Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against NoteWorld alleging, among other things, violations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and Washington state law. At issue on appeal was whether an entity could compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause in a contract to which it was not a party. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that NoteWorld was not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary or through equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court need not decide any other question on appeal and affirmed the judgment. View "Rajagopalan v. NoteWorld, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed separate copyright infringement suits against defendants for posting articles from the Las Vegas Review-Journal online without authorization. In consolidated appeals, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff lacked standing in both cases because agreements assigning plaintiff the bare right to sue for infringement did not transfer any associated exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq. Because plaintiff lacked standing, the court also concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the fair use claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the motions to dismiss in both cases, but vacated the portion of the district court order in Hoehn granting summary judgment on fair use. View "Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Clevo appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hecny. Clevo, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of computer parts and accessories, and Amazon, a Brazilian entity, agreed that Clevo would manufacture and sell, and Amazon would buy, millions of dollars' worth of Clevo computer parts. Under Clevo and Amazon's negotiated terms, the Hecny Group was designated to handle all of the contract shipments. More than a year after the initial misdelivery to Amazon, Clevo sued numerous Hecny Group entities for the unpaid remainder of the goods' purchase price. The court concluded that the Guarantee was initially effective to place Clevo and Hecny Transportation in direct contractual privity, without any contractually-created statute of limitations. But that initial relationship was modified when the Bills of Lading issued. By operation of the Himalaya Clause, the benefit of the one-year statue of limitations in the Bills of Lading extended beyond Hecny Shipping to Hecny Transportation as well. Because Hecny Transportation had asserted that provision in defense to suit, Clevo's claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Alaska Rent-A-Car sued Avis claiming that Avis had breached a settlement agreement causing Alaska business to be switched to Budget Rent-A-Car, its local competitor. The district court granted a partial summary judgment, establishing that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement, and that Avis had breached the agreement by using the same personnel to sell and market both Avis and Budget cars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alaska Rent-A-Car for $16 million and Avis appealed. The court held that the district court was correct in ruling that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement by virtue of its sufficiently timely joinder. The court rejected Avis's peremptory challenge claim under Batson v. Kentucky. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to listen to Alaska Rent-A-Car's expert as well as Avis's. The evidence sufficed to establish reasonable certainty for the damages awarded. The district court did not err by applying Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 to the attorney's fee award. The parties agreed that the amount of prejudgment interest was awarded in error, double counting, and that the judgment should be reduced. View "Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Prius owners, brought a putative class action suit against Toyota, alleging that they experienced defects in their anti-lock brake systems (ABS), resulting in increased stopping distances. On appeal, Toyota sought review of the district court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Toyota could not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. The district court had the authority to decide whether Toyota, a nonsignatory to the Purchase Agreement, could compel arbitration. The court discerned no reason that plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kramer, et al v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law