Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they forced their way into his home without a warrant, threw him to the ground and then tasered and arrested him. In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search was unreasonable as to a defendant who was physically present and expressly refused consent to entry. The panel held that Randolph closely paralleled this case, and the warrantless entry into plaintiff's home violated the Fourth Amendment because none of the lawful exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bonivert v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a pretrial release officer improperly procured a warrant for plaintiff's arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. The panel held that the officer was not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity for a defective arrest warrant where, given the similarities between his role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, his action in submitting the bare unsigned warrant should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge. View "Patterson v. Van Arsdel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law