Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class of consumers whose Touchpad orders had been cancelled, alleging that Barnes & Noble had engaged in deceptive business practices and false advertising. On appeal, Barnes & Noble challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration against plaintiff under the arbitration agreement contained in its website's Terms of Use. The court held that there was no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the agreement. The court also held that where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on - without more - is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the court concluded that there is nothing in the record to suggest that those browsewrap terms at issue are enforceable by or against plaintiff, much less why they should give rise to constructive notice of Barnes & Noble's browsewrap terms. In light of the distinguishing facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Barnes & Noble's estoppel argument. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had insufficient notice of Barnes & Noble's Terms of Use, and thus did not enter into an arbitration agreement. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her consumer rights claim under section 480-2 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (UDAP claim). The court concluded that district courts evaluating whether a borrower's complaint states a claim under sections 480-2 and 480-13 against a lender need only address whether the complaint adequately alleges that the lender used unfair or deceptive acts in its relationship with the borrower, without looking to negligence law to determine whether the lender breached a common law duty of care; rather than requiring proof of a common law duty of care, section 480-2 is better interpreted as imposing a statutory duty on lenders not to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce; and, given Hawaii's low bar for showing damages, the court concluded that for the purpose of a motion to dismiss plaintiff's allegations that BAC's deceptive conduct caused her to waste two years of effort and incur multiple transaction costs were sufficient to state an injury that caused damages. Therefore, plaintiff has alleged a UDAP claim and the court reversed the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Compton v. Countrywide Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., alleging that defendants made false representations to him in connection with their efforts to collect a purported debt. Plaintiff claimed that defendants violated the FDCPA by misidentifying his original creditor in a series of collection letters sent to him, as well as in a complaint filed against him in state court. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing where plaintiff alleged that he suffered the violation of his right not to be the target of misleading debt collection miscommunications. The court also concluded that plaintiff had statutory standing under the FDCPA. The court concluded that Nelson & Kennard violated the FDCPA by including misleading references to American Investment Bank in both its letter to plaintiff and in the state court complaint it filed against him. These conclusions were sufficient to warrant both reversal of the judgment granted to Nelson & Kennard and entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a putative class action alleging violations of California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, Cal. Civ. Code 1747.08. The Act prohibits retailers from collecting personal identification information in connection with credit card transactions. Plaintiffs alleged that Redbox violated the Act by imposing that customers using credit cards provide their ZIP codes to obtain discs from Redbox kiosks. The court concluded that Redbox's alleged conduct does not violate the Act where the statute exempts certain transactions, including those where "the credit card is being used as a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or similar occurrence." Accordingly, the court dismissed the action. View "Sinibaldi v. Redbox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his putative class action alleging that ebay.com's Automatic Bidding system breached two provisions of eBay's User Agreement, violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code 17204, and constituted intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for breach of contract where the two provisions at issue in the User Agreement did not constitute an enforceable promise by eBay. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the UCL where, even if the User Agreement had represented that eBay would directly transmit bids to sellers, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he relied on this representation. Moreover, since a reasonable person in plaintiff's position could not have relied on such a representation, it would not have been material. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to set forth a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Block v. Ebay, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against FreeScore under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that FreeScore was not a "credit repair organization" as defined in the CROA. The court held, however, that FreeScore was a credit repair organization because FreeScore, through the representations it made on its website and in its television advertising, offered a service, in return for the payment of money, for the implied purpose of providing advice or assistance to consumers with regard to improving the consumer's credit record, history, or rating. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stout v. FreeScore, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Spokeo, operator of a website that provides users with information about other individuals, for willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Because the district court had neither been divested of jurisdiction nor submitted this case to the jury, it was free to reconsider its own prior ruling. Therefore, the court concluded that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not limit the district court in its final order. The court also concluded that alleged violations of plaintiff's statutory rights were sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III, and plaintiff had adequately pled causation and redressability. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal, concluding that plaintiff adequately alleged Article III standing. View "Robins v. Spokeo, Inc." on Justia Law

Experience Hendrix filed suit against Pitsicalis alleging that Pitsicalis was infringing trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, and that the trademark infringement also amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice proscribed by Washington's Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.010-19.86.920. Determining that Pitsicalis had Article III standing, the court concluded, inter alia, that the WPRA was constitutional as applied to the narrow set of non-speculative circumstances at issue in this case; Pitsicalis was liable under the Lanham Act for using domain names that infringed Experience Hendrix's trademark "Hendrix"; and Paragraph 5 of the permanent injunction failed to state clearly the terms of the injunction and did not describe in reasonable detail the acts that were and were not restrained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that the Washington statute was unconstitutional and remanded Pitsicalis's declaratory judgment claims pertaining to the WPRA with instructions to enter judgment on those claims in favor of Experience Hendrix; affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment on Experience Hendrix's claim that Pitsicalis's use of domain names infringed Experience Hendrix's mark; vacated the permanent injunction and remanded so the district court could revise the language at issue; reversed the Rule 50(b)(3) decision to strike most of the jury's award of damages under both the Lanham Act and the WPRA; affirmed the district court's order granting a new trial on damages under both statutes; remanded for a new trial on such damages; vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees under the WCPA; and remanded the fee request for further proceedings. View "Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com" on Justia Law