Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against manufacturers of dry cleaning equipment brought, inter alia, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly held that plaintiffs' allegations that the manufacturers contributed to waste disposal, by the design of machines that generated waste and by the instructions they gave on use of these machines, were insufficient as a matter of law to support a civil action under the RCRA because all of the manufacturers' alleged contributions were passive. The court held that to state a claim predicated on RCRA liability for "contributing to" the disposal of hazardous waste, a plaintiff must allege that defendant had a measure of control over the waste at the time of its disposal or was otherwise actively involved in the waste disposal process. Mere design of equipment that generated waste, which was then improperly discarded by others, was not sufficient. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that "contribution" required more active involvement than was alleged as to the manufacturers.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss where plaintiff claimed that defendant violated a section of California's Rees-Levering Act (Act), Cal. Civ. Code 2983.2(a), which required a car loan lender to provide certain post-repossession notices to a defaulting borrower prior to selling the repossessed car. At issue was whether the Act's notice requirements were preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 C.F.R. 7.4008, and its regulations. The court held that because the Act sections at issue were directed toward debt collection and were therefore not preempted by the NBA, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs claimed that defendants, owners and managers of a for-profit website called DMV.org, violated federal and state unfair competition and false advertising laws by actively fostering the belief that DMV.org was an official state DMV website, or was affiliated or endorsed by a state DMV. The district court held that defendants violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), but rejected plaintiffs' claim under California's unfair competition statute. The district court issued an injunction ordering DMV.org to present every site visitor with a splash screen bearing a disclaimer and denied monetary relief and an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Both sides appealed. The court held that plaintiffs had established sufficient injury for Article III standing and that plaintiffs had met both prongs of the test in Jack Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v. American Kennel Club, Inc. for Lanham Act standing. The court held that the district court committed no error in holding that defendants violated the Lanham Act but remanded for the district court to reconsider the duration of the splash screen in light of any intervening changes in the website's content and marketing practices, as well as the dissipation of the deception resulting from past practices. The court held that the district court did not err in denying damages. The court held that because the district court erred in finding that defendants'c conduct was not exceptional and that plaintiffs had unclean hands, its denial of attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the award of attorney's fees anew. The court held that the district court's findings that defendants were jointly and severally liable were not clearly erroneous. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold DMV.org in contempt for technical breaches of the injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions.

Plaintiffs, a putative class of retail cable and satellite television subscribers, brought suit against television programmers and distributors alleging that programmers' practice of selling multi-channel cable packages violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. At issue was whether the district court properly granted programmers' and distributors' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' third amended complaint with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to allege any cognizable injury to competition. The court held that the complaint's allegations of reduced choice increased prices addressed only the element of antitrust injury, but not whether plaintiffs have satisfied the pleading standard for an actual violation. Therefore, absent any allegations of an injury to competition, the court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff purchased travel arrangements through Expedia, Inc.'s ("Expedia") website and Expedia emailed him a receipt, which included the expiration date of his credit card. Plaintiff claimed that this email receipt violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., in part to combat identity theft. At issue was the meaning of the words "print" and "electronically printed" under FACTA, in connection with an email receipt. The court held that "print" referred to many different technologies, all of which involve the making of tangible impression on paper or other tangible medium. The court also held that a receipt, under FACTA that was transmitted to the consumer via email and then digitally displayed on the consumer's screen was not an "electronically printed" receipt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of owners and lessors of 2007 model year and older Volkswagen and Audi vehicles, alleged that defendant, Volkswagen of America, Inc., limited the availability of replacement vehicle keys and failed to sufficiently disclose information about the potential difficulty and expense of obtaining such replacements. At issue was whether objector-appellant had Article III standing to appeal a settlement agreement between the parties. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and held that objector-appellant, who expressly disavowed any financial interest in the fee defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff's counsel, failed to demonstrate how he had suffered injury as a result of the fee order.

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Westwood Apex, a subsidiary entity of Westwood College, filed a breach of contract action against defendant to recover an unpaid student loan in San Bernardino County Superior Court. Defendant, a former Westwood College student, filed a class action counterclaim alleging that Westwood Apex and Westwood College committed fraud and engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices in connection with their operation of the college. Westwood College subsequently filed a notice of removal in the Central District of California. At issue was whether section 5 of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), allowed a party joined to an action as a defendant to a counterclaim, an additional counterclaim defendant, to remove the case to federal court. The court held that section 1453(b) did not permit additional counterclaim defendants to remove an action to federal court and therefore, affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state courts.

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their putative class action asserting antitrust claims against defendants where plaintiffs alleged that the fares they paid for airline tickets were unlawfully excessive and in violation of both state and federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. At issue was whether plaintiffs' state law claims were properly dismissed; whether the court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal claims; and whether the court had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order governing the pretrial coordination of pending cases in the same multidistrict litigation. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims and held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713, preempted state regulations of foreign air carriers. The court also held that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal antitrust claims where the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to plaintiffs' motion by denying leave to amend on the basis of the court's prior case management order. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order where these decisions did not represent final judgments.

Plaintiffs, various tenants of Norton Community Apartments, L.P. ("Norton"), sued Norton over rent disputes and other claims. At issue was whether International Realty & Investments, Inc. ("International Realty"), the agent appointed by a receiver to manage and collect rents on the Norton property, was a debt collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("Act"). Also at issue was whether the district court's sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel for filing multiple identical actions and the district court's award of attorneys' fees to defendant for opposing plaintiffs' disqualification motions was an abuse of discretion. The court held that International Realty, as the residential property manager in this case, was not a debt collector because it acquired the debt before default and thus exempted it, as the manager, from the Act. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs' counsel where plaintiffs' counsel filed nine separate but identical actions for alleged violations of the Act and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions where there was no legal basis for the motion to disqualify defense counsel.