Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank, alleging federal and state law claims arising out of the modification of the deed of trust for plaintiffs' home. At issue is the retroactivity of 15 U.S.C.1641(g), a 2009 amendment to the 1968 Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Section 1641(g) requires a creditor who obtains a mortgage loan by sale or transfer to notify the borrower of the transfer in writing. The court held that section 1641(g) does not apply retroactively because Congress did not express a clear intent to do so. The court noted that its holding is consistent with numerous district court decisions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Talaie v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a debt collector, alleging that by sending a collection letter that sought ten percent interest on a debt, defendant violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(f)(1) and thereby violated California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the Rosenthal Act), Cal. Civ. Code 1788-1788.33. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that defendant's debt collection letter did not violate the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act where the district court's grant of summary judgment was based on an incorrect reading of California Civil Code section 3287. The court concluded that section 3287(a) can entitle a creditor to prejudgment interest on a debt that is certain or capable of being made certain even without a prior judgment. View "Diaz v. Kubler Corp." on Justia Law

In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants’ “natural” cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs’ other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a false advertising lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson and McNeil Nutritionals, LLC (collectively, McNeil) challenging several of McNeil’s assertions about its product, Benecol, a vegetable oil-based spread. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that McNeil’s claims about its product were not authorized under the FDA’s regulations and were false. Plaintiff asserted claims for relief on behalf of a putative class of Benecol purchasers under California’s Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The district court granted McNeil’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to plead reasonable reliance on any misrepresentations and that Plaintiff’s claims for relief were preempted under federal law. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to challenge McNeil’s statements; (2) Plaintiff’s claims for relief were not preempted to the extent they were predicated on McNeil’s statements about trans fat, and a certain FDA letter was not entitled to preemptive effect; and (3) Plaintiff’s action was not barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Remanded. View "Reid v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class of consumers whose Touchpad orders had been cancelled, alleging that Barnes & Noble had engaged in deceptive business practices and false advertising. On appeal, Barnes & Noble challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration against plaintiff under the arbitration agreement contained in its website's Terms of Use. The court held that there was no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the agreement. The court also held that where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on - without more - is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the court concluded that there is nothing in the record to suggest that those browsewrap terms at issue are enforceable by or against plaintiff, much less why they should give rise to constructive notice of Barnes & Noble's browsewrap terms. In light of the distinguishing facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Barnes & Noble's estoppel argument. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had insufficient notice of Barnes & Noble's Terms of Use, and thus did not enter into an arbitration agreement. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her consumer rights claim under section 480-2 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (UDAP claim). The court concluded that district courts evaluating whether a borrower's complaint states a claim under sections 480-2 and 480-13 against a lender need only address whether the complaint adequately alleges that the lender used unfair or deceptive acts in its relationship with the borrower, without looking to negligence law to determine whether the lender breached a common law duty of care; rather than requiring proof of a common law duty of care, section 480-2 is better interpreted as imposing a statutory duty on lenders not to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce; and, given Hawaii's low bar for showing damages, the court concluded that for the purpose of a motion to dismiss plaintiff's allegations that BAC's deceptive conduct caused her to waste two years of effort and incur multiple transaction costs were sufficient to state an injury that caused damages. Therefore, plaintiff has alleged a UDAP claim and the court reversed the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Compton v. Countrywide Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., alleging that defendants made false representations to him in connection with their efforts to collect a purported debt. Plaintiff claimed that defendants violated the FDCPA by misidentifying his original creditor in a series of collection letters sent to him, as well as in a complaint filed against him in state court. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing where plaintiff alleged that he suffered the violation of his right not to be the target of misleading debt collection miscommunications. The court also concluded that plaintiff had statutory standing under the FDCPA. The court concluded that Nelson & Kennard violated the FDCPA by including misleading references to American Investment Bank in both its letter to plaintiff and in the state court complaint it filed against him. These conclusions were sufficient to warrant both reversal of the judgment granted to Nelson & Kennard and entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a putative class action alleging violations of California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, Cal. Civ. Code 1747.08. The Act prohibits retailers from collecting personal identification information in connection with credit card transactions. Plaintiffs alleged that Redbox violated the Act by imposing that customers using credit cards provide their ZIP codes to obtain discs from Redbox kiosks. The court concluded that Redbox's alleged conduct does not violate the Act where the statute exempts certain transactions, including those where "the credit card is being used as a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or similar occurrence." Accordingly, the court dismissed the action. View "Sinibaldi v. Redbox" on Justia Law