to support a legally cognizable claim. The panel explained that plaintiff's use of a colloquial, shorthand phrase makes plain that plaintiff was alleging that the officers' use of force was unreasonably excessive. The panel also held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not bar plaintiff's other claims. View "Byrd v. Phoenix Police Department" on Justia Law

Heryford, Trinity County, California's District Attorney, sued American Bankers and others, on behalf of the people under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging they had “engaged in deceptive marketing and sales practices.” Private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL; only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties. The complaint listed private law firms as “Special Assistant District Attorneys.” An agreement required the Firms to “provide all legal services that are reasonably necessary,” and to “conduct negotiations and provide representations at all hearings, depositions, trials, appeals, and other appearances” with authority to control the performance of their work “under the direction of the District Attorney,” stating that Heryford’s office did “not relinquish its constitutional or statutory authority or responsibility” and retained “sole and final authority to initiate and settle.” Heryford retained the Firms on a contingency-fee basis. American Bankers challenged the contingency-fee agreement as a violation of its federal due process rights that gave the Firms “a direct and substantial financial stake in the imposition of civil penalties and restitution,” which “compromise[d] the integrity and fairness of the prosecutorial motive and the public’s faith in the judicial process.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Heryford’s retention of private counsel to pursue civil penalties cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a private relator’s pursuit of civil penalties under the qui tam provisions of the False Claim Act, an arrangement that does not violate due process. View "American Bankers Management Co. v. Heryford" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement as a civil detainee while awaiting the adjudication of an involuntary petition under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act violated substantive due process. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's confinement triggered both presumptions under Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931–35 (9th Cir. 2004), that the conditions of his civil detention amounted to punishment. In this case, sexually violent predator detainees in the Twin Towers Correctional Facility were subject to essentially the same conditions of confinement as their criminal counterparts, and conditions in the sexually violent predator unit in the facility were more restrictive than conditions at Coalinga State Hospital. The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages against the County and against the sheriff in his official capacity; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for damages against the sheriff in his individual capacity; and noted that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was moot because he died during the pendency of this appeal. View "King v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs filed suit against online retailer Zappos.com, alleging that they were harmed by hacking of their accounts. The panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs also alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit identity fraud or identity theft. The panel explained that it assessed standing at the time the complaints were filed, not as of the present. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the risk of future harm was fairly traceable to the conduct being challenged and that their identity theft injury was redressable. The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs filed suit against online retailer Zappos.com, alleging that they were harmed by hacking of their accounts. The panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs also alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit identity fraud or identity theft. The panel explained that it assessed standing at the time the complaints were filed, not as of the present. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the risk of future harm was fairly traceable to the conduct being challenged and that their identity theft injury was redressable. The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc." on Justia Law