Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a class action, any settlement must be approved by the court to ensure that class counsel and the named plaintiffs do not place their own interests above those of the absent class members. In this false advertising case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a class action settlement, negotiated prior to class certification, that included cy pres distributions of money and food to unidentified charities. The settlement also included $2 million in attorneys' fees, the equivalent of a $2,100 hourly rate, while offering class members a sum of $15. The Court set aside the class settlement, holding (1) the district court did not apply the correct legal standards governing cy pres distributions and thus abused its discretion in approving the settlement; and (2) the settlement failed because the negotiated attorneys' fees were excessive. Remanded. View "Dennis v. Berg" on Justia Law

At issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was whether an adverse claim to a stake may be so lacking in substance that a neutral stakeholder cannot interplead in good faith. Interpleader is proper when a stakeholder has at least a good faith belief that there are conflicting colorable claims. Appellee in this case was an insurance company that sought to interplead disputed insurance proceeds. Seeking to interplead the insurance funds, Appellee filed a counterclaim against Appellant and a third party complaint against Appellant's former husband. The district court found that interpleader was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee interpleaded in good faith, and consequently, the district court's judgment in interpleader was proper. View "Michelman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against Rearden Commerce, asserting numerous claims related to a conflict between the parties' marks and names. The district court granted Rearden Commerce's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' trademark-related claims. Specifically, the district court found Rearden Commerce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellants' claims of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, common law trademark infringement, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Rearden Commerce. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against defendants, a debt-collection law firm and Dean Prober, Esq. (collectively, Prober), after Prober sought to collect a debt plaintiff owed to Prober's client. Plaintiff alleged that Prober's debt collection letter did not comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., or its state equivalent, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1788 et seq., namely by impermissibly requiring her to dispute her debt in writing and, as a result, misrepresenting her rights to dispute her debt. Assuming without deciding that Prober's notice could be understood implicitly to require written disputes, the court held that a validation notice violated section 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA only where it expressly required a consumer to dispute her debt in writing.

Pom challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's Pomegranate Blueberry beverage, claiming that Coca-Cola violated the false-advertising provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and that Coca-Cola violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof'l Code 17200 et seq., and its False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof'l Code 17500 et seq. The district court partially granted Coca-Cola's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment to the extent it barred Pom's Lanham Act claim with respect to Pomegranate Blueberry's name and labeling. The court vacated the summary judgment to the extent it ruled that Pom lacked statutory standing on its UCL and FAL claims; the court remanded so that the district court could rule on the state claims.

Plaintiffs brought several state causes of action in Arizona state court against Medtronic for injuries sustained by Richard Stengel from his use of a pain pump manufactured by Medtronic. Medtronic timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law. The court held that even if some of plaintiffs' claims could be interpreted to escape express preemption, they could not be interpreted to escape implied preemption. Therefore, the district court correctly held that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was futile and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13.

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules.

Skydive Arizona sued SKYRIDE for false advertising, trademark infringement, and cybersquatting. SKYRIDE subsequently appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, the jury's actual damages and profits awards, and the district court's damages enhancement. Skydive Arizona cross-appealed the district court's limitation of the permanent injunction to Skydive Arizona, and sought a nationwide injunction against SKYRIDE. The court reversed with regard to the district court's doubling of actual damages, and reinstated the jury's original actual damages award for false advertising, and for trademark infringement. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims. Thus, as modified in actual damages for false advertising, $2.5 million in actual damages for trademark infringement, $2,500,004 in lost profits for trademark infringement, and $600,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and modified in part.

Defendants, ICC and Charles D. Hendrickson, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the district court's orders granting three of plaintiff's post-summary judgment motions. The court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment under Rule 56 where the district court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact but that ICC had violated the FDCPA and that Hendrickson was personally liable as ICC's sole owner, officer, and director because he qualified as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA. The notice of appeal was untimely filed as to the latter three post-summary judgment orders and were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.