Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their second amended complaint alleging that HP concealed a design defect in its Pavilion Notebook computers that manifested after the expiration of the warranty and created an unreasonable safety hazard in violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq., and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq. The court found that the district court did not err in requiring plaintiffs to allege the existence of an unreasonable safety defect and that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the existence of an unreasonably safety defect or HP's knowledge of a defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sought rescission of her loan secured by a trust deed with the Bank for alleged violations of disclosure requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because it was filed after the three-year period set by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). Plaintiff argued that because she gave the Bank timely notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-year period, and the district court erred in dismissing the case. The court held that, under the court's precedent and Supreme Court precedent, the time limit established by section 1635(f) was applicable here. Moreover, as explained in Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., section 1635(f) was a three-year statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more than three years after the consummation of the loan secured by the first trust deed, regardless of when the borrower sent notice of rescission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Honda appealed the district court's decision to certify a nationwide class of all consumers who purchased or leased Acura RLs equipped with a Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) during a 3 year period under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs alleged that certain advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and omitted material information on its limitations. The court held that the district court erred because it erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class, and because it erroneously concluded that all consumers who purchased or leased the Acura RL could be presumed to have relied on defendant's advertisements, which allegedly were misleading and omitted material information. Accordingly, the court vacated the class certification order.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Burger King, raising claims under Oregon law for product liability, negligence, and vicarious liability after plaintiff discovered that a Burger King employee had spit into his Whopper. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a final judgment on the pleadings dismissing his diversity action against defendants. This order certified to the Supreme Court of Washington the dispositive and unsettled question of Washington state law at issue in this appeal, namely, whether the Washington Products Liability Act (WPLA), Wash. Rev. Code 7.72.010, permitted relief for emotional distress damages, in the absence of physical injury to the plaintiff purchaser, caused by being served and touching, but not consuming a contaminated food product.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, among other things, a violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court subsequently granted defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and plaintiffs timely appealed. The court held that plaintiffs clearly alleged in their complaint that they were never given a Notice of Right to Cancel that complied with TILA. Consequently, the complaint was not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

The Attorneys General of Washington and California filed parens patriae actions in their states' courts alleging that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) panels, and that state agencies and consumers were injured by paying inflated prices for products containing TFT-LCD panels. At issue was whether parens patriae actions filed by state Attorneys General constituted class actions within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court held that under the plain text of section 1332(d), the parens patriae suits were not class actions within the meaning of CAFA. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the actions and properly remanded them to state court. Given this conclusion, the court need not, reach any other issue raised by the party.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's decision, on summary judgment, that letters sent by appellant to nearly 40,000 California residents constituted "false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]... in connection with the collection of any debt" in violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Appellant also appealed the jury's award of statutory damages under both the FDCPA and California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act), California Civil Code 1788, et seq. The court held that the letters, which misleadingly implied that appellant had the ability to report obsolete debts to credit bureaus, and impliedly threatened to make such reports, violated section 1692e(5) and e(10) of the FDCPA. The court recognized that the FDCPA did not pre-empt consistent state action, including cumulative recovery of statutory damages under state law. The court also held that the Rosenthal Act's remedies were cumulative, and available even when the FDCPA afforded relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Plaintiffs, individual homeowners, sued defendants, some of the nation's largest housing developers, seeking damages, attorneys fees and costs, and the option to rescind their home purchases due to defendants' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of California law. At issue was whether plaintiffs, who purchased homes in new developments, had standing to sue defendants for injuries allegedly caused by defendants' practice of marketing neighboring homes to individuals who presented a high risk of foreclosure and abandonment of their homes, financing those high-risk buyers, concealing that information, and misrepresenting the character of the neighborhoods. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' overpayment and rescission claims for lack of Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs' decreased economic value and desirability were cognizable injuries. While the court agreed with the district court that, on the current record, plaintiffs have not established a sufficient causal connection between any decreased value and desirability and defendants' actions, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Dealership and Porsche when the pre-owned car that she purchased from the Dealership developed serious mechanical problems during the warranty period and the Dealership refused to honor her warranty claims. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., and breach of contract and unconscionability under California law. The district court granted the Dealership's petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in the sales contract that plaintiff signed when she bought the car and stayed the action against Porsche. Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal was that the MMWA barred the provision mandating pre-dispute binding arbitration of her warranty claims against the Dealership. Although the text of the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration, Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority under the statue to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC construed the MMWA as barring pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements and issued a rule prohibiting judicial enforcement of such provisions with respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA. Because it was required to defer to the reasonable construction of a statute by the agency that Congress had authorized to interpret it, the court held that the MMWA precluded enforcement of pre-dispute agreements such as Porsche's that required mandatory binding arbitration of consumer warranty claims. The court declined to address plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.